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2Abstract
My thesis revolves around three axes: the Foucauldian critical-historical method, its
relationship with enlightenment critique and the way this critique is implemented in
Foucault’s seminal work, History of Madness. Foucault’s exploration of the origins of
psychiatry applieshis owntheories of power, truth and reason anddraws on Kant’s
philosophy,shedding new light on the way we perceive the birth and development of
psychiatric practice. Following Foucault’s adoption of ‘limit attitude’, which
investigates the limits of our thinking as points of disruption and renewal of
established frames of reference, the thesis aims to dispel the widely accepted belief
that psychiatry represents the triumph of rationalism by somehow conquering
madness and turning it into an object of neutral, scientific perception. A history of
limits examinesthe birth of psychiatry in its full complexity: in the late eighteenth
century, doctors were not simply rationalists but also alienists, philosophers of
finitude who recognized madness as an experience at the limits of reason, introducing
a discourse which conditioned the formation of psychiatry as a type of medical
activity. Since that event, the same type of recognition, the same anthropological
confrontation with madness has persisted beneath the calm development of
psychiatric rationality, undermining the supposed linearity, absolute authority and
steady progress of psychiatric positivism. Foucault’s critique foregrounds this
anthropological problematic as indispensable for psychiatry, encouraging psychiatrists
to become aware of the epistemological limitations of their practice, and also to
review the ethical and political issues which madness introduces into the apparent
neutrality of current psychiatric discourse.
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4Introduction
Michel Foucault’s work has been widely represented as a challenge to the
Enlightenment. The Enlightenment is generally characterized as a philosophical
movement that places faith in rationality and progress. Foucault by contrast is
regarded as a postmodern, anti-Enlightenment theorist whose lifelong preoccupation
with power, knowledge and discourse is viewed as antithetical to reason and truth.1
Foucault’s seminal work, History of Madness, is considered to be a product of his
anti-Enlightenment position, rendering him one of the main figures of anti-psychiatry.
His views are widely accepted as an attack on the Enlightenment concern with reason,
which supposedly produced the science of psychiatry by silencing what it considered
as unreason. According to that commonly held assumption, Foucault undermines the
oppressive character of reason and proposes a historical narrative based on power,
knowledge and exclusion which refutes the Enlightenment project and questions the
whole scientific edifice of modern psychiatry which still prevails in the west.
The present study offers a critique of this reading of Foucault, demonstrating
how his theoretical approach does not oppose either the Enlightenment or psychiatry
tout court but rather strives to foreground their susceptibility to renewal and
transformation. Considering his work on Kantian critique and his historical
methodology, we shall demonstrate that Foucault conceives the Enlightenment not as
a teleological process of reaching scientific objectivity but as a critical attitude to the
present moment as difference. 2 The History of Madness adheres to this Kantian
understanding of the Enlightenment, offering a critique of the evolution of western
psychiatry, tracing the ruptures and discontinuities that challenge the smooth and
linear appearance of the progression of psychiatric knowledge. Our reading of that
5text shows how Foucault’s work does not oppose psychiatry, but unsettles its
foundations, exposing its potential for being refounded on new terms.
Our analysis will not be restricted to an overview of the History of Madness
based on Foucault’s later essays on Kant and the Enlightenment. The existing French
and Anglo-saxon literature on these topics is already abundant. The studies of Barry
Smart, Frederic Gros, Thomas Osborne and Claire O’ Farrell have offered a
reevaluation of Foucault’s relationship with Kant and the Enlightenment, dispelling
previous categorizations of Foucault as an anti-Enlightenment, ‘postmodern’
relativist.3 Similarly, Todd May, Gary Gutting, Colin Gordon, Robert Castel and
Nikolas Rose have reexamined the History of Madness, foregrounding its
groundbreaking critical-historical method against the criticisms made by those
historians and psychiatrists who attacked the book for its supposed lack of accuracy
and its seemingly anti-psychiatric spirit.4 The influence of these seminal works on the
debate on the Enlightenment, the theoretical implications of psychiatry and the
domain of Foucault studies, has been immense. The aim of the present study, however,
will not be to synthesize them, but to explore the possibility of using these works as
background knowledge for a critical analysis of actual clinical topics. Thus, inspired
by these valuable theoretical sources but also going beyond them, our study will focus
less on the History of Madness itself and more on the whole spectrum of clinical
reflections which Foucault himself conducted from his early analyses on Kantian
anthropology and the critique of phenomenology prior to the History of Madness, to
his sophisticated analyses of psychiatric topics as they appear in his recently
published lectures, Psychiatric Power and Abnormal. These reflections complement
the History of Madness and clarify earlier, unrefined themes of Foucault’s critical
thinking. In fact, it will be these reflections, along Foucault’s reassessment of his own
6oeuvre in his later interviews and articles that will serve as a lens through which
Foucault’s entire body of work will be reappraised, foregrounding a continuity
between his earlier reflections on the birth of psychiatry, his general historical outlook
and his detailed clinical observations. This continuity, however, will not constitute an
artificial homogenization of Foucault’s thinking, which is known for its inner tensions,
its discontinuities and breaks; it will underscore Foucault’s critical attitude as his ‘one
great thought’;5 it will show how Foucault’s anthropological exploration of rational
forms subsists beneath the apparent contradictions of his work, connecting his diverse
and multiple levels of analysis into a coherent critical approach both to the
Enlightenment and to psychiatry.
While insisting on the uniformity of Foucault’s thinking, however, we shall not
attempt to present a general rational theory which will supposedly ‘enlighten’
psychiatrists. Neither shall we aim to provide a sociological analysis of psychiatric
knowledge, to suggest more rational ways of exercising psychiatric power or to
introduce therapeutic alternatives for clinicians.6 On the contrary, we shall illustrate
that what psychiatrists have inherited from the Enlightenment is not the capacity to
increase their rationality, but the possibility of its critique. The Enlightenment is not
an emancipatory project promising the liberation of the psychiatric subject who
asserts her rationality. On the contrary, it is a form of critical thought freeing the
psychiatrist from the constraining effects which the excess of this rationality produces.
The effect of Enlightenment critique is not to expand, refine or refute the domain of
psychiatric knowledge, but to ‘question the limits and powers it has abused’7 and to
trace the weak points where the foundation of psychiatric rationality can appear most
vulnerable to being overturned. This is not to imply an irrationalist method of
approach but, on the contrary, a sceptical stance where psychiatric rationality
7questions its own sovereignty and its claims to universality. It is a mode of
examination of ‘a reason whose autonomy of structures carries with itself the history
of dogmatisms and despotisms — a reason which, consequently, has the effect of
emancipation only on the condition that it succeeds in freeing itself of itself.’8 As we
shall emphasize throughout this study, it was the critical engagement of reason with
itself which brought psychiatry as a discipline into existence, and it is the same
conflict, the same battle which fuels current debates in psychiatry, bringing
psychiatric rationality to its limit. It is this reflection on the limits of psychiatric
rationality, this limit-attitude, which will guide our discussion and analysis of
Foucault’s consistent involvement with all the major issues preoccupying psychiatry
today ─ anthropology, phenomenology, epistemology, anti-psychiatry, simulation and
psychoanalysis. Enlightenment critique, we shall argue, can place the mental health
worker in a position to challenge not only the psychiatric institution but more
generally the rational framework of the society in which she functions. Through the
critical attitude, the psychiatrist can become a diagnostician, not only of her patients’
pathology, but also of her present reality inside and beyond the psychiatric institution.
Chapter 1 outlines Foucault’s critical approach. Foucault dismisses from
the outset the supposed centrality of reason in the rejection of tradition, authority and
prejudice that the Enlightenment allegedly advanced. He rather considers the
Enlightenment as an investigation of the nature of reason, its function and its
boundaries. Foucault shows how reason has both a technical and a reflective side, it
constitutes both the foundation of knowledge and its limit, both the principle of the
empirical investigation of man and the border of human cognition. Kant had already
demonstrated this basic duality, this fundamental bifurcation of reason to which
philosophy as critique must be attentive. Foucault, however, does not consider this
8bifurcation as timeless and universal, belonging to a transcendental consciousness, as
phenomenology and the Frankfurt School would have it.9 He adds another dimension
to reason: history. There are specific historical moments when reason bifurcates and
engages in a conflict with itself, generating breaks, ruptures and discontinuities. Such
a rupture occurred in the late eighteenth century, when an internal splitting of reason
gave birth to the sciences of man. Critique locates precisely this split, this conflictual
relationship between reason’s foundational and critical role which constituted the
founding instance of psychiatry in the late eighteenth century.
Foucault therefore dismantles the misleading association of the birth of
psychiatry with the supposed sovereignty of scientific rationality and the dawn of the
Enlightenment. It was not because rationality reached a certain level of maturity that
psychiatry was able to constitute itself as an institution and an organized body of
knowledge. Late eighteenth century rationality was not more advanced or more
progressive than others. Like all forms of rationality in the west, it formed the
framework for the exercise of power, the management of individuals and the
production of knowledge. What was unique in its application was that it established a
norm. As a particular way of governing individuals and administering justice on the
basis of rationality rather than the monarch, the territory or the state, it sought ways of
establishing rational definitions of normality. At that point an important bifurcation
took place: medicine was called upon to provide rational knowledge that would
legitimize scientifically the norm, the rationally acceptable modes of government
connected to it, and the correct application of the laws to which this norm was bound.
This knowledge, however, could only be produced with reference to those who
escaped the norm, and whose irrationality had to be spotted, isolated and excluded, in
order to be restored to normality. Breaking with all previous rational knowledge
9concerning the mentally disordered, the doctors of the time focused on the limits of
cognition to account for what it was in those individuals that was totally foreign and
inassimilable to reason. Those specialists were now called alienists and their medical
undertaking was not only rational but also reasonable, it was an endeavour which was
quasi-scientific and quasi-philosophical, consistent with Kantian anthropology and the
postulate of the gap between the domain of reason and its limits, between the
empirical determinations of man and his finitude. Proto-psychiatry was therefore a
discourse of otherness which did not yet constitute a medical specialism, but
resembled medicine only by analogy, which is why it survived only until the middle
of the nineteenth century. It was from that historical point that a new form of
rationality sought to insert a strictly medical methodology into this conceptual
enterprise so as to achieve continuity and isomorphism with medical practice.
Alienism gave way to psychiatry as we know it today, positivism prevailed and
insanity was replaced by mental illness. The anthropological dilemma between reason
and madness was replaced by a spectrum of diseases; phenomenology, psychology
and biology offered an objective and aetiological grip on nosological entities
previously regarded as philosophical concepts under alienism. Foucault’s critique
amounts to locating those occasions in the history of psychiatry where the
anthropological problematic returns, not because of some metaphysical necessity, but
because there is an indispensable core of alienism in the heart of psychiatric practice,
an ineluctable opposition between madness and reason which surfaces at the weak
points of the all-encompassing rationality of psychiatric positivism bringing about
radical transformations and reversals.
In chapter 2 we move on to a deeper discussion of Foucault’s critical approach,
starting with its relationship with phenomenology, which, apart from being Foucault’s
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initial source of inspiration, constitutes the theoretical basis of modern psychiatry. As
Foucault had demonstrated in his studies on Binswager and the phenomenologists
prior to the History of Madness, phenomenology offers a rigorous description of lived
experience, seeking to grasp its inherent meaning. It considers, however, this meaning
as timeless and universal, reducible to a transcendental subject. Foucault on the other
hand, looks for the construction of meaning through collective practices which
generate a shared experience of rationality. This collective rational framework defines
as irrational anything which falls outside its grasp, anything that is foreign to it. In
order for this division to take place, in order for an irrational experience to be
organized as a field of collective rational perception and an object of medical
knowledge, and in order for this knowledge to be systematized and institutionalized, a
regime of truth is required. This regime of truth is psychiatric diagnosis; psychiatric
diagnosis organizes the political, juridical and administrative criteria for the selection
and isolation of subjects as mad. Diagnosis demarcates the limits of meaning, it
decides which experiences belong to the realm of the nonsensical and must be
sequestered involuntarily or judged legally irresponsible. Truth is not inherent to
human perception, as phenomenology claims, and diagnosis is not a system of
classifying forms of lived experience susceptible to understanding. For Foucault,
diagnostic truth is a discursive practice which first and foremost distinguishes those
types of lived experience which can be recognized as rational by a specific form of
medical perception, and those limit experiences which elude its grasp. Psychiatry was
therefore born on the basis of a dual diagnosis of both reason and insanity, an
arbitrary but nonetheless real division which made possible the organization of all
subsequent psychopathology of lived experience.
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The primacy of diagnostic truth over lived experience underlines the central
importance of epistemology in Foucault’s critique. In chapter 3 we focus on
Foucault’s approach to epistemology which is sceptical, to the extent that he does not
consider the psychiatrist as a scientifically neutral subject, a phenomenologist
performing strictly descriptive medical acts. His scepticism does not imply that the
psychiatrist lacks validity but that the very act of diagnosing between reason and
madness has deep political and ethical effects. Diagnosis is a political intervention; it
is not merely a way of classifying diseases, but a scientific response to the political
concerns of the society in which the psychiatrist lives, and which entitle her to
legitimate administrative policies and judicial decisions with reference to madness.
Diagnosis is also an ethical act. It is a truth regime which permits whole bodies of
medical knowledge to define normality, setting up ways of constructing pedagogy,
morality and ethics on the basis of the division normality/abnormality. Foucault,
however, is not an anti-psychiatrist, portraying the psychiatrist as an oppressive figure
using her knowledge as a mask for her coercive role as a political and normalizing
authority. On the contrary, Enlightenment epistemology shows that if the influence of
the psychiatrist is profoundly political and ethical, then her decisions can have
subversive rather than oppressive effects. In today’s biological and normalizing
psychiatric practice which denies otherness and strives to insert strict objectivity into
psychiatric discourse, there are occasions when diagnosing madness disrupts the
positivist grip, thereby raising political issues for magistrates, drawing new diagnostic
divisions for psychiatrists and suggesting alternative ways of conceiving normality.
This is most evident in events in the history of psychiatry such as the dangerous
individual of forensic psychiatry and the phenomenon of hysteria of the late
nineteenth century, which we examine in chapters 4 and 5.
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In chapter 4 our analysis becomes more ‘clinical’, to illustrate more clearly
Foucault’s approach as we have described it so far. Using his reflections in his
lectures at the Collège de France, we attempt to offer an interpretation of actual
clinical practice through the prism of theoretical concepts which Foucault himself
masterfully combined with his penetrating clinical insight. Thus, drawing mostly on
his lectures entitled Abnormal, in this chapter we focus on the political implications of
psychiatric diagnosis, stressing the clear distinction and opposition between critical
psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. Anti-psychiatry considers the division of sanity and
madness as a given fact, arguing that psychiatry is essentially a political force which
labels, misdiagnoses and forcibly deprives the mad of their freedom by incarcerating
them and imposing arbitrary models of normality on them. Foucault follows the
opposite line of reasoning: it was the involvement of psychiatry in political and
juridical disputes which gave birth to the category ‘madness.’ The mad as abnormal
individuals endowed with rights emerged as a result of psychiatric diagnosis which, in
the years of alienism, had not identified the insane as a political category or a
subspecies of criminality punishable by forced hospitalization. On the contrary, proto-
psychiatric diagnosis had carefully selected the mad and isolated them so as to avoid
the confusion between delinquency and insanity, punishment and treatment. It was
later, in the late nineteenth century, and more extensively in the twentieth, that the
mad were inserted, under a security orientated form of rationality, into the dubious
clinical category of ‘dangerousness’, causing psychiatric diagnosis to lose its rigour
and become an instrument of punitive power. While anti-psychiatry overlooks this
historical transformation attributing the blurring between crime and illness to the
pseudo-scientific status of psychiatry, Foucault judges this development as the
regressive effect of a new political situation rather than an intrinsic defect of
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psychiatric knowledge. He does, however, see in this regression strong potential for
renewal, insofar as the weakened epistemological position of the psychiatrist in the
face of the danger of madness becomes a blind spot for political power. The
monstrosity of madness is a singularity beyond the reach of our current security
orientated rationality. The human monster resists medicalization, it defies ideological
categories and is irreducible to unified and totalizing discourses of rights or liberation.
Monstrosity poses a challenge to the psychiatric institution, to the courts and to the
field of social work, where experts confront the fear that it provokes, the danger that it
generates, and the political and social questions that it raises.
In chapter 5 our analysis shifts to the epistemological problematic of
psychiatric discourse and its implications for the construction of a new ethics of truth.
Psychiatric knowledge since the nineteenth century has sought to dispense with the
duality of diagnosis, the basic dilemma madness/non-madness. In order to establish an
objective model of normality and the recognition of the abnormal as mentally ill, it
has adopted a model of truth based on a continuum between sameness and otherness,
a limitless field of differentiation of diseases where every illness is made intelligible
according to a common unit of measurement. Central to this effort is the
medicalization of the elusive body of the insane through the discourse of pathological
anatomy and neurology. Biology, neurology and instinct have formed the positivism
of psychiatry, the model whereby psychiatric power penetrates the body of the insane,
controls and categorises it in order to define it objectively as abnormal. This effort,
however, confronts dead ends and contradictions. Here Foucault foregrounds
simulation as the greatest epistemological obstacle impeding the linear progressive
march of psychiatric positivism toward absolute objectivity. Simulation, the
phenomenon of malingering which confuses the distinction between authentic and
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inauthentic illness, is a fundamental difficulty which psychiatric knowledge has not
been able to overcome, despite its efforts to eliminate it through elaborate etiological
theories and statistical measurements which aspire to uncover illness in its bodily
depth. Contrary to the anti-psychiatrists for whom simulation is proof that psychiatry
is methodologically inadequate to reach an acceptable level of medical sophistication,
for Foucault simulation is a critical phenomenon reintroducing the duality of
diagnosis which positivist psychiatry tries to obfuscate. In his lectures, Psychiatric
Power, Foucault studies simulation closely, and analyses hysteria as a special case of
counterfeit illness which introduced alienism for the first time into the heart of
psychiatric positivism. Hysteria appeared in the nineteenth century as a limit case
which inserted itself neatly into the truth regime of neurology, affirming it
diagnostically but with no recognizable anatomical localization. Charcot successfully
used hysteria as an argument against simulation, he could not however assign it to a
pathological seat and was obliged to demonstrate its presence through hypnosis and
the dramatic presentation of its symptomatology. Through conformity and
suggestibility, the hysterics turned Charcot into an alienist who abandoned his
demonstrative neurological model and staged diagnostic truth in a theatrical and
ritualistic way. The hysterics were no longer recognized as mad subjects and were
discharged from the asylum as patients with real neurological disorders caused by
psychological factors. They stood at the limits between the normal and the
pathological, between sanity and madness, bodily ascription and psychological
attribution. The hysterics marked a new era for psychiatry, the turning point after
which psychiatric truth would have to reconsider its standards for the definition of
normality, and the functioning of its institutions. After hysteria, neurology lost its
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authority, madness was problematized again and Freudian psychoanalysis came on to
the scene.
In the sixth and final chapter, we deal with Foucault’s relationship with
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, Foucault shows, is part of the legacy of the
Enlightenment to the extent that is in itself a form of alienism. From his early writings
Foucault had already identified psychoanalysis as a counter-science insofar as it posits
human finitude as the point of reference for any subsequent research. The Freudian
unconscious — and the Lacanian Real — thematize the irrational part of the psyche as
the starting point and limit of the diagnostic process. The demonstrative power of the
psychiatrist, psychoanalysis argues, always stumbles against man’s negativity — his
internal madness. In psychoanalysis, therefore, there is a critical split which is an
inherent part of its diagnostic truth. This split, however, although thoroughly Kantian
and anthropological, lacks historical perspective. For Foucault diagnostic splits do not
come about spontaneously. They constitute critical moments in history resulting from
the dynamic interaction, strategic opposition and conflict between those involved in
the production of diagnostic truth ─ doctors, magistrates, patients. This was the case,
as we show in chapters 4 and 5, with the forensic expert who tackles monsters instead
of mentally ill subjects, and with Charcot who confronted the madness of the hysterics
from within his objective neurological method. Psychoanalysis on the other hand,
tries to reconcile and de-historicize this opposition, and submit it to the specific
doctor-patient relationship. The figure of the analyst artificially produces the
diagnostic rupture not in order to test and question madness, but to provoke its
irruption in the form of crisis. This crisis is controlled and sustained by the authority
of the doctor and can never trap her power, overturn it or question it. For Foucault,
however, a crisis is a singular, subversive event, which puts the psychiatric institution
16
in check, otherwise it simply renews psychiatric rationality. This is why for Foucault
psychoanalysis can have a critical value only if it is detached from its power effects as
an institutionalized knowledge. As a challenge to the reality of the psychiatric
institution and the power of the psychiatrist, and not as an authoritative power,
psychoanalysis can inspire local struggles, stimulate crisis and debate and reveal
contemporary forms of alienism as evental sites of Enlightenment critique.
Thus the notion of alienism is a central idea of the present thesis. It
encapsulates the common ground of psychiatric practice and Enlightenment critique
and their shared field of application. Asserting the presence of alienism inside
psychiatric discourse, however, does not amount to a nostalgic return to the
supposedly ‘enlightened’ days of proto-psychiatry of the late eighteenth century. It
does not suggest that psychiatry was closer to its truth and its essence at the moment
of its birth. As Foucault would put it, ‘only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the
distant ideality of the origin.’ 10 Historical analysis shows — and this will be a
constant theme throughout our study — that as a discourse of limits, and therefore as
a form of diagnostic truth consistent with the spirit of the Enlightenment, alienism
does not refer to a project or a specific historical epoch, but to a scientific but also
historico-philosophical reflection on the limits of psychiatric knowledge. Alienism is
not an epistemological endeavour laying down methodological guidelines or
invalidating the objective value of psychiatric truth, but a theory and practice taking
into account the logical limitations which reason itself imposes on psychiatric
knowledge. This is why alienism is not one scientific method among others, but a
singular medical practice containing its own critique. It brings back today the question
of the essential correlation between medical, historical and philosophical truth, at a
time when scientific positivism proclaims their strict separation and
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incommensurability. This fundamental correlation, marginalized by the dominant
forms of western medical rationality, had been problematized not only by the
philosophers and the proto-psychiatrists of the late eighteenth century, but also by
their precursors of ancient Greek medicine who, from Plato and Hippocrates to the
Stoics and Plutarch, had postulated the close kinship between medicine and
philosophy as parts of a single region (mia khōra) where reason, logos, creates both
the possibility for the exacting method of scientific observation and the conditions of
its impossibility.11
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?
The Enlightenment is a diverse and complex phenomenon. Its historical origins
are difficult to locate, and there is no general consensus on how to determine its goals
and objectives.1 It is for these reasons that the question of the Enlightenment has
stirred so much controversy among thinkers. Broadly associated with an intellectual
movement that took place around the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment has been
considered as defying tradition, authority and religion, on the basis of rational inquiry
and autonomy. Rationality is viewed as central to the efforts of the Enlightenment
thinkers to free humanity from myth and superstition. But the importance that
rationality has come to occupy in this movement, has divided its critics. Many
scholars have celebrated the emergence of the Enlightenment’s faith in rationality and
progress which has given rise to the scientific study of man, to the primacy of the
subject, and to a humanist discourse. Others mistrust the Enlightenment, maintaining
that its adherence to reason has generated irrational practices which have resulted in
abuses of power and totalitarian regimes.2
Owing to these diverse and opposing attitudes, Foucault’s own involvement with
the Enlightenment has been subject to conflicting interpretations. His work is still the
object of an ongoing debate about the position he occupies in relation to the
Enlightenment. One trend of thought regards Foucault, along with thinkers such as
Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty, as a postmodern thinker.3 Postmodernism is in many
ways considered as a counter-movement to the Enlightenment. Whereas the
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Enlightenment thinkers are generally regarded as proponents of rationality, objective
truth and science whose telos, or end, is to liberate mankind from prejudice through
the acquisition of ever-more precise knowledge, postmodernism is sceptical of
objectivity and truth, thereby distrusting metanarratives which claim conceptual
mastery of the world.4 Foucault, in particular, has been viewed as a postmodern
thinker of power and knowledge, whose discourse seeks to undermine the foundations
of truth and reason by showing how those foundations are never neutral, being always
produced by the power relations of a given historical and cultural context. For these
reasons Foucault’s insistence on the permanence of power and irrationalism is
regarded as being fundamentally in conflict with the unremitting belief in objectivity
associated with the view of the Enlightenment among certain strands of postmodern
thought.5 Other critics adopt the opposite attitude towards Foucault’s enterprise, but
reach a very similar conclusion that his work on the Enlightenment marks a
discontinuity in his overall body of thought. Drawing on his late essays on Kant, they
argue that Foucault actually defended the Enlightenment only when a rupture had
taken place with his earlier ‘postmodernism.’6
Our present study offers an alternative to these interpretations that will shed new
light on Foucault’s relationship with the Enlightenment and the critical-historical
aspect of his work. We shall show how Foucault is neither an anti-Enlightenment
thinker who rejects reason and truth, nor a defender of the Enlightenment who had
come to abandon his earlier preoccupation with the interpenetration of power and
knowledge. His project rests precisely on the idea that there is no necessary ‘for’ or
‘against’ the Enlightenment. Foucault’s relationship with the Enlightenment engages
at length with the question: ‘What is this Reason that we use?’7 Seeking to explore the
roots and the historical development of this question, Foucault sets out to interrogate
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the nature of reason, its possible applications and its limits. We shall argue that for
Foucault reason has a history which manifests itself in forms of rationality which
constitute the foundation of knowledge and the search for truth. These forms of
rationality evolve through time and therefore cannot characterize a specific historical
period. For this reason, the notion of the triumph of rationality is a simplistic view of
the Enlightenment. For Foucault, the age of the Enlightenment begins when forms of
rationality are subjected to a critical reflection on their limits, when reason itself
questions the rational foundations of what is accepted as reason. The Enlightenment is
marked by this tense interaction between rationality and reason and can never reach
an endpoint. It is an incomplete and open ended process, representing a critical
attitude to the present moment rather than being confined to a particular historical
epoch.8
Foucault uses Kant to explore the critical aspect of the Enlightenment, focusing
on the reflective powers of reason on the limits of what is known. Foucault draws, in
many respects, on Kant’s philosophy, to dismantle the notion of the Enlightenment as
a rationalized project of science, ethics and politics. His aim is to open up a field of
research that investigates the ways through which reason examines the limits of what
is taken as given and true, as well as the effects that this examination produces on the
way people think, act and experience reality. We shall argue that the exploration of
Kant and the critical dimension of the Enlightenment is not a late preoccupation for
Foucault, but a domain of research already evident in his early writings which
informed his entire body of work. While he distances himself from certain aspects of
Kant’s thought, Foucault views Kant’s critical philosophy as central for developing
his own understanding of the Enlightenment, naming his project a Critical History of
Thought.9 Kant’s method of questioning the pretensions of rationality, and reflecting
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on the limits of who we are through reason, inspired Foucault to analyse the birth of
the human sciences, and especially of psychiatry, which will constitute the main focus
of our study. In this chapter we shall provide an outline of his critical-historical
endeavour, highlighting the mutually supportive and subversive interaction of
rationality and reason which will be crucial for interpreting how Foucault constructs
his History of Madness and his subsequent reflections on the domains and limits of
psychiatric discourse and practice. It is our contention that his study of madness can
be understood primarily as a study of the irreducible tension between reason and
rationality.
Rationality and Reason —The ‘Blackmail’ of the Enlightenment
From the outset, Foucault makes it clear that the exploration of the limits of
reason does not mean that reason is the enemy of critical thought. As he admits, ‘It is
not reason in general that I am fighting. I could not fight reason.’10 On the contrary,
for Foucault reason is a critical weapon against the excesses of rationalism. Maurice
Blanchot notes in an essay on Foucault, ‘Foucault is not calling into question reason
itself, but rather the danger of certain rationalities or rationalizations.’11 Thus the
crucial distinction on which Foucault’s enterprise rests is that between reason and
forms of rationality:
I don’t at all identify reason with the totality of the forms of rationality. The latter
could until recently dominate in the types of knowledge, the forms of technology, and
the modalities of governance. The application of rationality occurs primarily in these
areas […] For me no given form of rationality is reason.12
This distinction is extremely difficult but crucial to elucidate. Forms of rationality are
not opposed to reason but, on the contrary, they stem from a basic ‘trust in reason’, as
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Nietzsche would say.13 They are forms of conduct and a structuring of reality based
on reason as a principle of knowledge and action. Forms of rationality constitute the
implementation of reason in everyday affairs. They are reason applied. They
correspond to Kant’s description of the private use of reason in a community, when
rules need to be followed, and practical ends to be pursued. It appears when man, as a
‘cog in a machine’, as Kant says, subjects reason ‘to the particular ends in view.’14 By
necessity, a form of rationality cannot be free in its use since it is placed at the service
of the specific role the individual has to play in a society as a worker, a scientist, a
soldier or a taxpayer. By contrast, reason has no practical, but only reflective
applicability; its role is to work at the limits of thought. Reasoning as a reasonable
being, as a member of a reasonable community and not as a cog in a machine, is a
purely critical operation, which is free in its public use in the spirit of the
enlightenment. Kant accepts the necessity of a development of certain modes of
rationality to be applied to social affairs, but the core of enlightened thought consists
of being capable of critiquing these affairs in an open and public manner. The mode
of rationality structures reality by assuming the status of a universal and global way of
thinking; reason, by contrast, reflects critically on the values that permeate it, the
principles that govern it, and the historical conditions from which it arose.
The distinction between forms of rationality and reason should not create the
illusion that their opposition is as clear-cut as it may seem. It should not generate the
naïve optimism that critiquing the contingency of rationality in the name of pure
reason as a higher tribunal will settle the question of the enlightenment once and for
all. Rationality and reason constitute two simultaneous operations (practical and
critical) of the same faculty (reason), and therefore their mutual exchange and
interdependence needs to be taken into account before we begin analysing their
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critical interaction: ‘if critical thought itself has a function — and, even more
specifically, if philosophy has a function within critical thought — it is precisely to
accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its
necessity, to its indispensability, and at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers.’15
Rationality is reason as principle of knowledge, necessary for grasping and
manipulating reality, which does not cover the entire field of human experience, and
when it attempts to extend its powers to domains beyond its limits, it undermines
itself by falling into arbitrariness and irrationality. The courage to recognize these
limits and the rigour to demarcate them belong to the reflective properties of reason
itself. This is reason’s critical operation. Kant’s ‘pure reason’ functions as a border of
knowledge, and not as its foundation. Its ‘purity’, however, does not imply that it can
be discovered or recovered in its raw state insofar as it can only function as a horizon
of rationality, as a limit to its ‘impurities,’ abuses and irrationalities, not as an essence
or a higher ideal to be achieved. Even if ‘pure reason’ could be isolated and rescued,
adhering to it would amount to turning it into a practical guide and a principle of
action, a new form of rationality. This is precisely the danger of seeking to identify
the Enlightenment with the resuscitation of reason. In fact, Foucault warns, any
misunderstanding concerning the Enlightenment is a result of this attempt to return to
reason and transform it into a supposedly more progressive form of rationality,
creating the misconception that the Enlightenment is a movement based on forms of
rationality which one must either accept or reject. This misconception is most clearly
evidenced in what Foucault terms the ‘blackmail’ of the Enlightenment.16 Being ‘for’
or ‘against’ the Enlightenment presupposes that we either accept or reject the tradition
of rationalism which the Enlightenment supposedly represents. It implies either that a
trust is placed in reason as a guiding principle in the search for knowledge and a
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source of liberation from externally imposed authorities, or that one should be
suspicious of reason, whilst ignoring the fact that there is always a form of rationality
accounting for this suspicion. Therefore this dilemma is illusory since in both cases
one does not escape the sphere of rationality. As long as the question of the
enlightenment is trapped in this dilemma, it is doomed to undermine itself constantly
by reproducing its aporias and paradoxes. For Foucault, on the other hand, the
enlightenment is not an obligation to restore its supposed ‘essential kernel of
rationality’, but an act of courage and a political problem of determining the
‘contemporary limits of the necessary’, through the critical interplay between
rationality and reason.17 The enlightenment is not a rational project but a ‘limit-
attitude’18 of reason that analyses and reflects upon the limits of rationality; it is the
critical work of reason reflecting on the boundaries of our knowledge, on what is
accepted as rational, true and real.
Foucault’s Enlightenment and Kant’s Epistemology
For Kant, the dynamic interaction between rationality and reason is first and
foremost an epistemological problem, a philosophical question pertaining to the
faculties of human cognition and the necessary limitations of knowledge. It is
therefore from Kant’s abiding preoccupation with human finitude and the possibility
of its transparency to knowledge that our analysis must begin. Foucault had shared
this preoccupation and already from the early stages of his work he had set out to
implement it to the study of concrete practices and institutions. Closely reading
Kant’s texts, Foucault investigated the question of critique and its essential connection
to the limits of rationality. With the help of the Kantian Critiques, he demonstrated
26
how the fundamental tension between rationality and reason became an area of
philosophical concern since Kant, and how it has informed psychiatric practice and
theory from the late eighteenth century to the present.
Kant’s basic motto, his instruction to those who seek to put their reason to work
is: ‘Aude sapere: have the courage, the audacity, to know.’19 This instruction does not
mean the courage to use knowledge against prejudice and superstition. It does not
imply the liberation of man through more precise and accurate application of
scientific learning which will lead humanity to a more mature state of self-realization.
It means questioning knowledge to assess to what extent something can be known and
to what extent reason can function as a source of knowledge, without transgressing its
limits; limits which can only be located by reason itself. This is why Kant’s critique
should not be seen as a manifesto of the enlightenment. It neither describes a unique
moment in history nor prescribes a utopian state of affairs based on reason and
progress. Kant’s work is viewed by Foucault as a reflection on the limits of thought,
constituting ‘the handbook of reason as it has grown up in the Enlightenment,’
rendering the Enlightenment ‘the age of critique.’20 Accepting the challenge to
criticize rationality and its dangers requires an idea of our knowledge and its limits,
and an act of courage to make these limits manifest.21 Reason does not only produce
knowledge but also delineates its boundaries which, when transgressed, generate
dogmatism and illusions. Thus, the critical process of the enlightenment does not
amount to expanding or perfecting knowledge, but to ‘know knowledge.’22
In the field of cognition, reason has no end other than itself. In fact Foucault
points out that reasoning, as Kant applies the term, räsonieren, is to reason for
reasoning’s sake.23 Reason’s function is theoretical, speculative and regulatory,
ensuring the correct application of concepts and establishing the limits of possible
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experience. Reason’s sole object is the understanding (Verstand) and its legitimate
use, not objects in the external world. It is responsible for the transcendental
conditions of possibility for knowledge, not for its actual contents. Knowledge is
governed by the understanding which is applied through a set of conditions set forth
by reason, which is itself unconditioned. Cognition is obliged to turn to the a priori
postulates of reason in order to seek the foundations of what will count as an object of
representation. But reason, which has endowed the understanding with the principles
of representation, is not itself responsible for representing. It only safeguards the
correct application of comprehension. As Kant points out: ‘all the concepts, nay, all
the questions which pure reason presents to us, have their source not in experience,
but exclusively in reason itself […] since reason is the sole begetter of these ideas, it
is under obligation to give an account of their validity or of their illusory dialectical
nature.’24 Reason is transformed into a form of rationality when it ceases to be
regulatory and becomes a principle of knowledge, when it abandons its transcendental
domain in order to become empirical.25 Reason has no end other than itself; therefore,
when it is forced to pursue ends foreign to reflection and speculation, it necessarily
generates illusions. Reason is sacrificed the moment it is turned into a principle. This
is how rationality is born.
Reason carries out its critical enterprise when it questions its own elevation to
the status of a principle of knowledge. Reason does not legislate. It ‘purges’ itself of
any teleology and assumes its position at the limits of knowledge. In its critical role,
therefore, it does not provide the ‘wealth’ of the source of knowledge, but the ‘rigour’
of its limit.26 Contrary to the commonly held assumptions which identify the
Enlightenment with the assertion of rationality as a principle of action and the wealth
of cognition and knowledge, supposedly endowing the subject with the autonomy and
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freedom to overcome dogmatism and external authority, Kant shows that it is
precisely the illegitimate status of sovereignty accorded to rationality which increases
our dependence on the authority of another and reinforces our state of tutelage.27 The
attitude of the Enlightenment begins when, by rigorously demarcating the limits of the
understanding, reason ensures its legitimate application, rendering the subject
autonomous precisely by abolishing the need to appeal to an external authority.
The Anthropology
After foregrounding the importance of the Critiques for the understanding of the
epistemological aspect of the Enlightenment, Foucault turned his attention to Kant’s
anthropology. The anthropology is an exemplary form of enlightenment critique,
opening up a field of research where man himself becomes both the object of rational
analysis and at the same time an area of perception whose limitations are submitted to
strict interrogation by reason. This is why on several occasions Foucault emphasizes
the fact that Kant’s anthropological project cannot be separated from the three
Critiques: ‘The Anthropology says nothing other than what is said in the Critique: we
need only glance through the 1798 text to see that it covers exactly the same ground
as the critical enterprise.’28 With his study of the Anthropology, Foucault inaugurated
his lifelong project of a historical exploration of the human sciences from the point of
view of enlightenment critique. It constituted his first systematic attempt to apply
Kant’s analytic of finitude to the concrete investigation of psychiatric theory and
practice as it appeared in the west during the period which has been named the
Enlightenment.
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In his Anthropology, Kant applies the three crucial questions of his Critiques
(what can I know? what must I do? and what can I hope for?) to the field of
experience, leading to a fourth question that will appear in his Logic; What is man?,
which supplements the critical enterprise and takes philosophical reflection ‘to
culminate in an interrogation of the questions themselves.’29 As Foucault shows, the
anthropology opened up for the first time in the west the possibility of a logical
reflection on the nature of the human mind. This is why it broke radically with all
previous abstract philosophical theories and empirical psychological approaches, and
has remained a singular method with respect to all subsequent modes of research in
the field of the human sciences up to the present. Anthropology does not constitute a
psychological, sociological or cultural project, but a type of empirical investigation of
man which considers and constantly refers itself to its epistemological limitations. It
shows how the efforts to offer an objective understanding of human nature are always
conditioned and limited by the finitude of man:
When I say ‘anthropology’ I am not referring to the particular science called
anthropology, which is the study of cultures exterior to our own; by ‘anthropology’ I
mean the strictly philosophical structure responsible for the fact that the problems of
philosophy are now lodged within the domain that can be called that of human
finitude.30
Kant’s problematic in the Anthropology, already in the spirit of his Critique, was
centered around the long standing tension between psychology and philosophy. He
was concerned with the growing replacement of the metaphysical discourse of
finitude by psychology and its positive theses on human nature. For Kant, the clear
and lucid methods of empirical psychology had come to fill the space occupied for
centuries by the obscure language of philosophy whose failure to reflect positively on
the nature of the soul had ‘given rise to the belief that the solutions to its irresolvable
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problems were hidden in psychological phenomena pertaining to an empirical study
of the soul.’31 However, Kant argues, this growing invasion of empirical psychology
into the domain of metaphysical reflection — to the point of complete substitution —
rested on a logical impasse, an aporia: empirical psychology attempted to describe the
nature of the soul and the rational laws that govern its functioning. It turned the
imagination and the understanding, the representations of consciousness and the
structure of perception into objects of empirical knowledge. It could not, however,
treat the nature of reason itself as a psychological phenomenon, insofar as it is reason
which, not only provides the very tools for psychological explanation, but also bars
access to whatever type of experience may lie beyond the domain of rationality. The
anthropology, then, is the language of logos, reason itself as the outer frontier of
empirical psychology designating its condition of impossibility, ‘that inaccessible
term that we are always approaching, but never actually go beyond.’32 This is why the
anthropology is the very limit of psychology. It studies consciousness in its negative
instances, and the faculties of the mind in their deviations. Instead of restoring the
laws of cohesion and harmony of the faculties, it foregrounds the moments when
these faculties come into conflict and contradiction. ‘Anthropology maintains the
division of the ‘faculties’— Vermögen — as in the Critique. However, its privileged
domain is not that where the faculties and powers show off their positive attributes but
where they show their failings — or at least where they face danger, where they risk
being obliterated.’33 The anthropology looks for the limit of the application of the
imagination and the understanding, the moments when these faculties transgress their
limits and ‘become other than themselves, illegitimate.’34 This was precisely the
method of the first psychiatrists of the late eighteenth century who actually inspired
Kant, as we shall see in the following chapter, to construct his anthropology. These
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proto-psychiatrists created psychiatry as a discipline by referring rational psychology
to its limits. In stark contrast to the medical treatises of the previous century, there
was only a minor contribution to psychological methodology during this period. There
was limited use of pathological anatomy as in the rest of medicine. These typical —
according to today’s standards — psychiatric practices were subordinated to the more
fundamental, basic practice of diagnosing and spotting madness as the disintegration
of the faculties, an experience at the limits of rationality, a domain beyond
comprehension. The proto-psychiatrists of this period were not psychologists
exploring the nature of perception and human cognition on the premise of the infinite
or of established truths borrowed from the natural sciences; they were alienists for
whom ‘the infinite (was) no longer given’, and for whom ‘there (was) no longer
anything but finitude.’35 Theirs was not a rational psychological project investigating
the soul, but a reasonable reflection on a radical alterity. It was their ‘tragic
confrontation with madness’ which broke with all previous psychology and medical
theories concerning mental disorder, demonstrating for the first time in western
history that ‘psychology can never tell the truth about madness because it is madness
that holds the truth of psychology.’36
The Perils of Anthropology
Anthropology is therefore a groundbreaking system which lies in the heart of the
Enlightenment and the roots of western psychiatry. It is not, however, identical with
Enlightenment critique. Although anthropology understands reason as offering a
barrier against the excesses of rational psychology, it can seek to sublate reason and
rationality or end up confusing them. While Kant, as we have shown, ingeniously
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demarcated the boundaries of knowledge in terms of its source, its domain and its
limit, his description does not exclude by definition the possibility of reason acting
simultaneously both as the source and the limit of knowledge, as practical reason
(rationality) and pure reason. It leaves open the possibility of a transition, a pendulum
between the a priori and the fundamental in a dialectical process where rationality
and reason exchange roles. Already in his Anthropology, Kant had hoped to reconcile
the two heterogeneous dimensions of the transcendental and the empirical, of the
realm of understanding and the limit of reason, which he had analysed in his Critique.
He had attempted to bridge the gap between these dimensions in his efforts to
construct a unified theory of the subject, causing western thought to slip into an
anthropological slumber equally dangerous to the psychological illusion.37 The human
sciences since the early nineteenth century have constantly attempted to fulfill this
ambition by producing ‘surreptitiously and in advance, the confusion of the empirical
and the transcendental, even though Kant had demonstrated the division between
them.’38 It is exactly this development which Foucault records in his History of
Madness. While psychiatry originally defined itself as a discipline on the basis of its
anthropological relation to the other, the exterior, foreign and excluded madman, its
theoretical edifice gradually regressed into psychologism and a discourse of sameness
and inclusion. In the middle of the nineteenth century the idea of madness was
inserted into positive medical knowledge, it was transformed into mental illness
through a system of psychological explanation and medical aetiology, and was
removed from its limit position and finitude of knowledge, to become an object of
empirical investigation. The truth of madness became transparent to medical
positivism, the mad lost their radical foreignness and the anthropological illusion
became dominant.
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We can now see why, in a single movement, characteristic of the thinking of our time,
all knowledge of man is presented as either dialectized from the start or fully
dialectizable — as always invested with a meaning which has to do with the return to
the origin, to the authentic, to the founding activity, to the reason why there is
meaning in the world. We can also see why all philosophy presents itself as capable of
communicating directly with the sciences of man or empirical studies of man without
having to take a detour through a critique, an epistemology, or a theory of
knowledge.39
In the History of Madness Foucault concludes with the chapter ‘The Anthropological
Circle,’40 where he shows how, in the nineteenth century, anthropology, using the
methodology of dialectics ceased to reflect on the a priori of reason and interpreted
madness no longer as a limit experience reflected upon by reason, but as the mere
opposite of rationality that could be studied empirically. Its efforts focused on the
reduction of rationality to a subject-consciousness that could presumably reveal the
inner truth of madness. This reduction, for Foucault, launched the empirical study of
man on the basis of his finitude while simultaneously denying that finitude, paving the
way for the linear progression of positivism, an all-encompassing form of medical
rationality which seeks to rationalize madness.
It is for this reason that the anthropology will serve as the anchoring point of
enlightenment critique, but it will not be Foucault’s last word. Critique must dispel
the illusions of anthropology. As Foucault notes, it must break ‘free of anthropology,
by turning against it, and, in so doing, by grounding it.’41 In his concluding remarks in
the Order of Things, Foucault is unambiguous as to the aim and form of his critique in
relation to the anthropological illusion: ‘there is no other way than to destroy the
anthropological ‘quadrilateral’ in its very foundations […] rejecting not only
psychologism and historicism, but all concrete forms of the anthropological prejudice,
we attempt to question afresh the limits of thought, and to renew contact in this way
with the project for a general critique of reason.’42 Thus, like other critical theorists,
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Foucault will be a consistent critic of positivism and psychologism which currently
renew and sustain the anthropological illusion behind the appearance of objectivity
and scientific progress. Crucially, however, he will place particular emphasis on the
inherent dangers of certain theories which, despite their critical tenor, risk re-enacting
the anthropological illusion.
Foucault frequently comes up against, as we shall show, the Frankfurt school and
phenomenology, both of which have had a profound effect on psychiatric practice
throughout the twentieth century with their influential Marxist, liberal or humanist
types of critique, without, however, escaping the dialectical interpretation of Kant.
Despite their association with the Enlightenment, both theories have overlooked the
critical kernel of Kantian anthropology. Thus, for Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno,
the growing perils of rationality stem from the intrinsic mechanisms and techniques,
from the oppressive powers endogenous to reason itself which capitalism has
inherited from the Enlightenment.43 According to their interpretation, which is a type
of humanism, there is an inalienable essence of man which reason has the duty to
liberate and to restore to its fundamental rights which are suppressed and denied.
Similarly, for Husserl and the phenomenologists, rationality is a distortion of reason
produced by western technoscientific society, generating a perpetual crisis involving
contradictions and internal conflicts within the field of rationalities, and an irrational
abuse of reason and of power. Rationality is a sickness of reason for Husserl, a
degeneration of reason responsible for the birth of multiple forms of rationality which,
by an ironic reversal, annul reason and generate irrationalities.44 According to the
critique of psychology that these two schools of thought offer, reason has the duty to
liberate the truth of madness and grasp its deeper meaning by questioning the
dominating scientific apparatuses and mechanisms of coercion which obscure it. Both
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humanism and phenomenology have taken anthropological consciousness for granted
and reproduced it by claiming to organize the criteria capable of freeing it from the
oppressive mechanisms which cloud it, violate it and prevent it from uncovering
madness in its truth.45 They have ‘dialectized’ the anthropology, transforming it into a
positive field supposedly freed from external constraints. This is why phenomenology
and humanism have either promoted the positivism of psychiatry, or criticized it in the
form of anti-psychiatric discourse, which does not overcome but merely repeats and
reinforces psychiatric rationality and anthropological thinking.46
Foucault radically opposes Husserl and the Frankfurt School and stresses the
need to avoid a normative view of reason and to resist its reduction to a form of
positivity, if critical thought is to be reinstated in anthropology. ‘In fact, the moment
we think we can give critical thought the value of positive knowledge, we will have
forgotten the essential point of Kant’s lesson. The difficulty we encountered in
situating the Anthropology in relation to the critical ensemble ought to have been
indication that the lesson is not simple.’47 Not only positivism, but also humanist and
phenomenological critique have failed to recognize the subtle distinction between
rationality as the domain of knowledge and reason as its limit, and instead set in
motion the dialectical opposition between the two terms. Foucault, on the contrary,
insists that it is precisely the notion that rationality is a distortion of reason which
undermines the anthropology. There is no essence, no a priori nature of reason which,
in the process of its implementation, supposedly loses its basic design by falling into
contradictions and irrationalities.48 Foucault saw and spotted multiple transformations
of rationality in his historical analyses, but ‘should one call that the demise of
reason?’49 Rationality in its technoscientific and political forms is undoubtedly linked
to mechanisms of coercion and excesses of power, but this in no way suggests that
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reason is the source of irrationality. On the contrary, only reason can critically reflect
on rationality to identify its set of values and imperatives as inherently irrational.
Reason cannot lose its basic design because, as limit, it is the faculty which makes
possible the spotting and diagnosis of the ambiguities and contradictions of rationality
in the first place. In its critical function, reason does not to reveal itself in its pure and
unadulterated state and it does not offer access to the truth of madness, but merely
indicates its presence at the borders of possible experience.50 This is why
phenomenology and humanist psychology have failed to escape the forms of
rationality that they criticize, slipping easily into the dogmatism of psychologism.
Phenomenological anthropology is deeply flawed in its suspicion toward irrational
elements examined by psychiatry. As critique shows, it is reason itself which
foregrounds irrational experiences as indispensable for the human sciences.51
Similarly, humanist anthropology is also ‘in tension’ with the spirit of critique insofar
as it seeks to use reason in order to liberate the inalienable essence of man, whereas
critical anthropology does exactly the opposite: in it reason alienates man from
himself, establishing a relationship with alterity which brings about a radical break
with his constituted truths, moving ‘towards something radically Other.’52 What the
anthropological endeavour in its critical form discovers is not human nature but a
relation with something completely other, inhuman. That discovery calls for ‘the
destruction of psychology itself and the discovery of that essential, non-psychological
because nonmemorizable relation that is the relation between Reason and
Unreason.’53
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The History of Rationality and the History of Truth
What is required, therefore, is a methodology that will free anthropology from
the burden of dialectics. It is through historical research that Foucault will seek to
dismantle these limitations intrinsic to the anthropological project. He will pursue a
type of analysis that will avoid the false duality between rationality and reason and
their dialectical opposition. This analysis will refute the humanist ‘bifurcation of
reason’ generating ambiguities and contradictions.54 It will indicate the limitations of
phenomenology which lay in reducing rationality and reason to a transcendental
subject which remains unchanged and stable through time. Historical research will
foreground forms of rationality rather than ‘rationality’ in general and will explore the
conditions under which these forms will establish different relationships with finitude
and the problem of otherness throughout history. Crucially, historical investigation
will uncover a field, a middle term, where rationality and reason dynamically interact
and where their tension, rather than reconciliation, becomes more pronounced. This
field, historical itself, is to be found inside the domain of knowledge, in the space at
once conditioned by rationality and limited by reason. This field is truth.
Thus Foucault turns to the history of science which, through the work of
Cavaillés, Bachelard and Canguilhem, foregrounded the epistemological question of
the Enlightenment,55 offering a way of analysing the critical interaction between
rationality and reason, without the peril of dialectics. Rationality, the historical
approach of these thinkers has helped to show, does not belong to a transcendental,
atemporal and universal subject as Kant, Marcuse or Husserl would have it, but
acquires historical forms which stem from specific practices and determine collective
activities pertaining to knowledge and science. Forms of rationality are not global and
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universal but local, specific and culture bound; they set the historical context for the
problematization of experiences beyond reason, by marking out the logical space in
which irrationality can become a problem and an area of perception. Thus, it was a
collective form of rationality which made the anthropology of the eighteenth century
possible, not its spontaneous thematization by specific thinkers. Anthropology itself
was the product of historical contingencies. Kant’s coup de force was not that he
invented finitude, but that he managed to theorize and philosophise about an alien
field of experience which had already been turned into an object of discussion and
debate through social practices, juridical and institutional transformations. Madness
was not the result of an oppressive rationality, nor an accident or a chance event in the
history of scientific rationality. It was the concrete effect of a particular mode of
rationality which incited reactions, induced discourses and raised concern in
previously silent behaviours, practices and institutions which were now organized
around something that could be called madness.
Shall we investigate this kind of rationalism which seems to be specific to our modern
culture and which originates in Enlightenment? I think that was the approach of some
of the members of the Frankfurt School [...] It may be wise not to take as a whole the
rationalization of society or of culture but to analyse such a process in several fields,
each with reference to a fundamental experience: madness, illness, death, crime,
sexuality and so forth. I think that the word ‘rationalization’ is dangerous. What we
have to do is analyse specific rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of
rationalization in general.56
Rationality is not prohibiting and oppressive, but productive. As the historians of
science have shown, forms of rationality do not produce the objective truth of
madness for a stable and unchanging knowing subject, but the conditions of truth
under which the historical construction of the anthropological consciousness capable
of conceiving madness became possible. Truth is neither an objective, ontological
quality of madness as humanism and positivism assert, nor a property of the
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consciousness which studies it, as the phenomenologists claim. It is not
transcendental, total and all encompassing, but emerges through relations, and is local
and differential. It is the mediating factor which makes possible the exclusion of
madness by the rational consciousness which contemplates it. Truth is political
through and through:
And then, you know all too well, that they’ve made me into the melancholy historian
of prohibitions and repressive power, someone who recounts history according to two
categories: insanity and its incarceration, anomaly and its exclusion, delinquency and
its imprisonment. But my problem has always been on the side of another category:
truth. How did power unfolding in insanity produce psychiatry’s ‘true’ discourse? [...]
I don’t want to write the sociological history of prohibition but rather the political
history of a production of ‘truth.’57
Foucault views truth as the middle term between rationality and reason, the locus of
their interaction and opposition. That is why he does not deny it or relativise it in a
‘postmodern’ way, but, on the contrary, he insists on the clarification of its nature and
its political significance. Foucault’s method explores the true and false statements
which condition what falls within the parameters of rationality and what eludes it.
Forms of rationality do not impose a distorted perception of reality and a one-sided
version of truth. In the history of the west, they have relied on demonstrability and
validity, and the most rigorous description of reality possible. They promote truth
claims free of moral, political or social prejudices. This is why these truth claims, and
more specifically the ‘true or false formulation (how it determines a domain of objects
about which it is possible to articulate true or false propositions),’58 are powerful on
account of their capability of being generally accepted as accurate. While a truth
claim which purports to distinguish between truth and falsity is always subject to rules
which derive from social contingencies and specific forms of rationality, on the level
of propositions ‘the division between the true and the false is neither arbitrary nor
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modifiable nor institutional nor violent.’59 This is precisely the reason why a rigorous
distinction between truth and falsity has the power of general acceptability and
universal validity. It is this division that founds knowledge and supports a form of
rationality by providing it with unquestionable legitimacy. Foucault aims to show that
all discursive and non-discursive practices are reduced to the division between true
and false claims. Bringing Nietzsche to the stage, Foucault calls this the ‘will to
truth.’60 This will to truth ‘constantly grows stronger, deeper, and more implacable.’61
The will to truth does not imply that epistemology (theories of knowledge, truth and
certainty) contains irrational elements that need to be excavated and ruled out. It
shows instead how human practices turn into an epistemological problem. Foucault’s
Nietzschean question is very important historically and critically: ‘How did it come
about that all Western culture began to revolve around this obligation of truth that has
taken a lot of different forms?’62 There is no pre-given object such as madness that
can be discovered and analysed in its truth. It was the will to truth, the obligation of
telling the truth, which established a collective relationship with finitude and alterity
— thus making the anthropology possible — by constructing madness as an object
that could be understood medically, within a specific framework of true and false
formulations that could fit into a medical model. This truth obligation presents itself
in the form of clearly formulated types of discourse which Foucault calls ‘regimes of
truth’ or ‘regimes of veridiction’:
Undertaking the history of regimes of veridiction — and not the history of truth, the
history of error, or the history of ideology, etcetera — obviously means abandoning
once again that well-known critique of European rationality and its excesses, which
has been constantly taken up in various forms since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. From romanticism to the Frankfurt School, what has always been called into
question and challenged has been rationality with the weight of power supposedly
peculiar to it […] the problem is to bring to light the conditions that had to be met for
it to be possible to hold a discourse on madness — but the same would hold for
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delinquency and for sex — that can be true or false according to the rules of medicine,
say, or of confession, psychology, or psychoanalysis.63
Through the justification of propositions that can be tested as to their truth or falsity,
regimes of veridiction provide legitimacy and scientific appropriation of irrationality.
They produce, sustain and sanction prohibitions, systems of exclusion, but also
mechanisms of production and liberation inside practices. The most important regime
of truth of psychiatry (and of medicine in general) is diagnosis. Forms of rationality in
psychiatric institutions rely on diagnosis to regulate their source allocations, organize
areas of research, and arrange spaces in hospitals. Diagnosis as a tool of
differentiation between true and false, authentic and inauthentic illness, not only
determines the explanatory framework for mental disorders, but also promotes and
justifies the goals of mental health policy, and supports the role of the institution in
the field of public hygiene, research funding and medicolegal practice. Foucault will
explore the diagnostic problematic of each period since the classical age, to show its
role as mechanism of power for psychiatric rationality. In his History of Madness he
will describe the conditions under which individuals diagnosed as outsiders in relation
to the norms, rules and laws of society were excluded in the late eighteenth century.
This exclusion gave rise to a novel distinction in the west, that between reason and its
Other (madness), giving birth to alienism and the Enlightenment anthropological
project. It was this distinction which established a basic dichotomy between the same
and the other which has determined the fate of western psychiatry ever since.
Diagnosis is not an ideological construct, a system of untruth which sanctions
false distinctions in order to exclude, oppress and exert violence.64 It is a discourse of
truth production on which a form of rationality depends in order to function. Every
discipline, every domain of knowledge relies on a diagnostic truth regime which
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sustains power by providing ‘the mechanisms and instances that enable one to
distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of
those who are charged with saying what counts as true.’65 A form of rationality does
not rest on the interplay between reality and false interpretations of it, but it is through
the production of true statements that it is imposed, reproduced and transformed, and
through which it relates to experiences which escape it. Rationality sets the rules for
the separation between true and false statements and at the same time specific effects
of power are attached to the true. There is a circular relation between truth and
systems of power that produce and sustain it, and the effects of power which it
induces and which extend it. It is the mutual support between a specific form of
rationality and its truth effects which has created the anthropological slumber from
which the human sciences have yet to emerge, reproducing the confusion between
rationality and reason, science and ideology.
The Will to Illusion as Critique
Critique, therefore, does not amount to questioning the irrational rationality of
science, the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensuring that a
scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology or founded on ‘pure reason.’
It aims at challenging the political, economic, and institutional regime of the
production of truth. As much as it is the power that consolidates and stabilizes a form
of rationality, truth can simultaneously be its point of weakness. Truth, the division
between truth and falsity, is a system of differentiation, a set of distinctions and a type
of qualitative knowledge. Therefore, it is not a substance or an entity one can claim to
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possess. It is an empty, unoccupied space, a void where only relations exist. ‘Truth
would be always present and yet never given,’ Foucault says.66 Truth consists of a set
of strategies and rules that make up the game of distinctions and discernments. Power
and rationality can undergo modifications and reversals when these rules and
strategies change.
It is at this point, in this empty space of truth that reason can begin questioning
and unsettling rationality. Reason can never be found in its pure state, but only in a
position of limitation vis-à-vis an established regime of truth. The role of reason is
subversive because it is the only faculty which can question truth and consider falsity.
Here falsity, error, does not imply the opposite of truth, but illusion. This ‘will to
illusion’, as Nietzsche would say,67 does not undermine the critique of the
Enlightenment but, on the contrary, constitutes its essential component; it is a
necessary limit, a perverse but also indispensable hypothesis that exposes the false
pretentions of rationality and the traps of power. For Foucault, it is crucial for any
reflection on man’s freedom and an ethical relationship with himself:
I think Kant’s insistence on showing that the condition of tutelage is due only to man
himself, echoes and corresponds, as if in empirical terms, to what critique tried to
analyse when instead of seeking to refute errors which are transmitted, inculcated, and
believed, it undertook to demonstrate how and for what reasons the illusions we
produce may be necessary.68
Illusion is not the refutation of a content of knowledge; it is not a mere revival of
Kant’s transcendental illusion which looks for the occasions when the application of
the principles of the understanding goes beyond the limits of experience.69 It does not,
therefore, amount to erecting epistemological obstacles. It implies the self-deluding
idea that rationality and knowledge have reached an endpoint.70 As we shall show in
the present study, Foucault will demonstrate how the construction of the diagnostic
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model of truth of the alienists was followed by truth regimes which sought to
eliminate otherness and establish a true/false division based on abnormality. These
medical regimes of truth have transformed anthropology into a dialectical enterprise
of naturalism and strict empiricism, aspiring to fix psychiatry on solid medical
principles. Restoring critique in the heart of the anthropological project, reason will
dismantle these positivist pretentions of psychiatry, reinstating alienism and the
discourse of the anthropology which can in fact ‘speak only the language of limit and
negativity.’71 Critique will demonstrate that by installing medical truth and falsity
inside its diagnostic apparatus, psychiatry will harbour the illusion that it has
dispensed entirely with the alterity of madness, while in fact there are occasions when
it is alterity itself which secretly controls the diagnostic regime. Monstrosity, hysteria
and other forms of mental illness will arise from the limits of the diagnostic field as
agents of a lost alterity who have the potential to set the game of truth and falsity
against the psychiatric rationality that aspires to integrate and incorporate them. These
unmarked terms, these blind spots of the psychiatric diagnostic system, will not
finally reveal the truth of madness; on the contrary, making the diagnostic game more
complex and enigmatic, they will defamiliarize psychiatry’s deep seated rationality,
and derealize its constituted practices and objects of knowledge, such as mental
illness.72
With its attentiveness to these limit cases where finitude emerges once again as
the condition of impossibility for psychiatric rationality, reason and its critical
enterprise can create zones of resistance through a permanent questioning of the
‘relationships between structures of rationality which articulate true discourse and the
mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it.’73 Inasmuch as specific agents of
rationality exert power through the imposition of valid distinctions pertaining to truth,
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reason is an instrument of those who resist through the power of illusion. With
illusion and simulation, reason works around the truth in order to delimit its field of
possible application, and to illustrate the restrictions in the production of truthful
discourse when rationality reaches its limits: ‘critique is the movement by which the
subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question
power on its discourses of truth.’74
Conclusion
The Enlightenment is not a state of affairs but an event. It is not an epoch
belonging to a historical totality but an attitude towards the present which
acknowledges the difference of the present from the past and future. It is a diagnosis
which uses reason as a tool for locating mutations, points of transition and ruptures:
‘Diagnosis in this sense does not establish the recognition of our identity through the
play of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the
difference between discourses, our history is the difference between times, our self the
difference between masks.’75 A diagnosis of our present condition contains an
essential relationship with otherness, which is the very function of truth itself.76 It
consists of reflecting on what is other in relation to our present rationality, and how
our ontology, that is, our practices, modes of being and existence, differs from other
cultures and other societies.
Kant’s Anthropology offers Foucault the opportunity to explore the relationship
that western rationality has established with otherness. From The History of Madness
onwards, on the grounds of the anthropological enterprise of the late eighteenth
century, Foucault will analyse in a critical fashion and without the dilemmas erected
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by phenomenology and humanism, the birth of the human sciences during the
Enlightenment, as a result of a reflection on human finitude and the limits of
rationality. This will enable him to dispel the commonly held view of enlightenment’s
preoccupation with reason and progress that supposedly made the sciences of man
possible. He will show how in the late eighteenth century it was not rationality that
viewed madness as its imperfection, but pure reason that conceived the madman as its
other.
However, anthropology is not without perils. Foucault explores the historicity
of rationality and truth in order to show that the illusion of anthropology stems from
its presupposition that the knowing subject is permanent and universal, bearing stable
conditions of possibility for knowledge and inherent forms of finitude. He shows
instead how the subject of knowledge is constructed as such by specific and
identifiable forms of collective rationality and ways of truth-telling which
simultaneously transform his finitude into an object of knowledge. The construction
of madness as an object to be known became possible under specific conditions which
gave birth to the rational man capable of understanding and recognizing madness.
From the birth of psychiatry to the present, Foucault records the mutual constitution
and the simultaneous modes of disappearance of the psychiatric subject capable of
relating to madness. He shows how the prevailing form of rationality and regime of
truth in the late eighteenth century produced the madman as Other, how this Other
turned into the mentally ill through changing forms of rationality and models of truth,
and how reason locates events, breaks and discontinuities when models of truth were
unsettled through the return of the eliminated Other.
This study will examine the conditions under which the anthropological survey
mutated into a type of positivism and naturalism, into a rigid method of analyzing
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detectable and measurable phenomena that can be fitted into an unproblematic
understanding of nature. The sciences of man have taken up the emphasis that the
Enlightenment placed on the individual, reducing every aspect of human behaviour to
a universal meaning giving subject. Rationality and reason are thought to be processes
ascribable to consciousness whose study can lead to the discovery of universal laws
underlying human behaviour and to develop causal accounts of how these laws
operate. Phenomenology, psychoanalysis and sociology have influenced psychiatric
discourse to the extent that, through subjectivity, limit experiences can be pinned
down and understood. All these theories and disciplines will be studied thoroughly in
order to illustrate more clearly how Foucault’s critical endeavour differs by
problematizing the relationships between power, subjectivity and truth, including how
these are involved in the production and transformation of psychiatric knowledge and
practice in the west. Foucault’s study revolves around these three axes and their
relationship with alterity, which characterize the enlightenment not as its end goal but
as its central problematic and its critical attitude. ‘The point is not to say that the
Greeks of the fifth century are a little like the philosophers of the eighteenth or that
the twelfth century was already a kind of Renaissance, but rather to try to see under
what conditions, at the cost of what modifications or generalizations we can apply the
question of the Aufklärung to any moment in history, that is, the questions of the
relationship between power, truth and the subject.’77
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CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY
In our introductory exposition of Foucault’s critical historical project, we briefly
discussed Husserl’s crucial contribution to the reappraisal of the Enlightenment.
Foucault was deeply interested in the phenomenological approach because, Husserl,
in his Crisis, offered a ‘genealogy’ of the constitution of meaning, of the birth of
rationality and its claims to universality and progress in western culture.1Husserl was
preoccupied with the description of lived experience and the manifestation of its
inherent meaning, as well as the phenomena of nonsense and irrationality originating
in the excesses and coercive effects of reason itself.
In this chapter we shall begin with Foucault’s critique of phenomenology for two
main reasons. First, phenomenology was the dominant philosophical trend of the
1950s, around the time Foucault embarked on his historical investigation of the
sciences of man. We shall demonstrate how Foucault’s early methods of analysis took
phenomenology to the level of historical critique. Second, phenomenology, with its
claim to analyse concrete things in a purely descriptive way, has guided mainstream
psychiatric thinking throughout the period extending from Foucault’s early writings
on psychology and madness to the present day. The way that Foucault integrated but
also reacted to this trend is important for reflecting on the historical dimension of
psychiatry and its present conditions of existence.
54
Foucault and Phenomenology
While critical of phenomenology’s intention to grasp phenomena in a pure form,
Foucault’s work does not reject it outright. Foucault speaks in phenomenological
terms, adhering to the idea of observable phenomena, whilst recognizing how all
phenomena are always mediated and shaped by the culturally-derived rules of
discourse and therefore do not exist in any strictly objective form. This is why he does
not exclude mental disorder as a valid object of phenomenological investigation, but
refutes the supposedly neutral, positivist model of phenomenological analysis which
believes that it can objectify illness. He therefore refuses to propose a new theory or
grand narrative to explain the underlying truth of phenomena. His historical analysis
reflects critically on the limits of phenomenology to explore what lies beyond its
grasp.
Phenomenology aims to study concrete and factual experience in a purely
descriptive way. For this reason, psychiatry looks to it to provide a scientific basis to
its analysis of madness. It is precisely the supposed objectivity of phenomenology that
Foucault mainly contests. According to Foucault, phenomenology as a mode of
analysis is limited by its contention that meaning is immanent in the lived experience
to be described and that sense is implicit in perception and history. Meaning does not
appear on its own, it is not ‘already there’ as an objective state which ‘envelops and
invests us even before we start to open our eyes and to speak.’2 Meaning depends on
conditions for its construction. By denying the contextual nature of meaning, its
dependence on discourse, phenomenology restricts the scope for critique, for the idea
that meaning is inherent in phenomena almost places it beyond question. This is
where Foucault’s inquiry becomes important because it discloses the potential for
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challenging and questioning the conditions under which meaning appears or
disappears in psychiatric discourse and practice:
I was talking to you about our generation and the way in which we were preoccupied
with the conditions for the appearance of meaning. Conversely, I am now telling you
that I was preoccupied with the way in which meaning disappeared, as though
eclipsed, through the constitution of the object […] in fact I am concerned neither
with meaning nor with the conditions in which meaning appears, but with the
conditions for the modification or the interruption of meaning, with the conditions in
which meaning disappears and in so doing gives rise to the appearance of something
else.3
Phenomenology asserts the universality of meaning, issued from a transcendental and
timeless subject. The phenomenological universe is saturated with meaning, there are
no gaps or holes in the network of meaningful connections. Objects which exist in
their neutral facticity are always referred back ‘to the active processes of meaning, to
its digging and elaboration.’4 Any event, emerging in the space of silence and ‘mute
inertia’,5 is engulfed in a world of ‘primal significations which always existed as a
disposition of the world around the self, tracing its paths and privileged locations,
indicating in advance where the event might occur in its possible form.’6 Foucault, by
contrast, is concerned precisely with the gaps, the cracks and the empty spaces devoid
of meaning, the interruptions and instances of silence where events irrupt and objects
of knowledge appear. In his historical studies he illustrates that the inscription of
meaning into appearances is not a primordial practice but a response to the sudden,
absurd and enigmatic emergence of phenomena in their raw state. An object of
knowledge is constructed as a result of a radical disruption of the sequence of
meaningful connections, not as an objective condition of the external world, as the
‘rock of facticity’ awaiting to be made intelligible.7 It was madness in its absurdity,
silence and meaninglessness which incited, under specific historical conditions,
certain contingent and not transcendental subjects to insert it into a discourse of
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significations which could acquire the status of psychiatric knowledge. Foucault’s
contention is that phenomenology, trapped as it is in its presupposition of an endless
proliferation and transformation of meaning, is unable to account for events, ruptures
and discontinuities in the history of psychiatry, which occur whenever meaning
appears or disappears, whenever it manifests itself in perfect clarity or undergoes
radical reversal.
In this chapter we shall look at Foucault’s break with phenomenology in the form
of historical critique which sets in motion two crucial factors lacking in
phenomenological analysis: forms of rationality and the history of truth. Meaning,
Foucault demonstrates, arises inside background historical formations permeated by
the form of rationality, the logic that governs the structuring and functioning of
institutions, shaping a collective experience capable of designating experiences
foreign and alien to it as irrational. He then explores what he calls ‘the truth axis’ of
rationality, namely the way diagnostic models of truth are produced in terms of the
separation of the true from the false.8 This process of separation consists in classifying
and categorizing observed facts and behaviours from the field of pre-established
irrationality in terms of the degree to which they conform to the conditions of what
can be accepted as true and false illness. It is then that these irrational experiences
which lie beyond intelligibility are problematized and isolated, becoming objects of
study. The entire diagnostic system is then built upon the basic differentiation
between these limit-experiences and other accessible forms of behaviour. This is how
a new model of truth revolving around madness was constructed in the late eighteenth
century in accordance with the Kantian anthropology. It will be from the nineteenth
century onward that this diagnostic model will gradually undergo transformations and
it will become ‘phenomenological’ in the sense that it will seek to dispense with the
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dual diagnosis between reason and insanity and will seek to identify the truth of
madness in the hermeneutic analysis of perception and the pathology of meaning.
Foucault will show how, at the limits of this diagnostic model and its subsequent
modifications, madness will once again disrupt the meaning behind the appearances
which phenomenology will try to describe rigorously. In the course of history,
insanity will turn these appearances against phenomenological hermeneutics,
unmasking singular and borderline forms of experience that generate events, breaks
and discontinuities in the history of psychiatry.
Foucault and Phenomenology
In his early writings, Foucault tackled phenomenological psychology. In 1954,
he published Dream, Imagination and Existence, a lengthy introduction to ‘Dream
and Existence’, a work by Ludwig Binswanger, a pioneer Swiss psychiatrist in
existential Daseinanalysis, author of the first work in existential psychiatry to be
written in the light of Heidegger’s Being and Time. During the same year, Foucault
published Mental Illness and Psychology, in which he attempted a study in various
types of psychological theory, mainly Binswanger’s work.
In both works, Foucault investigates and uncovers the common thread running
through phenomenologists as diverse as Husserl, Sartre and Heidegger. Their efforts
share a common feature: description of the actual, lived experience of the sick
individual: ‘the understanding of the sick consciousness and the reconstitution of its
pathological world, these are the two tasks of a phenomenology of mental illness.’9
Meaning is central in phenomenological and existential analysis. Comprehension is
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necessary in order to grasp both the experience that the patient has of his illness (the
way in which he experiences himself as a sick and abnormal individual) and the
morbid world on which this consciousness of illness opens. Foucault asks the question
whether it is possible to understand everything.10 Understanding cannot possibly go
beyond its limits, in domains where meaning by definition no longer exists, as in
madness. Psychiatry has used reason to venture into the world of madness which is an
impossible task, yet it is a fact, unintelligible for phenomenology, that the division
between reason and madness did occur at some point in history. In fact, Foucault
concludes in the second part of his Mental Illness and Psychology, and in the
introduction of the History of Madness, it was this very division which turned
madness into an object of medical perception which preceded and conditioned the
effort directly to explore the experience of the mad individual: ‘None of the concepts
of psychopathology, even and especially in the implicit process of retrospections, can
play an organizing role. What is constitutive is the action that divides madness, and
not the science elaborated once this division is made calm and restored.’11 The central
problematic of the History of Madness revolves around the observation that it was not
the progress of reason that made madness more accessible to doctors. Madness lies
beyond the grasp of reason. It is precisely what is outside the domain of reason: ‘the
madman therefore is never mad to his own way of thinking, but only in the eyes of a
third person who can distinguish between reason and the exercise of reason.’12 The
emergence of psychiatry as a discipline in the late eighteenth century cannot be
explained retrospectively through the maturation of reason that somehow mastered the
negativity of madness. Rationality remains by necessity foreign to the experience of
madness. Thus, the history of psychiatry, despite its developments, has always been a
monologue of reason on madness.13 As part of this monologue, phenomenological
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analysis displayed inherent limitations, forcing Foucault to abandon it as a method of
approach: ‘For two reasons, not unrelated to each other, this project left me
unsatisfied: its theoretical weakness in elaborating the notion of experience, and its
ambiguous link with a psychiatric practice which it simultaneously ignored and took
for granted.’14 Explaining the consciousness of the mad subject in terms of time,
space or insight, as Binswanger and Minkowski do, amounts to interpreting
irrationality on the basis of categories of rational thought.15 The decision to
incarcerate a patient against their will relies on psychological premises about the
patient’s disturbed perception, stemming from the judgment of the rational
consciousness which incarcerates. Existential analysis and phenomenology take the
experience of madness and the medical practices that deal with it as given, seeking
afterwards to submit both to reflection and interpretation. Foucault, by contrast, insists
that a certain social, collective experience among those in possession of reason
precedes and makes possible a scientific encounter with madness. This collective
experience is what Foucault set out to explore:
In relation to phenomenology, rather than making a somewhat internal description of
lived experience, shouldn’t one, couldn’t one instead analyze a number of collective
and social experiences?
As Binswanger showed, it is important to describe the conscience of the insane. And
after all, is there not a cultural and social structuring of the experience of madness?
And shouldn’t that be analyzed? [...] through this experience of madness, how was
madness presented as an object of knowledge for a kind of medicine which identified
itself as mental medicine? Through which historical transformations, which
institutional modification, was the experience of madness constituted with both the
subjective pole of the experience of madness and the objective pole of mental
illness?16
For Foucault phenomenology remains trapped in a fundamental aporia: it presupposes
a universal, transhistorical meaning-giving subject that is in a position to claim to
understand experiences that escape meaning. This impossibility needs to be analysed.
Historical investigation of the social experiences and mentalities must first and
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foremost be able to answer the questions: ‘is there an experience of madness which is
characteristic of a given society? How was the experience of madness able to
constitute itself? How did it manage to emerge? And why was madness chosen as an
object of perception?’17
In order to tackle these questions, Foucault sets out to explore the conditions
which made possible, at a specific historical point, the formation of a rational
experience that could designate madness as an experience foreign to it. He does not
put forward a general theory of man, which would only transpose the problem by
offering another rational discourse claiming to capture the inaccessible silence of
madness. He does not offer a study of an economic or social context that would accept
a priori the division between reason and madness. He shows how the division
between these two forms of experience had to be made in strictly rational terms;
therefore, the conditions that gave rise to it, whether social, economic or cultural,
must have opened up a rigorously logical space in which this division could be
applied and make sense. It is this logical space on which Foucault bases his
endeavour; it is populated by formal and logical correlations obeying describable
rules which give birth to and contain all the concrete forms of experience whose
meaning and causal explanation can be explained a posteriori.
Forms of Rationality
Foucault accords priority to formal relationships over actual lived experience.
These relationships already exist in Husserl in the form of the pre-reflective ‘life-
world’, but always as the totality of our knowledge universe in accordance with and in
relation to a transcendental subject.18 Foucault, on the other hand, seeks to make
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manifest the logical correlations which form the backdrop against which
consciousness and subjectivity take shape. Resembling structuralism and analytic
philosophy, his methodology consists of showing how these logical connections are
impersonal, arise in practices and institutions, and are expressed in discourse which
constructs subjects of knowledge and constitutes the universe of meaning. They do
not make up the background totality of knowledge, but comprise the network of
conditions in which individual consciousness appears:
Existentialism tried to describe experiences in such a way that they could be
understood in psychological forms, or, if you wish, in forms of consciousness, that
you could not, however, analyse and describe in logical terms. To put consciousness
everywhere and to release consciousness from the web of logic were, on the whole,
the great concerns of existentialism, and it is to these two tendencies that structuralism
is opposed.19
Foucault, however, is not a structuralist, an analytic philosopher or a logician. He
investigates discourse as a system of rules in their manifest existence, in their
consistency and their materiality. He examines how logical relations are put to work
inside actual practices, are employed by real individuals and permeate institutions. He
displays the logical structure of concrete domains of action whose agents are formed
as subjects in the course of the very application of reason. The study of these logical
structures requires a method distant from anthropology, humanism and dialectical
thought, which he terms ‘analytic reason.’20 Analytic reason studies how ‘logic is
inserted into the very heart of reality,’21 how specific categories of rational thought,
forms of rationality, infiltrate, make up and organize power relations and their effect
in the way reality is perceived.
Forms of rationality are thus logical structures specific to each society and
generate its relations of meaning, its value system and its set of goals founding its
laws and institutions. They comprise the web of practices, tactics and strategies
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through which reason operates in society. Foucault links forms of rationality closely
with the exercise of power, offering a model of power relations which differs
considerably from the one dimensional view of power as a system of coercion and
oppression. Power is not synonymous with violence and the imposition of force in the
form of constraint and prohibition. Power is a mode of action regulating the actions of
others; it incites and induces the conduct of others, their possible or actual, present or
future actions. It therefore includes calculated and rational mechanisms of directing
the conduct of others, constituting a field of procedures of government.
Governmentality is equivalent, in Foucault’s thinking, with power. As he notes,
‘when I say ‘govern someone’, it is simply in the sense that one can determine one’s
behaviour in terms of a strategy by resorting to a number of tactics […]
governmentality […] the group of relations of power and techniques which allow
these relations of power to be exercised.’22 Each society pursues its organization
through rational means, and uses reason as its principle in order to direct people’s
conduct towards a common set of goals that will ensure the management of
community affairs. Institutions are structured on the basis of a particular form of
rationality, which appears as the explicit programme of this institution. Although a
form of rationality may initially represent an ideal schema in the mind of a few
individuals and therefore an imaginary production, as soon as it becomes embedded in
the institution, it constitutes a fragment of its reality and directs the conduct of those
subjected to it in the institution:
Practices do not exist without a certain regime of rationality […] The rational
schemas of the prison, the hospital, or the asylum, are not general principles that can
be rediscovered only through the historian’s retrospective interpretation. They are
explicit programmes; we are dealing with sets of calculated, reasoned prescriptions in
terms of which institutions are meant to be recognized, spaces arranged, behaviours
regulated. If they have an ideality, it is that of programming left in abeyance, not that
of a general but hidden meaning.23
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Forms of rationality are inscribed in practices and institutions and play an active role
in them. They constitute the type of thought that sustains them, the logic according to
which spaces are arranged, individuals are examined and treated, sources are
allocated, laws and regulations are imposed. This is why Foucault takes pains to
differentiate himself from analysts such as Erving Goffman, an American sociologist,
whose influential work on the asylums in 196124 contributed to the formation of
Community Psychiatry. Goffman studied closely the function of psychiatric
institutions and was the first to suggest their potentially harmful effects of
institutionalization25 and stigmatization.26 Foucault distances himself from Goffman’s
project on the ground that his own concern is the exploration of forms of rationality
within the institution, not the institution itself and in general:
his problem is the way a certain type of institution works, the total institution — the
asylum, the school, the prison […]. Goffman’s problem is the institution itself. My
problem is the rationalization of the management of the individual. My own work is
not a history of institutions or a history of ideas, but the history of rationality as it
works in institutions and in the behaviour of people.27
For Foucault, an analysis of the internal structure of an institution is not fruitful by
itself since it leaves the rationality which governs it unquestioned. Only the analysis
of forms of rationality can provide a framework for any phenomenological or
institutional approach.
Forms of rationality are historically determined. Programming, measurement,
and rational calculation change over time and place, depending on the specific
interactions of practices, institutions and systems of knowledge. In the seventeenth
century, for example, various sociopolitical and economic factors raised the issue of
rational management and control over the territory. This type of management created
a set of institutions and practices that promoted the production and circulation of
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goods. Productivity became the dominant form of rationality, rendering idleness a
vice, a fact that led the unproductive forces of society (the idle, the poor, the
vagabonds and the mad) to exclusion (Foucault’s ‘Great Confinement’). In the late
eighteenth century, on the other hand, the dominant form of rationality had to do with
another type of government based on discipline, correction and control. The role of
individuals with respect to the social bond was reviewed on the basis of
normalization, punishment and correction through treatment. As a result, a group of
those deemed as irrational under the previous form of rationality were now removed
from the large places of exclusion and were transferred to special institutions where
correction and reform would be provided. Madmen were distinguished from
delinquents, the poor and the physically ill. The asylum, the prison and the clinic were
born. It is the era of the birth of the human sciences.
In all these examples, we see how the historically conditioned forms of
rationality create a set of collective rational experiences which determine each time
the features of what a given society designates as irrational. In a retrospective
analysis, Foucault notes that his main concern in the History of Madness was
rationality, that is, the way madness became an object of perception, as a result of a
collective rational experience shared by those subjects considered reasonable:
My first book was called Madness and Civilization but in fact my problem was
rationality […] instead of beginning with the subject moving from awareness to
reason, it is better if we see how, in the Western world, those who are not the subjects
of reason, those who are not considered reasonable, that is, those who are mad, are
removed from the life process […] Reason is what sets aside madness. Reason is what
gives itself the right and the means to set aside madness.28
Foucault describes a social division generated and shaped by a collective rational
consciousness that arises inside institutions. This consciousness, governed by a
specific mode of rationality, sets the initial conditions for the conceptualization of an
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experience that is foreign to it. Science will begin to reflect on this alien experience
only after this social division has taken place. Logic is foreign to causality and
precedes it. Only after a logical space has opened up an empirical domain can science
begin to fill it with meaningful connections and causal explanations. Causality and
hermeneutics can only emerge in a preestablished field governed by relations
accountable by deduction, implication and exclusion, that is, by formal rules of logic
whose concrete functioning is located in the actual relations between men.29
Forms of Rationality and Truth — Madness as the ‘Prodigious Other’
Insofar as each governmental logic, each form of rationality has its own
specificity in each historical period, it becomes clear that the rationality of the late
eighteenth century, although unique in the history of the west for its founding role for
the human sciences, has no special privilege in the history of science. As we have
shown, this moment did not emerge as a result of the progress of rationality. It was
not on the basis of the discovery, by rationality, of universal laws underlying human
behaviour, or the promise that human suffering would be overcome by the advance of
science that the late eighteenth century gave birth to the human sciences. The
eighteenth century was not an enlightened age that saw the maturation of reason. It
was a period whose dominant form of rationality, no more mature or oppressive than
others, problematized madness, allowing it to be studied in terms of truth and medical
diagnosis. It is therefore in the dominant regime of truth which appeared during this
period that we should look for an answer to the question posed by Foucault of ‘why
was madness problematized, starting at a certain time and following certain processes,
as an illness falling under a certain model of medicine […] (and) how was the mad
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subject placed in this game of truth defined by a medical model or body of
knowledge…’30 To illustrate the formation of this truth regime, a method beyond the
scope of phenomenological description of lived experience is needed, a method which
will demonstrate how madness as an experience at the limits of phenomenology could
be transformed into an object of medical perception in the late eighteenth century.
As we showed in the previous section, the rationality of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century confined a diverse and heterogeneous group of individuals deemed
as irrational (the idle, the poor, the vagabonds, the libertines, the mad), thus there was
no need yet for psychiatry to exist. There were no asylums or experts in disorders of
the mind, but only doctors who treated physical illnesses and offered moral guidance.
When the madman entered the ‘Garden of Species’,31 that is, the field of
classification, it was not as a term of reference ‘but as principle of judgment; madness
was therefore caught up in the structures of the rational.’32 In the world of the great
confinement groups of irrational individuals were indiscriminately confined. There
was no need to draw a distinction between authentic and inauthentic illness. Both
were viewed as of the same origin, and one passes from one to another by means of an
individual will. Legally, madness offered no excuse for deviant behaviour. It was on a
par with evil, and in fact it only served to amplify evil and make it more dangerous.
Crimes were indiscriminately viewed as offences against the sovereignty of the king
and the state, and therefore it mattered little whether their perpetrators were mad or
simply evil.
In the late eighteenth century the need for distinctions surfaced. The form of
rationality was directed toward discipline, surveillance, training and correction.
Judicial consciousness focused on the individual whose crime bore a rationality which
had to be understood and treated with either medical or penal correctional
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incarceration. Doctors were asked to identify individuals whose deviant behaviour
could be studied in medical terms, treated with medical means and rehabilitated in
proper institutions. There emerged a need for specification of whether the perpetrator
of a particular crime was to be corrected medically or rehabilitated through
punishment. It was at that point in history that an event brought about the isolation of
the mad, their extraction from the places of confinement and their insertion into places
specifically designed for their treatment. There was a ‘New Division’33 which is
analysed by Foucault as the event around which the whole History of Madness is
centered.34
The doctors of the time were asked to perform a diagnosis, to draw the
distinction and spot the crimes attributed to mental conditions, bringing to the fore the
theory of alienism. Alienism indicates enstrangement, in the sense that certain
individuals were agents of an experience whose content eludes understanding. These
were experiences at the limit, beyond comprehension, mental states that lie beyond
intelligibility, beyond the reach of rationality. Free will, responsibility and rational
action were impossible to conceive in this group of patients, since the experience they
represent is incompatible with the very possibility of thought. The content of these
experiences is located outside the field of possible experience set out by the truth
conditions of classification. It is unconditional, exceeding the conditions of possibility
which allow for a meaningful existence.
Alienism marks the beginning of the anthropological project of the late
eighteenth century. It was a medical-philosophical project whose field of study was an
empirical approach to man in close relation to a critical reflection and transcendental
philosophy. As we saw in the previous chapter, Kant’s anthropology is situated in this
context. His project deals with the exploration of the knowledge of man in association
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with a reflection on pure reason. As Foucault notes, in the Anthropology there is an
‘extensive analysis of the deficiencies and illness of the mind (which) prompts a brief
paragraph on reason.’35 Whereas in his Essay on the Maladies of the Mind, dated
1764, Kant studied the various mental disorders in terms of alterations of the concepts
of experience, in the Anthropology:
This classification has been modified: its organizing concepts are those relating to
possible experience, while the notions of amentia, dementia, insania, and vesania are
bracketed under the general heading of alienation (Verrückung), as they are in
Suvage, or Linné. The affinity between the text of the Anthropology and that of the
Essay is still obvious, but here we have a clearer indication of how the text was made
to fit with critical discoveries and the scientific developments of the time.36
Kant links possible experience with its limit which is reason. When that limit is
crossed, we move outside the sphere of reason, to madness. Possible experience is
conditioned by the subject’s rationality and is linked to truth and freedom. On the path
to truth man is always free and capable of conceiving the possibility of error: ‘the
possibility of error is linked to duty, and to the freedom, to avoid it.’37 Kant uses the
term Kunst which literally means art, to describe the work of reason to take
hypotheses to their limits and conceive the possibility of total self-deception in a
rationality that is certain that the distinction between truth and falsity has been
definitely achieved. For Kant, through the possibility of deception reason liberates
man from the realm of necessity which his rationality would rigidly impose. Reaching
the limits of his truth claims, the subject is free to question the authority of his own
established schemas:
the Kunst […] its role is as much to construct an illusion (Schein) on top of and facing
the phenomenon (Erscheinung), as it is to give that illusion the plenitude and the
meaning of a phenomenon [...] a freedom which is all about exercising negation […] a
dangerous freedom which relates the work of truth to the possibility of error, and in
this way manages to keep the relationship to truth from the sphere of determination.38
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The madman lacks this freedom. She lacks the faculty of reason which enables her to
hypothesize that her convictions may be a mere simulation. She is therefore trapped in
her unconditional truth as she is unable to conceive error. Because of her inability to
use her reason and therefore to communicate her private truth to others, the madman
is the agent of an experience that is possible to observe but impossible to comprehend.
Based on the medical-philosophical theory of alienism, the insane were isolated
and placed within asylums. Madness became an object of medical perception. From
an object of moral judgment which it was during the classical age, madness was
excluded by reason as its pure negativity, its Other, in the late eighteenth century.
Madness as an object of knowledge and the asylum were born and psychiatry
gradually entered the medical model:
there is a history of madness, I mean of madness as a question, posed in terms of
truth, within a discourse in which human madness is held to signify something about
the truth of what man, the subject, reason is. From the day madness ceased to appear
as the mask of reason but was inscribed as prodigious Other […] something like a
history of madness begins, or at least a new episode in the history of madness.39
Madness was a case of deception that hid its own truth and for this reason it became
the prototype of mental illness, around which psychiatric diagnosis revolved.
Delirium, a medical and quasi-philosophical notion and a truth category for the
alienists, became the heart of madness for the proto-psychiatry of the early nineteenth
century. ‘In 1826,’ Foucault notes, ‘delirium was the constitutive hallmark, or at least
the major qualification, of madness.’40 The delirious individual who committed a
crime was acting in a dream state, in the sense that she was a subject ‘not aware of the
truth and to whom access to the truth is barred. If she is as in a dream, then her
consciousness is not the true consciousness of the truth and can therefore be attributed
to someone in a demented state.’41 Employing the Kantian philosophical approach to
madness, the proto-psychiatrists were medical philosophers who treated madness in
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terms of its transcendence rather than its physical (humoural) aetiology or its
underlying psychology. They were alienists who saw a transcendence in delirium, ‘a
silent transcendence, which constitute(s) the truth of madness […] (which) cannot
bear witness to its own truth.’42 They introduced a break with the conventional
medical approach to mental disorder, because they were the first to view madness in
its internal, private truth. As Foucault points out, ‘Esquirol is the last of the alienists
because he is the last to pose the question of madness, that is to say, of the relation to
truth.’43 Madness, for the alienists, was not the patient’s distorted perception. It was a
type of error, a distorted relationship with the truth which, for this reason, was
incommunicable, and hence a private and inaccessible experience, a limit experience.
Madness was for the first time posed in terms of truth and unreason, as otherness.
The presence of madness as radical alterity in the heart of the diagnostic system
of the psychiatry of the late eighteenth century is evident both in the theoretical
edifice of alienism and in its everyday practice. Despite the isomorphism that the
proto-psychiatrists tried to achieve with the rest of medicine, medical knowledge was
not used. It was solely diagnosis which made possible the legal role of psychiatry and
established an analogon with medical practice. This analogon established formal
similarities with the diagnostic truth regime of medicine, without continuity with the
content of medical knowledge.44 Moreover, there was a crucial difference: whereas in
medicine diagnosis was able to cover the entire field of diseases, providing
differential knowledge, in psychiatry an absolute diagnosis prevailed, between
madness and non-madness. This binarism was indispensable for the decision to spot
and incarcerate someone against their will, in the context of social defence. It was of
paramount importance for the prevention of the crises of madness which could entail
criminal behavior, and therefore prompted compulsory admission and immediate
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treatment.45 Therefore truth was placed at the heart of madness as the inner core of its
experience and the possibility of its cure. It formed the basis of the doctor-patient
relationship. It was later, when psychiatry posed the question of truth within itself, in
an attempt to constitute itself as a medical and clinical science, that madness lost its
singularity and its position as a limit experience, becoming a mental illness among
others.46
From Phenomenology to the History of Truth
Foucault therefore shows how madness was not integrated by the calm advance
of rationality. It was a product of exclusion by reason which reduced it to silence as
an impossible experience. Thus, his critical historical method operates at the limits of
phenomenology. Whereas phenomenology promotes a hermeneutic approach to the
historical variations in the immediacy of lived meaning in which madness can be
recognized, Foucault indicates the conditions which, through the interruption of
meaning, brought about the formation of madness as an object of medical perception.
Madness was produced through truth effects, through a model of truth which, both
external to and constitutive of meaning, established a distinction between true and
false medical statements which made possible the recognition of a lived experience as
mad. Phenomenology cannot account for this crucial transformation, inasmuch as it is
precisely the dimension of truth that it lacks. This is why Foucault is critical of
phenomenology on the ground that its focus on lived experience fails to take into
account the model of truth shaping that experience: ‘It is very noteworthy that
[Sartre’s] way led from the history of truth to phenomenology while the way of the
subsequent generation to which we belong, arose particularly to sever itself from
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phenomenology in order to return to the question of the history of truth.’47 Foucault
analyses a collective rational experience rooted in the distinction between true and
false, authentic and inauthentic irrationality, which affects how we interpret and
understand our experience of pathology. Phenomenology lacks a historicity of reason
as well as a history of truth that would contextualize pathology and explain its
problematization in the course of history.
Phenomenology is preoccupied with daily experience, the search for the
objectivity of knowledge and the origin of meaning in the founding subject.
Beginning from the transcendental foundation of knowledge, it searches for the
meaningful and psychological aspects of experience. It accepts, therefore, the lived
experience of the insane mind as a reality, but fails to see it as a borderline experience
which has been constructed as such by a regime of truth. Foucault, on the other hand,
shows how madness emerged as an effect of truth, independently of a transcendental
rational subject and at the margins of everyday experience. It was born, therefore, as
an object of knowledge, at the limits of phenomenology:
[…] grasping the moment by which a field of truth with objects of knowledge was
constituted through these mobile technologies. We can certainly say that madness
‘does not exist’, but this does not mean that is nothing. All in all, it was a matter of
doing the opposite of what phenomenology had taught us to say and think, the
phenomenology that said, roughly: madness exists, which does not mean that it is a
thing.48
Husserl’s innovation consisted of constructing phenomenology as an anti-psychology
enterprise that questions the problematic of the cogito as a foundation of knowledge
and empirical truth about man. Husserl focused on how thought can interrogate itself,
discovering the unthought in the heart of the ratio. He therefore repeated Kant’s
anthropological project, reviving the problem of the a priori. However, he went on to
‘dialectize’ it by replacing Kant’s dilemma between same and other, with the search
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for an originary consciousness. He downplayed truth in favour of meaning. He
effectively denied the existence of madness as a problem of human finitude, by
reducing it into ‘a description — empirical despite itself — of actual experience, and
into an ontology of the unthought that automatically short-circuits the primacy of the
‘I think.’49 Truth, in Husserl’s system, tries to capture the transcendence of finitude
through the significations of actual experience belonging to the transcendental
subject. He identifies the problematic of finitude as an eidos, an essence possessing
only formal properties, given to intuition under specific conditions of perception.50
According to Husserl, then, madness exists as an essence whose meaning can be
grasped negatively through the reduction of the variant significations with which it is
invested; it is not a thing, however, as it can only be intuited as a formal structure, an
empty region, on which comprehension depends.51
For Foucault, on the other hand, madness does not exist, but it is not nothing. He
does not presuppose that madness already exists ‘out there’ as a reality; he is not a
formalist or a structuralist either, assuming that madness is an ideal structure, a
Kantian thing-in-itself, or an empty space containing only formal properties, which is
nonetheless necessary for modes of representation and signification.52 He is sceptical
of both the Kantian universal ‘madness’ and the Husserlian essence of ‘madness’
which can be intuited and whose meaning can be unearthed through
phenomenological reduction and imagination.53 Foucault begins with the assumption
that madness does not exist as an objectively existing phenomenon, seeking to explore
what history can make of the real practices and events which were organized around
the diagnosis of something that is supposed to be madness.54 He shows how the
appearance of madness was arbitrary historically but nevertheless real; madness was
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brought into existence through a regime of truth which inscribed it in reality and
submitted it to the legitimate division between true and false:
Madness, disease, delinquency and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a
question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally
being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects were only wicked illusions or
ideological products to be dispelled in the light of reason finally having reached its
zenith. It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices —
from the moment they became coordinated with a regime of truth — was able to
make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera),
nonetheless become something, something however that continues not to exist. That is
to say, what I would like to show is not how an error — when I say that which does
not exist becomes something, this does not mean showing how it was possible for an
error to be constructed — or how an illusion could be born, but how a particular
regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that does not exist able
to become something. It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, real
practices, which established it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality.55
Foucault posits the existence of a diagnostic form of knowledge which inserts a
primitive experience with no meaning of its own, into the game of truth and falsity,
whereby it acquires the significations and structures of ‘madness.’ Diagnosis is thus
not a representational property of a stable consciousness but a discursive practice
which, on a formal level of knowledge, ascribes specific determinations and formal
attributes to a concrete experience which can be recognized as mad. This regime of
truth neither represents nor reveals but constructs madness, not in the sense that it
produces it linguistically, but because it brings about the ascription of the universal
‘madness’ to a specific form of experience which then could be called mental
illness.56
Foucault’s phenomenology and the simulacrum
Psychiatric diagnosis is therefore at the heart of the psychiatric regime of truth
which is anterior and exterior to the hermeneutic approach to madness.57 Madness is
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first and foremost an epistemological problem, a question of an applied differential
logic, rather than a problem of mathematical entities or ontological substances. This is
why the centrality of diagnosis in Foucault’s system reinstates logic as a theory of
appearances into phenomenology.58 In this respect, Foucault is a more consistent
phenomenologist than Husserl himself. Starting with his Logical Investigations,
Husserl had begun with the formal, descriptive study of the contents of consciousness
but gradually concerned himself with the interrogation of man’s being, with ‘the
question of ontology’(Foucault’s emphasis).59 While he initially focused on the study
of images and the force with which they envelop and immobilize the pathological
consciousness, he soon aspired to ‘make these images speak’ through a meticulous
and descriptive language which looks for investments of meaning, metaphysical
structures and mechanisms of psychic causality.60 Foucault’s logical analysis, by
contrast, deals with impersonal surface phenomena which produce the individual
consciousness of madness. His study is not an investigation of the pathological
perception of the patients; instead, he focuses on the other side of the dividing line, on
the formation of medical perception where diagnostic truth and the silence of the
image are made to form an audiovisual tool for the description of madness. ‘A hearing
gaze and a speaking gaze: clinical experience represents a moment of balance
between speech and spectacle.’61
Taking this fragile relationship between the visible and the expressible, this two-
dimensional space of configuration of illness as his anchoring point, Foucault does
not suggest ways of constituting a possible space of localization of illness, of
discovering the ontological depth of the patient’s morbid perception — her anatomy
or her psychology.62 On the contrary, remaining on the same level of surface events,
he records the alterations of the medical perception of madness through the subversive
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participation of the patients themselves in the game of appearances. He looks for
those instances in the history of psychiatry when images arising from the patients’
clinical manifestations do not unveil but block access to the inner truth of their
experiences, bringing about new interruptions of meaning. Foucault shows how the
more psychiatry seeks to modify its diagnostic truth regime so as to accommodate and
make possible the formation of causal theories (neurology, biology, genetics) and the
psychological appropriation of madness through meaning, the more the mentally ill
reinsert the question of otherness, resisting meaning and causality. They disrupt the
phenomenological universe of signification, but without constituting logical errors,
theoretical impasses, or disciplined obstacles inside an established body of
knowledge. They present as ‘vain images’ and false appearances, as simulacra which
do not reveal an experience but allow it to escape representation.
For Foucault simulacra are symptoms that not only evade signification, but
disrupt the whole system of meaning; through these symptoms, an experience
‘delegates and manifests itself, but (also) withdraws and in a sense conceals itself’63.
The simulacrum strips momentarily an image of its determined meaning. It has the
property of ‘designating no meaning but referring to a model.’64 As a false
appearance, the simulacrum does not refute the distinction between the true and the
false that makes up the truth model on which psychiatric discourse is based, but it
insidiously affirms this distinction, while depriving it of any referentiality. It thus
brings alterity dangerously close to the world of sameness through the identity of
images and the apparent stability of truth, while preventing this coming together from
acquiring a fixed ground and substantiation, letting Otherness ‘recede into an
inaccessible distance.’65 Simulacra preoccupied Foucault in his studies of the history
of psychiatry, with hysteria being an exemplary case which inverted the Husserlian
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endeavour that seeks the meaning invested in appearances, installing falsehood into
the regime of truth that uncovers the essence behind phenomena.66 Through hysteria,
Foucault shows how the simulacrum is a form of resistance to psychiatric power and
truth, to the terms of the division between reason and madness, not a minor scientific
error.
Psychiatric diagnosis is the epistemological arena in which a battle is waged
between a psychiatry which strives to give medical meaning to madness, and those
who resist it from the standpoint of the role they are assigned as mental patients.
Foucault explores the terms of this conflict which unsettles precisely the diagnosis
that makes it possible, creating significant scientific and political effects. He shows
how the medicalization of madness is not a linear and irreversible task. There is a
price to pay for recognizing an experience as mad, and building, on the basis of this
recognition, forms of knowledge, normative frameworks of behaviour and potential
modes of existence as opposed to and in relation to the mad subject. There is a cost,
for psychiatry, in ‘constituting the madman as the absolute other in that it not only
pays this theoretical price, but also an institutional and even economic price as the
organization of psychiatry allows it to be determined.’67
Conclusion
Phenomenology is part of the rational project of psychology which tries to grasp
madness in terms of the significance of daily experience that it claims to be able to
analyse. Foucault, by contrast, shows that madness is a ‘focal point of experience,’68
an experience which, as Nietzsche, Blanchot and Bataille had shown, lies as close as
possible to the ‘impossibility of living […] at the limit or extreme.’69 It is a singular
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experience around which psychiatric, psychological and sociological knowledge has
been constructed, social forms of behaviour have been developed, and ethical norms
have been established. Foucault applies the same method and same type of critique in
all his studies on prison, sexuality and ethics. In a statement which epitomizes his
entire project, he points out that ‘I have taken pains to understand how man has
reduced some of his limit-experiences to objects of knowledge: madness, death, crime
[…] The relationship between limit-experiences and the history of truth. I am more or
less imprisoned or wrapped up in this tangle of problems.’70His preoccupation with
limit-experiences offered not only a critical weapon vis-à-vis institutions, but also a
way of reflecting on his epistemological concerns, his ethical attitude and his
treatment of the notion of the enlightenment.
Foucault considers the fate of those experiences at the limits of rationality in
western cultures. He does not offer theories that explain these experiences, but tries
instead to reflect on the effect that they have on rational thought. His aim is not to
liberate, understand or express the experience of madness, but to examine its
confrontation with reason. This is why Foucault’s main area of reflection was not
madness itself but the domain of all those conflicts and struggles which have taken
place around the question of madness. Although Foucault could have provided a
philosophical or psychological theory of madness from his perspective as a historian
and a thinker, he undertook his project from the position of the specific intellectual
who became directly involved with those struggles which have produced the
consciousness of madness, as well as with those conflicts through which madness
itself has challenged the rational world which tries to capture it. It is from within such
participation, from his personal engagement in real institutions, political debates and
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ethical confrontations provoked by the enigmatic experience of madness, that
Foucault has been able to produce a discourse both true and politically effective:
If one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and
effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the
struggles taking place in the area in question. I tried first to do a genealogy of
psychiatry because I had had a certain amount of practical experience in psychiatric
hospitals and was aware of the combats, the lines of force, tensions and points of
collision which existed there. My historical work was undertaken only as a function of
these conflicts. The problem and the stake there was the possibility of a discourse
which would be both true and strategically effective, the possibility of a historical
truth which could have a political effect.71
Enlightenment critique is a militant and ‘cynical phenomenology’, as Barthes would
say,72 where truth and experience do not form a common field reducible to
signification, but are in constant tension and mutual interdependence. Phenomenology
unfolds the entire field of possibilities connected to daily existence, seeking to unearth
the truth of experience through the ascription of meaning. For Foucault, by contrast,
experience contains no inherent meaning but organizes a mode of being which can be
mediated and interpreted only through the distinction between truth and falsity. The
ontology of ourselves in its raw state is not true or false, mad or sane. It is
transformed, modified and becomes politically important, when it relates to the truth:
An experience is neither true nor false: it is always a fiction, something constructed,
which exists only after it has been made, not before; it isn’t something that is ‘true’,
but it has been a reality. To summarize, then: the difficult relation with truth which is
entirely at stake in the way in which truth is found used inside an experience, not
fastened to it, and which, within certain limits, destroys it.73
Thus, enlightenment critique is not a form of Gnosticism; it does not offer a mode of
esoteric knowledge, an access to the secrets and mysteries of the experience of
madness through elaborate exegetical methods.74 It is not a form of mysticism either,
a form of union with the world of insanity, an ‘attempt to join — even if it means
crossing the night — the positivity of an existence by opening a difficult line of
communication with it.’75 As a critical ontology of the present, enlightenment critique
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takes experience as experiment, as its etymological root denotes, a test with the truth
which classifies that experience as irrational, mystical or meaningful.76 Hence
Foucault’s own appraisal of the History of Madness as an ‘experience-book,’ a
diagnosis of our current position in relation to madness, its perception and its history
in the modern world. It invites his readers to relate this experience to the test of truth
in order, not to provide an immediate grasp of madness in itself, but to incite debate
and provoke conflict around the established political, epistemological and ethical
criteria of truth which designate madness as an experience at the limits in our culture.
This is why Foucault’s work combines truth with fiction so that it demonstrates the
link of this experience with our present reality, and at the same time makes it appear
modified to us. ‘This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for
example, imprisonment, penalization) and at the same time to separate ourselves from
them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same form of
experience.’77
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CHAPTER 3
FOUCAULT’S EPISTEMOLOGY: SUBJECTIVITY, TRUTH, REASON AND THE
HISTORY OF MADNESS
Foucault’s critique of phenomenology dismantles the notion of the smooth
and linear progression of knowledge based on lived experience. Phenomenology
claims to be able to focus on the subjective experience of mental illness, to rigorously
describe it and to offer its understanding. By recording the history of forms of
rationality and of truthful discourse, Foucault shows that social structures and
practices frame and classify the subjective experience of mental illness on the basis of
true and false statements. At the limits of diagnostic taxonomy, reason reflects on the
conditions of impossibility for existence, transforming limit experiences into objects
of medical perception. This is how madness gave way to the birth of the asylum near
the end of the eighteenth century.
Critiquing the phenomenological universality of subjective experience amounts
to rejecting the fundamental character of the subject and its transcendental functions.
Foucault uses his critical-historical method in order, not to relativize the subject,
which is still part of the phenomenological project, but to show how the subject is
constructed and transformed throughout history. Social practices generate domains of
knowledge and cognition and inside these domains the subject can relate to its objects
of perception in a meaningful way. There is no pre-existent subject of representation,
as the point of origin from which knowledge is possible and truth appears. Subjects
and objects emerge simultaneously as a result of truth procedures specific to a given
historical period.1 The compatibility between subject and object is not necessary but
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contingent, it is the product of precise and identifiable rules of truth telling which
bring about the construction of the knowing subject as much as the object which is
known.2
This is Foucault’s step towards the conversion of phenomenology into
epistemology, as Deleuze points out.3 In this chapter we aim to show how the
epistemological account of enlightenment critique is the point of convergence of
Foucault’s historical and philosophical considerations. His epistemological analyses
indicate the central position that truth occupies in his system.4 His position vis-à-vis
truth, however, is, as we have shown, thoroughly historical and political. He therefore
seems to be a relativist who denounces the stability of truth and its universal validity.
Moreover, notwithstanding the logical rigour of his analyses, by reducing the
construction of truth and subjectivity to a primordial set of practices and forms of
rationality, he appears to be advocating the inevitable mixture of elements foreign to
scientific truth. This is why, as we shall discuss at length in the next chapter, he has
been labeled an anti-psychiatrist.
Strictly speaking, however, Foucault is not an epistemologist. An
epistemologist tries to measure the objective value of a science, the degree of its
universal validity, and to analyse its internal structure. She starts with an abstract,
universal knowing subject and then focuses on the structure and principles of
scientific statements themselves, examining their ability to yield true knowledge.5
Foucault’s domain of research, on the other hand, is, in the line of Canguilhem and
Bachelard, the coupling of epistemology and the history of science, studying how
historically determined sets of discourses, institutions and practices, bring into play
specific scientific activities through the production of truthful discourse.6 He does not,
therefore, contest the validity of scientific truth, and does not explore the conditions
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under which a scientific statement can be recognized as true. He rather explores the
external components which make the production of true scientific statements possible.
These components are undoubtedly heterogeneous to the scientific endeavour which
they engender, but they do not distort or falsify it.7 Foucault’s concern, therefore, is
not to reveal the impurity of a science, but to examine ‘how, approximately, can a
type of knowledge (savoir) with pretenses to scientificity arise from a real
practice…’8 Thus, as we shall now illustrate, he does not seek to question the
scientific status of the psychiatric subject in order to refute her ability to articulate true
statements, but, on the contrary, he investigates the extra-psychiatric forms of truth
telling which constitute the psychiatric subject as capable of formulating true
statements. He then considers the conditions under which these true statements can
produce valid knowledge about subjects recognizable as mentally ill, who, as a result
of this knowledge, are excluded, marginalized, encompassed, trained or guided in
their conduct and behaviour.9 Foucault therefore considers what he calls the ‘politics
of truth’, the social and institutional confrontations, struggles and conflicts producing
subjects qualified as psychiatrists, and the ‘ethics of truth,’ that is, the establishment
of certain relationships of subjects with themselves and others as a result and effect of
the psychiatric endeavour.10 This dynamic relationship between these three modalities
of truth (politics, science, ethics) permeates his epistemological studies in the field of
psychiatry. For Foucault, truth is thus not an endpoint for knowledge, but an activity
of establishing differences, the axis around which governmental practices, scientific
knowledge and ethical modes of subjectivity revolve.11
Foucault therefore dismantles the image of a calm history of progress based
on a founding subject whose increasing rationality will uncover the truth of mental
illness, free of any political or ethical determinations. Using the philosophical
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analogon of Descartes, he shows how in its origins psychiatry had established a
fundamental relationship with the otherness of madness, a relationship which became
epistemological only to the extent that it was simultaneously a juridico-political
concern and an ethical requirement for the definition of the norm in the late eighteenth
century. It was only since the development of positivism that psychiatry sought to
disengage its scientific knowledge from non-scientific elements but also to ground
political and ethical issues on the most objective research possible. This positivist
effort, Foucault argues, has sought to crystallize the rational psychiatric subject into a
transhistorical, universal source of knowledge and madness into a reality susceptible
to objective medical observation. Phenomenology, psychology and biology have
encompassed all fields of human behaviour, laying claim to a universal understanding
of all possible experience. The madman has disappeared as other and has become the
mentally ill. The historically contingent relationship between the psychiatrist as a
subject of knowledge and the mentally ill as newly formed medical object of study
has come to be seen as necessary and timeless. Truth is not regarded as a historical
factor bringing together subject and object, but as a more complete knowledge of the
object based on growing technological perfection. By claiming to be able to discover
the nature of mental illness, demonstrative psychiatric truth aims to provide
unequivocal answers to problems exceeding its own domain.
Foucault challenges this model of linear progress, not because he contests the
epistemological validity of psychiatry, but because it is precisely this validity which
creates the illusion of a necessary, scientifically grounded ethico-political unity. He
argues that this unity is contingent, fragile and precarious. Psychiatric knowledge
cannot dispense with madness and the philosophical, social and cultural issues that it
raises. It is madness itself which, at the edges of diagnosis, the psychiatric regime of
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truth par excellence, has destabilized the image of a politically and ethically neutral
psychiatric subject. Since the nineteenth century phenomena of monstrosity and
hysteria, there have been cases where the mentally ill re-emerge as others, as agents of
simulation who alter the game of truth imposed by psychiatric discourse. They
introduce splits inside diagnosis, depriving the ethico-political unity of its
epistemological foundation while renewing at the same time previously silent and
unquestionable political and ethical problems which bring about crises, ruptures and
breaks.
It is therefore in the confrontation with the radical alterity of madness that we
shall trace Foucault’s contribution to psychiatric epistemology as a form of
enlightenment critique. We shall demonstrate that Foucault’s enterprise is not merely
an anti-psychiatric treatise that views the invention of madness as a result of an
oppressive rationality. Foucault does not celebrate the exclusion of unreason as a
phenomenon whose study could give back to the madmen the voice that they have
been denied. He does not perform a moral or political inquiry into the cultural and
social prejudices that prevent doctors from acknowledging madness. Foucault rather
describes the ongoing epistemological battle between the scientists, who establish
divisions of truth and falsity, and the patients, who represent a term that lies beyond
these divisions. It is this conflict around the potential of articulating truth and falsity
in relation to mental illness that forces, we shall argue, psychiatry to reconsider its
ethical and political attitudes and gain awareness of the limits of its rationality.
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Foucault’s Scepticism
Foucault’s epistemological method is a form of scepticism.12 The notion that
what appears as timeless scientific truth involves non-scientific components which
participate in its construction, situates Foucault firmly within the sceptical trend of
thought. On several occasions Foucault himself declares that his method is sceptical,
placing himself within the Western sceptical tradition of Descartes, Kant and
Husserl.13 He does not, however, share the commonsensical epistemological use of
Cartesian and Kantian scepticism in the study of the relationship between the structure
of cognition and the demand for truth. He does not look for the threshold of
scientificity in a supposedly cognitive Cartesian — and Kantian — sceptical
framework which foregrounds the limitations of knowledge in the inaccessibility of
the knowing subject, as well as in the unattainable in-itself, ‘truth or a reality in
itself.’14 For Foucault, Kantian and Cartesian scepticism are singular in the history of
western epistemology insofar as they are not restricted to establishing the internal
rules of cognition, but scrutinize its external limitations and its relation to
irrationality. We saw Kant’s scepticism with regard to his reflections on finitude and
possibility of the anthropology in the previous chapters. We shall now discuss
Cartesian scepticism and its relevance to the History of Madness. Descartes, Foucault
argues, does not question the representational function of scientific propositions but
introduces external — political and ethical — elements constituting the matrix for the
emergence of propositions which can have a representational function. He does not
even advocate the primacy of the subject, but shows how subjectivity undergoes
transformations when it confronts radical alterity: madness. Madness is not merely the
limit of knowledge, but an alien experience which introduces a political and ethical
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context for the formation of scientific knowledge. This context, this spiritual
dimension of knowledge, will become the source of inspiration for Foucault and his
investigation of the historically informed rules which produce the cognition-truth axis
and problematize its limitations, shaping only at a final stage the internal truth criteria
for psychiatry.
Foucault’s scepticism therefore challenges the view that scientific discourse is
an autonomous, self-sufficient mode of truth-telling. He illustrates its dynamic
interaction, reciprocity and reversible relationship with truth demands imposed
externally on science by the practices of government within which it is born, and with
the ethical truth requirements that it produces in turn. This interaction between
politics, science and ethics had already been an area of concern for the ancient
thinkers. For the ancient Stoics and Cynics, the knowledge of the self and the world
did not concern the discovery of causal connections and the secrets of nature, but it
was a relational knowledge, a form of knowledge preoccupied with the relations
between politics, institutions and laws, and the possibility of rational discourse. This
same knowledge had an effect on the subject, as an ‘ethopoetic’ knowledge,
producing a specific relationship of the subject to himself.15 The problematic was the
same for the ancient Sceptics themselves, for whom the production of self-knowledge
constituted a rigorous examination of the subject’s consciousness closely linked to its
political role and the creation of ethical principles.16
The spiritual epistemology of the ancient tradition became marginalized since
the famous ‘Cartesian moment’ and the beginning of modern philosophy, when a
strict separation between politics, science and ethics took place.17 According to the
usual epistemological interpretation, Descartes’s Meditations introduce a radical
break with ancient spirituality, insofar as in them Descartes detaches the thinking
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subject from the political or ethical conditions needed for the transformation of the
subject’s mode of being in order for that subject to gain access to the truth. The
Meditations posit objective knowledge based on sound reasoning as the sole condition
for the truth. It is enough for the subject to follow a method whereby she will deduce
the law of her representations, never letting go of the line of self-evidence, for truth to
be attained. Descartes’s subject is, then, a transcendental, immutable agent whose
freedom from the constraints of interest, passion or morality constitutes the very
possibility for the discovery of truth in the form of objective, neutral knowledge.
Through systematic doubt of his senses, the same interpretation continues, Descartes
aims to reach a state of certainty which only pure thinking can provide, in the manner
that mathematics provides clear and distinct ideas. The obvious truth definitively
attained is the only requirement for the subject, which thereby becomes the
impersonal, universal subject, the agent and origin of a new scientific era, marking the
historical point when the institutionalization of modern science became possible.18
Our contention is, rather, that for Foucault the ‘Cartesian moment’ is not a
point of rupture but, on the contrary, a moment of revival of ancient scepticism which
paved the way for a type of philosophical reflection that would later permeate the
critical spirit of the enlightenment. In an original reading of the Meditations, Foucault
shows how Descartes in many ways renews the ancient problematic of spiritual
knowledge — hence the appearance of Foucault’s discussion of Descartes in a brief
but crucial analysis in the History of Madness. Descartes, Foucault shows, is not
merely seeking the foundations of knowledge, nor a foundational relationship of
knowledge and philosophy. Descartes is not even performing the usual sceptical
exercise which consists of thinking about everything in the world that could be
doubted, directing his search towards indubitable knowledge.19 If we read Descartes’s
94
thought experiment not as an intellectual method defining the law of representations,
but as a meditation, as its title suggests, it will become clear that Descartes performs a
test on himself as a subject, a test of truth through which his subjectivity emerges
transformed.20 Descartes is not concerned with the relation between his ideas and
reality or with the relationship between his mind and the external world. He does not
simply look for a ground for his beliefs and convictions, but primarily sets as the task
of his meditation to respond to the question: ‘how could I discover the truth?’21 As the
meditation proceeds, this search for truth transfigures the subject conducting the
meditation.22 Descartes’s will to truth is an ethical demand, a desire to avoid
deception so that the lucidity of self-examination and self-scrutiny can guide moral
decisions and the establishment of codes of personal conduct. It is also a political
demand, a demand of power placing truth itself in the privileged position of
determining the terms in which Descartes can constitute himself as a legitimate
scientific subject. This double demand, therefore, precedes and conditions the
constitution of scientific knowledge, it does not arise from it. Foucault demonstrates
that the Meditations do not merely proclaim the foundations of scientific theory, or
the ground of political or ethical principles based on scientific knowledge. They
constitute a spiritual exercise which tests the political and ethical effects that the truth
may have on subjectivity:
If Descartes’ Meditations are in fact an enterprise to found a scientific discourse in
truth, [they are] also an enterprise of parresia in the sense that it is actually the
philosopher as such who speaks in saying ‘I’, and in affirming his parresia in that
precisely scientifically founded form of evidence, and he does this in order first of all
to play a particular role in relation to the structures of power of ecclesiastical,
scientific, and political authority in the name of which he will be able to conduct
men’s conduct.23
Crucially, Descartes centers his moral and politically pertinent project around a
singular moment overlooked by conventional epistemology: the exclusion of
95
madness. In the series of tests to which he submits his thought, Descartes performs the
ultimate test, the most extreme hypothesis his rationality can endure. He hypothesizes
that there is one case in which simulation, the absolute condition of self-delusion, can
take on the form of perfect clarity, and where doubt ceases to exist. This case is
madness. The mad subject, Descartes argues, firmly and clearly believes that
everything around her, the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, sounds, are illusory;
she believes that her body is made of glass, or she has no hands, or eyes. Whereas for
the rational subject this identification is submitted to doubt, for the mad subject it is
an unequivocal reality, a distinct and clear conviction free of the possibility of
deception. Whereas for the rational subject this state of absolute certainty is merely an
extreme hypothesis, a limit case suggested by an evil genius which introduces the
possibility of deception, for the mad subject it is a state of absolute and unconditional
truth.24 It is on account of this unconditionality, this impossibility and this exteriority
with regard to all hypotheses that madness is excluded: madness is not a defect
intrinsic to knowledge itself. It is not endogenous to reason, a product of its excess. It
is not a property of the object, of its structure and essence. It is postulated by reason
as an external condition for the attainment of truth, as a limit beyond which truth
becomes unconditional and therefore absurd.25 Madness must therefore be excluded if
the doubting subject is to exert an ethical and political role based on truth.
Descartes’s breakthrough, therefore, consists of excluding madness in a
threefold manner. Madness is not excluded as a formal or objective condition of
knowledge, but as an external, spiritual and ethical condition of truth: ‘In order to
know the truth I must not be mad.’26 The rational subject may well be impure or
immoral and still know the truth, but self-delusion is the sole extra-ethical condition.
It is a state of mind governed by a private, incommensurable truth which cannot be
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communicated; it cannot be transformed into ethos. Secondly, madness is excluded
politically; employing the term demens, Descartes disqualifies the mad subject as a
legal category incapable of certain religious, civil and legal acts. Insofar as the mad
subject represents the impossibility of thought itself, legal rights do not apply to it.27 It
stands outside juridical rules, the possibility of rational punishment and correction. It
is therefore marginalized with respect to rational norms. Finally, after this political
and ethical exclusion has taken place, the mechanisms responsible for the disordered
reason inside the mind of the mad person can be made intelligible. Only after madness
is conceived as an impossibility of thought, an exteriority and even a threat to reason,
can it be contemplated as a rectifiable disease, an object of a constituted knowledge. It
is then that the mad subject can become an object of medical reflection, and not only
an ethically and politically disqualified subject. It can be problematized medically as
an effect of truth. This, as we shall show, is crucial for the emergence of psychiatry as
a scientific enterprise. There is no pre-existent ‘mad’ object which calls for a rational
investigation of its nature. Nor is there a rational subject which creates the object
‘madman’ ex nihilo. Both emerge in a reciprocal relation, as a result of the effects of
truth, when the truth is taken to its limits, to simulation.
Thus Descartes does not posit an abstract, universal knowing subject which
grounds the structure and principles of scientific statements.28 Starting with this
assumption, current mainstream epistemology studies the scientific rules which stem
from the relationship of an originary subject with an equally fixed and transparent
object, a relationship irreducible to political categories. The ‘Cartesian moment’ is the
founding instance for this epistemology which regards social relations and political
forms as elements foreign to the knowledge relation, setting for itself the task of
defining the strict separation, incommensurability and heterogeneity between politics,
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science and ethics. Any confusion and interdependence between these domains is
regarded as a negative component clouding and obscuring the knowledge relation, and
it is the duty of epistemology to restrict as much as possible the obfuscating influence
of political and social conditions on the subject of knowledge ‘who rightfully should
be open to the truth.’29 Foucault, on the other hand, argues that in Descartes political
and ethical conditions do not constitute an obstacle or a veil for the subject of
knowledge, but play a positive role in the production of this subject and its
correspondent object. The subject of knowledge is not given but is transformed the
more she seeks the truth, by way of the effect upon her occasioned by the articulation
of truth. This transformation entails prohibitions, interdictions and restrictions which
the scientific subject must follow in order to remain scientific. Cartesian
epistemology, Foucault shows, is essentially an ascetic practice, a process whereby
the subject explores the part of himself which must be renounced if she wants to
behave rationally and regulate her behaviour on true principles. The Cartesian
scientist submits to the ascetic price of reason, accepting the necessity of excluding
her irrational side as a condition for the modification of her mode of being in order to
ensure access to the truth.
From Descartes to the History of Madness
Let us now look at how Foucault applies his critical reading of Descartes to the
History of Madness. Foucault shows how the triple Cartesian exclusion (political,
epistemological and ethical) of the mad subject took place on a social level at a
specific point in history. This is not to imply that the reasons for this exclusion are
reducible to the rationalist process of a transcendental Cartesian subject, applicable to
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all periods. On the contrary, Foucault shows that the heart of these transformations
occurred not during the time of Descartes, but almost a hundred years later, during the
Enlightenment. This is Foucault’s main concern: to explain why madness became an
object of knowledge during the Enlightenment, and under which conditions. His aim
is to replace the simplistic view that the Enlightenment inherited Descartes’s rational
project and brought it to its climax, with the critical approach which brings to the fore
crucial distinctions and decisions made by the man of the Enlightenment amidst
existing forms of rationality.30 Instead of treating the individual of the late eighteenth
century as a pre-given rational subject seeking to exclude madness in order to assert
the autonomy and sovereignty of her rationality, Foucault explores the historical
conditions under which this subject was formed as rational through the exclusion of
madness. Repeating but also going beyond Descartes’s asceticism which begins with
a fundamental will to truth, a presupposed methodical path of doubt from which
madness must be excluded, Foucault is even more sceptical: he examines how such a
will to truth emerged historically, which conditions generated it, and why it
necessitated the exclusion of madness. If, for Descartes, something has to be
renounced in order for knowledge to be produced, Foucault reverses this proposition
by asking, ‘what must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce
anything?’31 Starting with this question, Foucault sets out to demonstrate that the
Cartesian will to truth is not transhistorical but it was the product of the specific
agonistic interplay of political, scientific and ethical components which surfaced in
the late eighteenth century. The result of this interplay was the exclusion of madness
and its problematization for the first time in western history as a domain of political
reflection, institutional transformation, establishment of normality and medical
attention.
99
Foucault does not argue that madness was outside the sphere of medical
concern until its medicalization in the eighteenth century and the advent of modern
psychiatry. On the contrary, he demonstrates that in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the medicine of madness was entirely within the corpus of general medicine,
in terms of aetiology and therapy. ‘Maladies of the spirit’ existed and theories of
humours were used to explain mental disorder. Somatic and mental treatments, baths
and theatrical performances were medical remedies for insanity. Also, Foucault does
not ignore the fact that certain places inside hospitals or private institutions were
reserved especially for the mad, such as the Hôtel-Dieu in Paris or the Bethlem
hospital in England. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the newly born
asylum bore completely different medical and institutional characteristics. Madness
became an object of knowledge as a separate and marginalized topic, not as a
condition requiring medical attention like other somatic illnesses. ‘It was a matter of
understanding how, in the Western world, madness had become a precise object of
analysis and scientific investigation only starting in the eighteenth century, even
though there had previously been medical treatises concerning (in brief chapters)
‘maladies of the spirit.’32 Alienism replaced the theories of humours and the asylum
therapist was not linked to the possession of professional medical qualification, in the
sense of ownership of a corpus of scientific medical knowledge. Medical treatises and
taxonomic systems differed radically from the medical theories written only one
generation before.33 The architectural design of the asylum in no way resembled the
general hospitals where the mentally disordered had until then been treated.34 There
was a sudden rupture, a clear discontinuity in the care of the mentally ill from the
moment madness became the object of specific medical and anthropological reflection
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in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a discontinuity which Foucault
sets out to analyse.
If Foucault were an enlightenment optimist, he would have claimed that
the rationality of Descartes and the political rationality that culminated in the French
Revolution, reached a stage of maturity during this period, that scientists and
politicians had become ‘enlightened’ enough to be able to identify mental illness and
offer the mad a humane treatment for the first time. If, on the contrary, his work were
an anti-enlightenment project, he would have attributed the birth of psychiatry to an
intensification of social control. The social order of the rational state would place
madmen under close surveillance to ensure the safety of the path towards reason and
progress. Foucault takes neither of these two sides. He refuses the ‘blackmail’ of the
Enlightenment. Instead, he speaks of two new elements which introduce a break in
relation to the allegedly smooth progress of seventeenth century rationality. He speaks
of fear and division.
A central feature of the late eighteenth century rationality, fear was a result of
urbanization and the new disciplinary governmentality. The fear was of the crowding
together of the population, the fear of epidemics, the excessive height of the buildings,
the fear of the cohabitation of the rich and the poor in an undifferentiated urban
environment.35 This fear gave rise to the need for an administrative division which
became possible with the emergence of a new type of knowledge during this period.
In the Order of Things Foucault notes an important mutation that took place in the
eighteenth century scientific rationality. In the eighteenth century, the plethora of
information gathered called for a classification of data. Whereas previously mathesis
was an ontology, a precise quantitative measurement of the world, and taxonomy
simply a mode of ordering of things measured, in the eighteenth century there was a
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Taxinomia universalis, a priority of specifying identities and differences which would
direct measurement. Kant’s analysis was crucial in this respect.36 Amidst this fear, a
new technology of truth arose, a call for a division and establishment of differences:
How could the madman be recognized? How could she be singled out without error?
Things no longer stood as they did in the Renaissance where madness had appeared
with clear signs, threatening reason with contradiction. Confusion now emerged as
there was no clear-cut way of distinguishing between those who are really mad and
those who were arbitrarily mingled with them. Diagnosis was crucial in order to
prevent chaos and the generation of even greater fear. It was important for the
arrangement of spaces and the clarification of forensic issues. For Foucault, the
primacy of differentiation at this historical point took place even before the scientific
theories about the mentally ill had been constructed: ‘working at the limits of the
resources that we have at our disposal, we can still partially trace the evolution of a
long, painstaking process of classification that moved in parallel to the theoretical
model but was entirely independent from it.’37 Diagnostic thinking in the late
eighteenth century established for the first time a truth regime which called for
differences and sought to authenticate mental disorder. This truth regime came to pick
out the mad as the genuinely ill among those indiscriminately confined. Mad were not
the evil, the mystics or the destitute, the dreamers or the mentally deficient. They
were those who were incapable of doubting, and therefore incapable of verifying what
they thought. They displayed a capacity to use arguments according to the rules of
logic, but they lacked judgment: they were unable to see through their mental images
because they gave absolute truth value to them. They never questioned the validity of
what they perceived. Their convictions were unshakable:
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the act of a reasonable man who, rightly or wrongly, judges an image to be true or
false, goes beyond the image, and measures it against that which is not. The madman,
by contrast, never steps over the image that appears. He allows himself instead to be
totally caught up in its immediate vivacity, and only gives his approval in so far as he
is entirely absorbed in it […] Whereas error is simply non-truth, and dreams neither
affirm nor judge, madness fills the void of error with images, and binds fantasies
together through affirmation of falsehood.38
Thus for late eighteenth century rationality the insane belonged to Descartes’s
category of demens, which is why their exclusion was primarily a juridico-political
act. The law posed specific demands on doctors to distinguish rigorously between
what will count as true and false illness. So as not to punish unjustly the one whose
crime was caused by madness rather than an act of choice, it was necessary for the
law to differentiate as clearly as possible between authentic and inauthentic madness.
Doctors were asked to perform a diagnosis, a differentiation and classification of
irrational behaviours, in order to ensure that justice could be administered to the
legally responsible, and urban fear could be lessened. Crucially, as we shall show in
greater detail in the next chapter, jurisprudence did not forcibly dictate diagnostic
procedures, it did not interfere with medical knowledge, but prompted the distinction
of true and false phenomena of illness, rendering doctors capable of producing for the
first time knowledge concerning the insane. Jurisprudence was an external factor
which set up the truth conditions for the reciprocal formation of madness as an object
susceptible of being understood and determined, and of the rational subject of mental
medicine. This is why Foucault considers the law as the most fundamental political
component in the genesis and development of psychiatric discourse.
The second type of exclusion was ethical. The newly born psychiatric
knowledge was obliged to legitimate and delineate the norm scientifically. The
psychiatric decision, to treat and correct medically, influenced and generated a whole
field of education and pedagogy. In the late eighteenth century, doctors intervened
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diagnostically in matters of morality, as a result of the bifurcation and close kinship
between medical psychology and the institutionalization of ethical behaviour. For the
late eighteenth century doctor there was a fundamental separation between those
unreasonable individuals who could not doubt their experiences, and those who were
simply law breakers, social outcasts or sexually promiscuous. For the first time since
the classical age, the libertines, the vagabonds and the poor were left outside the
medical milieu. They fell outside psychiatric and legal jurisdiction as they were
indeed unreasonable but in the sense that they were the manifestation of a form of
reason ‘alienated in the unreason of the heart,’ and therefore not legally incompetent
or politically irresponsible.39 Theirs was a reason that served the desires of the heart
and its use was indistinguishable from disorder resulting from immorality, but it was
clearly not madness. In an important passage in the History of Madness, Foucault
mentions a letter sent by Marquis de Sade’s doctor, Royer-Collard, to the chief of
police in 1808. Royer-Collard wished to discharge Sade from Charenton in order to
turn it into a hospital. In his letter, he states that he does not believe that Sade is mad,
but simply a man of vice who cannot be treated medically but is in need of
imprisonment. His diagnosis, like many others that separated the world of unreason
from that of madness, was decisive:
Royer-Collard no longer understood correctional existence. Having looked for its
meaning in illness, and failing to find it there, he reverts to an idea of pure evil, which
has no reason for existence other than its own unreason, which he terms the delirium
of vice. The day of that letter to Fouché, classical reason ended, leaving its own
enigma, and that strange unity that grouped together so many diverse faces was
definitely lost to us.40
With the insertion of the new type of diagnosis, the absolute diagnosis between
madness and reason, the doctor had to give an account of this division, in order to
determine how these patients would be treated, how many of them deserved and could
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benefit from internment, and to what extent they posed a danger to society. So the
doctor employed the theory of alienism to identify and explain the behaviour of these
individuals. The madman was now an object which was isolated physically, observed
daily and explained medically. At the same time, the rational subject of the
psychiatrist was formed. He was an alienist whose role was to define, explain and
manage his new object of study within a specified location — the mental hospital. He
became responsible for all the production of knowledge relating to this new field of
medicine. Psychiatry was born.
The Death and Return of the Other
Our analysis of Foucault’s reading of Descartes has attempted to refute the
one-dimensional interpretation of the History of Madness as either a historical
document, inaccurate in many respects, or as a structuralist endeavour devoid of
epistemological validity.41 Our discussion is closer to readings such as Derrida’s, who
has drawn special attention to the simultaneous historical and philosophical originality
of Foucault’s work which is closely linked to his reflections on Descartes.42 Unlike
Derrida, however, we have placed greater emphasis on the history of truth as it
operates in the background of the exclusion of the insane, showing how this
background constitutes an essential component of enlightenment critique. Thus, we
illustrated that a particular game of truth in the late eighteenth century focused on
madness as the impossibility for thought. We have shown how diagnosis was the truth
regime which satisfied the double requirement of responding to the needs of the late
eighteenth century universe of taxonomy, and of conforming to the rules of medical
theory and juridical practice. This diagnostic regime of veridiction simultaneously
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generated madness as the outside of reason, and constructed the rational subject who
supervised spaces of confinement such as the asylum in which madness was isolated
and studied. It established madness firmly as the true, authentic illness, representing a
marginal and borderline experience foreign to morality and normality.
It is therefore obvious that it is in diagnosis, the truth regime of psychiatry
par excellence, where politics, epistemology and ethics meet. Diagnosis, as we
indicated in the previous chapter, is not a neutral epistemological endeavour operating
in a strict phenomenological field. It is a metalinguistic discourse, a discursive
practice through which the elements and rules of construction of a language, one that
can be called psychiatric, are defined.43 But it is not value laden; it is not permeated
by extra-scientific, ideological or moral categories.44 On the contrary, in order for
these categories to have a political effect, they have to rely on the ability of diagnosis
to establish a domain in which truth and falsity can be made pertinent. As we have
shown, forms of rationality set up programmes, lay down collective values and goals,
and dictate codes of governing and ways of doing things. These programmes, goals
and regulations are not free floating but are attached to the production of true and
false. They rely on true discourses which ‘found, justify and provide reasons and
principles for these ways of doing things.’45 Rationality does not exert power through
the imposition of truthful discourse that is accepted blindly. It ‘wills the truth’; that is,
it poses a demand for a distinction, the strict separation between true and false
statements; the legitimacy and acceptability that this division provides constitutes the
power of rationality, creating what will count as real and valid for scientific
research.46 This was precisely the function of psychiatric diagnosis as it was
constructed in the late eighteenth century: a set of true and false propositions which
offered scientific legitimacy to the political and ethical pretensions of a specific form
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of rationality. These propositions did not represent the reality of mental illness; they
established a differential diagnosis, a basic distinction, a dual field between madness
and sanity, conditioning any subsequent investigation of mental illness, its ontology,
the modes of being connected to it, the institutional structures supporting it, and the
cultural norms emanating from it.47
It was from the late nineteenth century when psychiatry sought to become a
normed, regulated, established medical science embodied in institutions, that
psychiatric diagnosis was divorced from its inherent political and ethical implications,
presenting itself as an objective and rigorous activity isomorphous and strictly
continuous with the rest of medicine. In order to achieve this isomorphism, psychiatry
sought to dispense with the otherness of madness and its political and ethical bearings,
so that a rigorous epistemology could provide objective access to illness and valid
methods of its cure. From the middle nineteenth century onwards, biology, genetics,
psychology and degeneration served as the aetiological factors of mental disorder.
Madness ceased to be the ‘absolute other’ of reason, and psychiatry would look for
natural factors that would differentiate types of mental illness. There was no longer a
dividing line between madness and reason, but a spectrum of illnesses with a
biological reality that should be uncovered using medical means of investigation.
Doctors ceased to be alienists and became psychiatrists, armed with medical
knowledge. This was the dawn of the age of the transformation of psychiatry into a
medical specialism. It was and still is characterized, not by the exclusion of madness
as other, but by the elimination of otherness itself. It paved the way for a narrative
according to which psychiatry has always followed the model of a medical science,
capable of discovering the reality of mental illness in a linear progressive fashion,
supported by neuroscience and advanced technology.
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Foucault’s scepticism critiques psychiatric practice precisely for this
supposed level of neutrality and scientific sophistication. He insists that non-scientific
elements have not been abolished, but have merely been obfuscated by the ‘whiggish-
march-of-progress’ view of psychiatry. He shows how the linear progress of
positivism merely appears to be independent from the political and ethical truth
demands which are nevertheless still imposed on psychiatric knowledge. Thus, it is
not the rationalization of psychiatric knowledge but the political imperative of
security which has extended the diagnostic and therapeutic powers of twentieth
century positivist psychiatry, and has increased its preventive role to the scientific
protection of society through heredity, familial sexuality, education and detection of
crime. Also, it is not the humanization of psychiatric practice but the social pressure
of the ethic of public hygiene and socialization which has created the conditions for
the abolition of the asylum through a massive deinstitutionalization, and the
generalization of psychological therapy and medical care. It is not because psychiatry
has adopted the advances of medicine and technological development (neuroscience,
psychopharmacology), but because there is a consistent ethico-political desire for
global medicalization and normalization, that psychiatry has achieved the discovery
of biological and psychosocial abnormalities to explain mental disorder.
Foucault does not question the scientificity of neurobiological and social
psychiatry, its objectivity or its demonstrative truth. He shows how this scientificity
has generated the false image of the solidity and unity of psychiatric diagnosis which
is, in actuality, determined by forces external to it. His critique consists of indicating
those occasions when madness itself shutters this false image, precisely at the moment
when positivism claims to have entirely dispensed with it. Madness resists its
integration, not by refuting the biological or psychological model of psychiatry, but,
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on the contrary, by conforming perfectly to it, while renewing the political and ethical
problems which lie behind it:
Psychiatry as we know it couldn’t have existed without a whole interplay of political
structures and without a set of ethical attitudes; but inversely, the establishment of
madness as a domain of knowledge changed the political practices and the ethical
attitudes that concerned it. It was a matter of determining the role of politics and
ethics in the establishment of madness as a particular domain of scientific knowledge,
and also of analyzing the effects of the latter on the political and ethical practices.48
Foucault examines thoroughly the clinical forms through which madness disrupts the
coherence of diagnostic truth. As we shall see in the following chapters, he studies the
case of the dangerous individual of nineteenth century forensic psychiatry, and the
problem of hysteria in the neurology of the same period. Both clinical entities
emerged from within a diagnostic truth regime that sought to impose scientific
uniformity between the law and evidence-based medicine, as well as between
neurology and alienism. The singularity of these patients consisted not in escaping
these categorizations, but in fracturing the desired interdisciplinary continuum. While
appearing as ordinary medical categories, these patients challenged either the political
role of psychiatrists, or the established ethical codes couched in normality. Thus,
dangerousness became a dubious clinical category, oscillating between legal and
psychiatric truth. It defied its legitimate placement either in prison or in a mental
hospital, provoking administrative rather than a strictly juridical or medical reaction.
Similarly, hysteria belonged neither to a general hospital nor to a psychiatric
institution or even to the psychoanalytic couch; it was a singular mode of subjectivity
irreducible to medical or psychological norms.49 Neither of these clinical cases
undermined theories and causal explanations, but, more radically, they both disrupted
the truth of psychiatric discourse. They occupied an epistemological void, a non-space
where psychiatrists were forced to exert a political and moral, rather than strictly
109
scientific role. They were both monsters, not only because they provoked fear, danger
or bewilderment, not only because they appeared as inhuman, other, but mainly
because they were epistemologically exterior to whole field of normality created by
psychiatric theory. They showed that psychiatry, like ‘each discipline recognizes true
and false propositions; but it pushes back a whole teratology of knowledge beyond its
margins.’50
Increasing the rationalisation of psychiatric practice will not abolish but
will only accentuate the confrontation with the political and ethical implications of
madness inside psychiatric practice. This is because truth is not a property of the
object or an achievement of rationality. It is a product of political, ethical and
scientific disputes, an event which irrupts suddenly in the form of crises.51 In the
truth-crisis, madness reintroduces fear, distance and division inside the established
unity, homogeneity and continuity which positivism seeks to achieve through the
rejection of the ‘prejudices’ connected to the ethical and political questions of
otherness. It is the mad, the patients themselves, who dismantle the positivist
continuity between the two poles of the knowledge relationship,52 in a process which
reverses the Cartesian epistemological problematic by taking it to its Nietzschean
extreme. While Descartes would accept the necessity of excluding madness as a price
that the psychiatric subject must pay in order to remain the master of meaning,
representation and causality, Nietzsche would celebrate the strategies of counterfeit,
evasion and disguise through which madness disturbs the diagnostic truth game,
challenging the hegemonic position of the subject in the field of representation.53 For
Nietzsche, as Foucault reads him, it would not be the exclusion but the inclusion of
madness which costs the psychiatric subject her authority in the field of knowledge.
The more the psychiatric subject aspires to transgress the limits of her knowledge, the
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more she sacrifices herself as an agent of knowledge, will and representation.
Confronting madness, the psychiatric subject loses her status as the origin of
knowledge, meaning and truth, and she is no longer the universal Kantian agent of
knowledge and morality.54 On the contrary, she loses her unity and becomes multiple,
facing the fact that she is ‘not one but split, not sovereign but dependent, not an
absolute origin but a function ceaselessly modified.’55
Conclusion
Foucault resists the epistemological claims to a general theory of all science
or of every possible scientific statement. Contrary to the epistemological discourse
which investigates the rules and forms, the conditions and structures of truth-telling,
Foucault analyses truthful discourse in close relation to the political structures within
which it can arise and become possible, and to the forms of subjectivity to which it is
linked. In other words, he explores the political and institutional conditions under
which a scientist can acquire the ability to articulate true psychiatric discourse, and
the modes of subjectification which this discourse generates. Thus, Foucault’s area of
concern is the domain that combines the history of science (the political forces, power
relations and institutional framework which determine the formation of specific
modes of scientific knowledge) and epistemology (the distinction between truth and
falsity governing knowledge, and the way this distinction interacts with modes of
government and forms of subjectivity).56 In this field of research, Foucault explores
the interdependence between truth, power and ethics, without seeking their
identification, underlying unity or strict separation. Instead he shows that
enlightenment critique consists in bringing these aspects together, raising the question
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of each with constant reference to the others, without confusing them, relativizing
them, or denying their specificity: ‘It is the discourse of the irreducibility of truth,
power and ēthos, and at the same time the discourse of their necessary relationship, of
the impossibility of thinking truth (alētheia), power (politeia), and ēthos without their
essential, fundamental relationship to each other.’57 Power relations, epistemological
structures and ethical issues find their locus of interaction, mutual dependence or even
antagonism in the activity of articulating truthful discourse. The role of critique,
however, is not to suspend political and ethical issues so that it can ensure that the
process of reasoning that a psychiatrist follows is correct in determining whether his
statements are true. It rather poses questions concerning the rationality that underpins
the qualification of the psychiatrist as a truth-teller; it challenges the moral, ethical
and political conditions that entitle her to present herself and to be considered as a
truth-teller; it considers the consequences of telling the truth about subjects and
imposing this truth as a norm. It is at the level of its practice that Foucault challenges
the truth which endows the psychiatrist with the position of a valid speaker of
scientific discourse, questioning the self-evidence of her status and her
indispensability, and foregrounding the effects of her discourse on the object which it
addresses and about which she is qualified to speak (the mad, the mentally ill, the
psychoanalytic subject).58
Foucault’s psychiatric critique is not a form of nihilism.59 He does not deny
the existence of psychiatric truth, and does not attach this truth to systems of arbitrary
(political and ethical) values which need to be overthrown. Instead, he critiques these
systems of values on the basis of contingent but intelligible
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practices of truth telling.60 If there are values and metaphysical prejudices hidden in
rationality, these do not determine the emergence of truth according to a certain
causality.61 The truth that they seek to produce no longer belongs to them. On the
contrary, truth reverses values, silences certain behaviours or gives voice and expression
to others. Truth is a perspective, not in the sense of being relative on account of
limitations inherent in human nature, but because it is strategic and polemic.62 It involves
incessant struggles, rivalry and disputes. We should not, Foucault points out, look to
philosophers but to politicians, if we really want to grasp the root of truth and its
manufacture.63 Truth is not the exclusive possession of an inventive mind nor the product
and ownership of reason, but an effect of relationships of domination, conflict and
debate: ‘devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion
of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their
spirit of competition — their personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of
reason.’64 Critique illustrates how every diagnostic statement made by the psychiatrist
opens up a battlefield, an agonistic space. However neutral and objective the utterances
of the psychiatrist may be, they define, organize and distribute the whole set of power
relations of her institution, posing at the same time the question of the ethos to which her
institutional structure will give space. Inversely, no moral or pedagogical values, no
partial goals or ideological forms will ever prevail, insofar as they will never find full and
absolute legitimacy in truth to which they will always remain foreign and irreducible.
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CHAPTER 4
IS FOUCAULT AN ANTI-PSYCHIATRIST?
In the previous chapter, we saw that for Foucault the truth of a science is
not measured in terms of the progress it supposedly makes in the wider scope of the
history of science, or by its accordance with the standards of epistemology. It is
produced in the form of crises, events and singularities, in the place where the history
of that science and its epistemology overlap. It is the result of a constant political,
scientific and ethical battle which is being waged inside sciences as rigorous as
mathematics and as dubious as psychiatry, which ‘only has an imaginary relationship
with scientific knowledge.’1 We shall now attempt to demonstrate this battle as it
arises in real psychiatric practice through the study of concrete examples which
Foucault himself described and analysed with the astuteness and erudition of a
clinician. We shall begin in this chapter with the political conflicts, the legal disputes
and the juridical and administrative debates which took place outside the asylum in
the late eighteenth century and which had a founding effect on the formation of
psychiatric diagnosis and a novel relationship with unreason in the west. We shall
then illustrate that when the political stakes which these conflicts expressed changed
almost a hundred years later, diagnosis was altered accordingly and alienism became
marginalized. In contrast to anti-psychiatry, which claims that the conflicts inherent to
psychiatric diagnosis will forever prevent psychiatry from achieving its ideal end goal
of dispensing with alienism altogether, Foucault considers alienism itself as an
integral part of psychiatric diagnosis, dismantling the anthropological and positivist
illusion of psychiatry. It is important, therefore, that Foucault’s critique be juxtaposed
with and thoroughly contrasted to the anti-psychiatrists. While for anti-psychiatry the
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vulnerability of psychiatric diagnosis to political influence constitutes an
epistemological defect which cancels the valid position of psychiatry in the history of
the sciences, for Foucault diagnostic truth is the starting viewpoint, the angle from
which political power can be judged, critiqued or overturned.
The History of Madness and anti-psychiatry
When the History of Madness was published, it was generally received with
silence and indifference. As Foucault himself observes, apart from an isolated
favourable reaction which came from literary circles (Blanchot, Barthes),2 most
psychiatrists and historians received the book with scepticism. Psychiatrists were
mostly preoccupied with theoretical debates, paying little attention to the book’s
historical approach, while historians showed little or no interest. Some of the
psychiatrists who reacted to the book were Marxists who examined it from the angle
of the epistemological concerns of the Soviet school of psychiatry to which they
adhered (Pavlov, reflexology). But even this group of scientists dismissed Foucault’s
research as ideologizing and falsified a few years later.3 When the anti-psychiatric
movement gained popularity in the 1960s, the book became the object of severe
criticism and systematic attack; it was immediately labeled as anti-psychiatric, the
‘gospel of the devil’ among psychiatrists,4 a treatise which denied the reality of
mental illness, represented psychiatric knowledge as pseudoscientific, and portrayed
Enlightenment rationality as an oppressive power that excluded unreason. Foucault
became associated with Laing, Cooper and Szasz, and was introduced as a
representative of anti-psychiatry in various seminars and conferences.5 Foucault
reacted to such a categorization and rejected it on several occasions. He protested that
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his work had been clearly misread as advocating the inexistence of psychiatric
knowledge or demonstrating the mythology behind it:
Sometimes people have read my book about madness as if I had written that madness
does not exist, or that madness was either a myth in medical or psychiatric discourse,
or that it was a consequence of mental institutions. I have never said that madness
does not exist or that it is only a consequence of these institutions.6
Foucault did not contest the validity of psychiatric discourse or the therapeutic role of
the asylum, but merely performed a study of the way various practices contributed to
the rise of psychiatry as a medical discipline. His critics failed to grasp the historical
scope of his research which, far from disputing the existence of mental illness,
explored the conditions of its emergence as a field of positive knowledge. This is why
their interpretation of the book — as a theoretical piece of work engaged in a polemic
against psychiatry — appeared to Foucault as highly inaccurate and enigmatic:
It is, however, rather curious that all the psychiatrists have read this as a book of anti-
psychiatry — a book which says explicitly: I shall speak of what has happened with
regard to madness and mental illness between the middle of the seventeenth century
and the beginning of the eighteenth, roughly speaking — and I have not gone beyond
Pinel. As if the book were speaking about the mental situation! [...] it wasn’t a matter
in any case of a direct attack on contemporary psychiatry, because it stopped at
analyzing facts and events that took place no later than the beginning of the nineteenth
century. And so why did people insist on seeing in that work a direct attack on
contemporary psychiatry? 7
Foucault remained puzzled by this miscomprehension, which he characterized as
superficial. He went on to make the humorous remark that it is exactly this type of
reaction regarding the historical origins of a scientific enterprise, however shameful
they may be, that marks the enterprise itself as pseudo-scientific.8
Lecturing on psychiatric topics at the Collège de France a few years after the
publication of the History of Madness, Foucault reiterated his own critical project, and
gave an alternative account of his relationship with anti-psychiatry. In the course
summary of his lectures published under the title Psychiatric Power, he analyses the
historical role of anti-psychiatry and he offers a different perspective on the type of
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critique that this movement promotes. Anti-psychiatry is a diverse phenomenon which
has permeated psychiatric practice since the historical point when the psychiatric
institution and the doctor’s role in it were put into question. Foucault notes that anti-
psychiatric discourse and practice are not restricted to the critique of the validity of
medical knowledge, but they extend to a systematic attack on the psychiatric
institution. Anti-psychiatry does not deny madness, but on the contrary aims at
liberating it from the constraining effects of medical intervention: ‘I think this enables
us to understand what is at stake in anti-psychiatry, which is not at all the truth value
of psychiatry in terms of knowledge (of diagnostic accuracy or therapeutic
effectiveness). The struggle with, in, and against the institution is at the heart of anti-
psychiatry.’9 Foucault shows how anti-psychiatry disputes the validity of psychiatric
discourse not from a strictly epistemological standpoint, but always in relation to the
doctor’s power, and the truth effects of his discourse on the patient. What it questions
is not the set of scientific statements or methods followed, but their ability to yield
truth claims about mental illness, to the extent that the doctor’s power and his role in
the asylum distorts and compromises their truth value:
It seems that the major tremors that have shaken psychiatry since the end of the
nineteenth century have all basically called the doctor’s power into question; his
power and its effect on the patient, more than his knowledge and the truth he told
regarding the illness. More precisely, let us say that, from Bernheim to Laing or
Basaglia, what was at stake was how the doctor’s power was involved in the truth of
what he said and, conversely how this truth could be fabricated and compromised by
his power.10
Despite their different perspectives and positions, anti-psychiatrists share a common
interest in the way relations of power have determined the distribution of roles in the
asylum, the epistemological approach to mental illness, and the forms of medical
intervention. Foucault credits anti-psychiatry with bringing this type of critique,
which focuses on the relations of power and the articulation of truthful discourse in
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the psychiatric institution, centre stage: ‘The typical reversal of antipsychiatry
consists in placing them, rather, at the centre of the problematic field and questioning
them in a fundamental way.’11 At this point Foucault’s own critique becomes
pertinent. His analysis in the History of Madness also revolves around the relationship
between power relations and the production of truth inside psychiatric discourse
which eventually determines the division between reason and madness. Foucault
makes it clear in Psychiatric Power that the systems of representation of madness that
he explores in the History of Madness are the result of an ‘apparatus of power and
game of truth, apparatus of power and discourse of truth.’12 But in spite of its apparent
affinity with anti-psychiatry, Foucault’s critique is fundamentally different. Anti-
psychiatry rests on certain a priori conceptions of power and truth which are regarded
as inherent to the functioning of the institution. The doctor-patient relationship is
always a relationship of domination and subjugation, and the truth that the doctor
holds and promotes is a scientific legitimization and justification of his oppressive
role. Foucault’s critique is more sceptical; his analysis contests the transhistoricity and
universality of a single type of power relation between psychiatrists and the mentally
ill and reveals the historical transformations that power undergoes in the psychiatric
institution. He shows how particular types of power relations produce different truth
regimes which determine the position of the mad as objects of knowledge, without
necessarily operating as instruments of control and oppression.
In this chapter we shall focus on Foucault’s lecture course, Abnormal,13
which highlight the series of events and crises which were determinant for the genesis
of psychiatry, as described in the History of Madness. Foucault’s project will be
contrasted to the anti-psychiatric endeavour, to show how his critique is more radical
and far reaching. Questioning all preconceived notions of power as simply
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subjugating and oppressive, Foucault stresses, as we shall show, the productive
relationship between power and truth. He explores power relations in terms of their
underlying forms of rationality which produced a particular regime of truth, opening
the logical space in which psychiatric discourse appeared. This truth regime involved
juridical aspects which in this epoch gained specific importance. Foucault discusses
extensively the rise of late eighteenth century medical jurisprudence, whose role in
the birth of the new discipline of psychiatry was so central, that he underscores its
constitutive role not only for the ‘history of criminal psychiatry, but also for the
history of psychiatry tout court and ultimately for the human sciences.’14 He shows
how medico-legal conflicts gave rise to the truth regime of psychiatry in the late
eighteenth century through the establishment of psychiatric diagnosis, and examines
the limits of juridical and psychiatric discourse, where the alienists introduced
madness as otherness, as the negativity and exteriority of reason. The study of their
medical and philosophical stance as a scientific response to legal disputes epitomizes
Foucault’s critical analysis which is not a refutation but a reinterpretation of the
Enlightenment and its implications for psychiatry. Madness is not a factual existence
that must be freed from the illegitimate discourse of psychiatry, as anti-psychiatry
suggests, but it was conceived as a limit experience and an object of medical
perception which arose from the engagement of the alienists in the institutional and
juridical debates of the time.
For Foucault, the major medico-legal crisis of the late eighteenth century was
one of the groundbreaking events in the history of western psychiatry. It was not,
however, a crisis supposedly produced by the inconsistent reality of the psychiatric
institution, but one of those events which have made that reality inconsistent and
subject to change. It was in this sense, we shall argue, that Foucault introduced a
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break with the anti-psychiatric community. Although he agrees with the anti-
psychiatrists that power and truth are the targets of a subversive critique, he insists
that both terms need to be redefined before their attack is possible. That is why he
does not put forward one more theory and does not propose solutions or alternatives,
but describes the struggles that bring forth the fragility of that power and that truth,
the points of resistance and possible lines of disengagement. Foucault does not aspire
to produce a discourse which will provide a foundation that can serve as a point of
reference for all possible critique. His critique precludes the possibility of a pre-
established consensus according to a Habermasian ideal of a transparent community
among critics.15 The problem of power and truth is general enough to address the
political ramifications of psychiatric practice, but it is also local enough not to fit into
a programme, serve as a factor of unity or become suitable for tactical occasions. Any
critique of power and truth is part of the nexus of power which it criticizes, while at
the same time it stands at its limits as a singular intervention which creates the
possibility of consensus rather than asserting it in advance. It therefore poses a
challenge to the psychiatric power relation as well as to those involved in its critique,
inviting them to begin with the question of ‘what proportion of nonconsensuality is
implied in such a power relation, and whether that degree of nonconsensuality is
necessary or not, and then one may question every power relation to that extent […]
one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality.’16
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Forms of Rationality, Regimes of Truth and Psychiatric Power
We shall now begin with the question of psychiatric power and its
relationship with the truth about mental illness, and how it marks a point of rupture
between Foucault and the anti-psychiatrists. Szasz criticized state psychiatry from a
liberal point of view, advocating a private form of therapy freed from the oppressive
apparatus of the asylum.17 Many leftist discourses which Foucault characterizes as
‘lyrically anti-psychiatrist’18 regard power as inherently oppressive and the
relationship between psychiatrist and patient as containing an endogenous reality of
domination. Basaglia, an Italian communist psychiatrist who sought to replace the
subjugating institution with a community health care system attached to state unions,
is a case in point.19 Existential psychiatrists such as Laing and Cooper promoted a
type of extra-institutional network of mental health services where the mad could be
accommodated and cared for in their authenticity, which is compromised by the label
given to them by the psychiatric profession.20 The common ground of the various
anti-psychiatric discourses is the notion of psychiatric power as intrinsically
oppressive and that the truth about the mad is a distorted and pseudoscientific body of
knowledge supported by a legal system of exclusion and coercion. The mad are
undesirable deviants who are deprived of their natural rights and liberties in the name
of science and the maintenance of social order.
Foucault rejects such monolithic interpretations of power. He sees
domination as merely one form of power relations and sets out to analyse power in its
complexity and its inherent logic.21 Power is not a thing but a set of relations that
circulate endlessly and undergo reversals. As we have shown, there is an underlying
form of rationality behind power, which relates to a historically contingent form of
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government. This form of rationality underlies the management of individuals, groups
and populations and regulates people’s conduct. Whether statist, dominating or
liberal, it is the logic endogenous to a specific power formation which comprises the
set of relations, strategies and tactics that govern the asylum and constitute its very
existence — its architectural design, its discourse and its type of medical intervention.
It is therefore the logical foundation of power, not its ontological structure, which
Foucault investigates.
I was then involved with some psychiatric institutions, where the power of the
administration, of the director, of the doctors, of the family, etc., functioned
absolutely, with reference to the mentally ill. If I had wanted to make, as they say, an
ontology of power with a capital P, I would have tried to establish the origin of these
great institutions of power; I would have placed my analysis exclusively on the level
of the institution and of the law, and on the power relationship, more or less regulated,
with which the violence against madness or madmen would have been exercised.22
Foucault investigates the logic that sustains power, its strategies and the interactions
that constitute the asylum world. His analysis operates at the level of the form of
rationality that formed certain relations of power, which throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries shaped a collective attitude towards a specific group of
individuals that could be designated as mad.
In order for the logic of power to be exercised, to become acceptable and to
function, a true discourse needs to be produced, accumulated, put into circulation and
set to work. Power rests on an economy of truth. As we have discussed, power does
not blindly impose truth or untruth but demands truth and needs it in order to function.
In our society, Foucault points out, ’we are forced to tell the truth, we are constrained,
we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it. Power constantly asks
questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes
the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it.’23 Over the centuries, the
truth obligation, this will to truth imposed by the system of power, the obligation for
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any subject to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as
an object of knowledge in order to be governed, has been crystallized in institutional
forms which sanction and legitimize the search for truth and turn it into an object of
scientific examination. Among those institutional forms, Foucault singles out the law
as central in the establishment and investigation of truth in the history of the west. The
Greeks were the first to problematize the constitution of a truthful discourse on the
basis of a legal situation, and for them the juridical discovery of the truth served as a
model for various forms of knowledge such as philosophical, rhetorical and empirical.
In the centuries that followed, their method remained stationary and did not achieve
the founding of a rational knowledge.24 It was taken up again and developed by the
Western societies from the Middle Ages onwards, when western culture revived and
amplified the elaboration of justice and punishment through the establishment of
truth, engendering certain types of knowledge which began to become organized
around scientific forms. Thus, the inquiring model, which prevailed roughly from the
Middle Ages until the end of the eighteenth century, legitimized measurement and
proof as means of discovering the truth, giving birth to the sciences of observation.25
In the late eighteenth century, it was the normalizing logic of legal investigation
which sanctioned not only evidence but also the examination of irrational behaviour
which generated the human sciences.26 It is this essential affiliation between stating
the truth and the practice of justice, fundamental for the formation of institutions and
the establishment of the rules governing scientific discourse, which Foucault tries to
analyse: ‘You see in that all these cases — whether it is the market, the confessional,
the psychiatric institution, or the prison — involve taking up a history of truth under
different angles, or rather, taking up a history of truth that is coupled, from the start,
with a history of law.’27
128
Foucault points out that the law is not the mask of power or its alibi.28 It is
its instrument of producing truth. In the West, legal procedures express a society’s
‘will to truth’, in the sense that they seek to sanction types of truthful discourse for the
justification of penal practices. Through witness testimonies, expert opinions and
police investigation, courts aim at the correct way of enforcing justice and
punishment. As a result, legal proceedings produce the truth regime of the sciences
represented in a courtroom: the psychiatric or medical expert and the forensic
investigator are called on to supply a reliable system of classification and definitive
criteria for the authentication of the object which they present as true in their
testimony. They are forced to make decisions and to articulate statements that affect
their entire discipline.
The problem was not to show that psychiatry was formed in the heads of psychiatrists
as theory, or science, or discourse claiming scientific status, and that this was
concretized or applied in psychiatric hospitals. Nor was it to show how, at a certain
moment, institutions of confinement, which had existed for a long time, secreted their
own theory and justifications in the discourse of psychiatrists. The problem was the
genesis of psychiatry on the basis of, and through institutions of confinement that
were originally and basically articulated on mechanisms of jurisdiction in the very
broad sense […] and which at a certain point and in conditions that precisely had to be
analysed, were at the same time supported, relayed, transformed, and shifted by
process of veridiction.29
Foucault argues that juridical forms were decisive historically for the origins of
psychiatry and the opening of the asylums in the late eighteenth century. It would not
be an overstatement to characterize the courtroom as the birthplace of psychiatry, and
forensic psychiatry as the starting point for the production of psychiatric knowledge.
At a specific point in western history, the encounter between the criminal psychiatrist,
the magistrate and the police determined the rules for the formulation of valid
propositions which generated the entire discipline of psychiatry. In the forensic
setting, psychiatric truth found its external conditions, as it was forced to produce the
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criteria for the formation of concepts, objects of knowledge and appropriate methods
in order to respond as a valid science to the legal and administrative demand.
In this chapter we shall demonstrate that Foucault upsets the ideological
conception of power which regards juridical forms and psychiatric knowledge as
components of the same superstructure which mask a basic reality of domination. We
shall illustrate that psychiatry and the law maintain a productive and mutually
regulatory relationship with each other, which no form of rationality can disrupt or
distort a priori, but can only alter its conditions and modes of existence. This is why,
as we shall now see, Foucault argues that the reason psychiatry could not emerge
within the framework of sovereignty was not the prevailing system of prohibition and
interdiction. It was the impossibility of establishing legal grounds for turning madness
into a legally ratified object of knowledge in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century. The discipline of psychiatry was not born until the late eighteenth century
when, under a disciplinary form of rationality, legislation proliferated and clinical
knowledge came into being.30
Sovereignty — the Great Confinement
The first and most pervasive misconception that Foucault attempts to dispel
is the identification of power with sovereignty, interdiction and prohibition. By
interpreting power in negative terms as a system of law, repression and censorship,
critical discourse — and the discourse of anti-psychiatry in particular — has never
managed to escape the image of the sovereign who forbids and of the absolute subject
(monarch, Father, general will) who manipulates the law, and against whom the only
possible challenge is transgression. Ethnology and psychoanalysis have adopted and
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universalized this legal conception of power, reducing it to a basic relation of man in
his primitive state with a juridical model of repression and prohibition (libido, the
incest taboo).31 To complicate matters further, this juridical conception of power has
been widely associated with Kant and by implication with the Enlightenment, insofar
as for Kant the possibility of the constitution of morality and the accomplishment of
maturity appears to refer to the sovereign whose law is in tension with the ethical
attitude of the universal subject and the requirements of practical reason:
Why do we always conceive power as law and as prohibition, why this privileging?
We can obviously say that this is due to the influence of Kant, to the idea according to
which, in the last instance, the moral law, the ‘you must not’, the opposition ‘you
must’/ ‘you must not’ is at bottom the matrix of all regulation of human conduct. But,
to speak truthfully, this explanation through the influence of Kant is obviously totally
insufficient. The problem is of knowing whether Kant had such an influence and why
it was so strong.32
The anti-juridical, anti-monarchical, anti-legalist discourse in terms of the rights of
the subject of law has come to be emblematic of most forms of critique of power.
Liberal, Marxist and existential forms of anti-psychiatry have attacked, as we have
shown, the intrinsically coercive powers of the psychiatrist in order to proclaim and
defend the patients’ rights against a transhistorical system of domination. Such a
discourse has been attributed to Foucault’s critical stance, which has, for this very
reason, been classified as anti-psychiatric.33 Szasz, for example, conceives psychiatric
power as essentially negative and dominating, following the assumption that power is
always modeled around a figure of sovereignty. In his book The Manufacture of
Madness,34 he depicts the psychiatrist as the direct descendant of the Holy Inquisitor.
Psychiatric power diagnoses, labels and incarcerates the mad in the same way that the
Holy Inquisition in the Middle Ages had picked out, suspected, isolated and
interrogated certain people which it had identified as witches. Only the method
changed towards scientificity. But essentially psychiatry is a religious force, a
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coercive institution that excludes and oppresses. In his scant reference to Foucault’s
work, Szasz interprets the analysis of the great confinement as an intensification of
social control and the exercise of a powerful sovereignty which silenced madness,
rather than the birth of a new discipline.35
Foucault reads Szasz’s narrative as a piece of historicism.36 Szasz
presupposes sovereign power and unreason as given objects whose opposition is a
necessary outcome of history. Contrary to Szasz, Foucault argues that the model of
sovereignty is a contingent form of power which prevailed over a specific period of
western history, and is not timeless and universal. He adds, crucially, that during its
prevalence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it did not engender psychiatry
as a medical specialism. At the time there existed only pre-psychiatric structures and a
non-specialised discipline concerning the ‘maladies of the spirit’. With its specific
governmental technology and its juridical model which bore constant reference to the
king, the system of sovereignty did not harbour the conditions for the emergence of
clinical knowledge. The system of sovereignty was a ‘system of Law-and sovereign,’
an extension of administrative techniques whose aim was to obtain proof of whether a
crime had been committed that would harm the state or the sovereign.37 There was no
need to ‘inscribe the crime, however outrageous, in terms of something like a
nature’,38 and therefore the doctor’s role was limited; he did not intervene at the level
of sentencing, but at a procedural level. The main concern of the authorities under the
system of sovereignty was the exemplary punishment rather than the correction of
deviants, that is, of the criminals, madmen, or the poor. As there were no legal
provisions or special institutions where these groups could be cared for, treated or
corrected, they were lumped indiscriminately inside places of confinement, as an
administrative measure of social order. This is Foucault’s ‘great confinement’, which
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is to be clearly distinguished from the birth of the asylum a few decades later, when
the problem of the confinement of the mad was posed in terms of scientific validity
rather than morality. The negative power of the monarch, his absolute authority and
force of subjugation and legal prohibition, did not suffice for the birth of the asylum
and the discipline of psychiatry. The asylum was not born until the end of the
eighteenth century, under a different mode of rationality.
Discipline — the Birth of Psychiatry
The conditions of possibility for the birth of the asylum and the formation
of psychiatric knowledge are to be found in a new form of rationality which took
shape in the late eighteenth century. An important double reversal occurred during
this period: the rise of jurisprudence and the birth of the human sciences. The law
became a discourse of truth holding monarchical power in check, preventing the
excesses of sovereignty by putting forth the inalienable natural rights of man. This,
Foucault notes, was the revolutionary approach, exemplified during the French
Revolution, and marks a new type of critique where legal discourse no longer
supported but limited the arbitrariness and illegitimacy of the sovereign.39 The other
form of critique emerged from the extension of scientific reflection on the validity of
governmental interventions, which, rather than facilitating governmental practices,
questioned the dogmatism of the state on the basis of a scientific knowledge of man.
This scientific knowledge provided a norm to which critique should refer in order to
challenge the superstitions of authority. Both discourses generated the optimism of the
Enlightenment as a new era of progress and freedom guaranteed by a global
rationality and a set of universal, codifiable principles which prevent the abuses of
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power. They have permeated, ever since, the discourses that claim to liberate
humanity in the name either of scientific validity or legal rights. They have
constructed the influential emancipatory model of the Enlightenment and its supposed
affiliation with humanism, which both psychiatry and anti-psychiatry have followed
and reproduced. Thus, on the one hand, mainstream psychiatry adopts the discourse of
the human sciences according to which the discovery of the true, psychologically
normal subject dismantles the false image of the juridical individual imposed by
power relations. Humanist or liberal discourse, on the other hand, has largely guided
anti-psychiatric movements which seek to free the enslaved, alienated subject from
the shackles of normality, in the name of its authenticity and its natural rights.40
Foucault shows, by contrast, that it was not the advanced rationality of the
exact sciences which were presumably able to annex the complex, confused and
ambiguous domain of human behaviour.41 It was not the increased awareness of the
nature of man and his universal rights which made possible the creation of medical
knowledge and the provision of mental health as an inalienable right of man. Both the
scientific knowledge of man and the stipulation of the legal subject are reducible to a
new form of rationality, a new system of disciplinary logic which appeared in the late
eighteenth century. Instead of the sovereign, the eponymous and powerful head of the
state, we see emerging ‘an anonymous, multiple, pale, colorless power’, which is
disciplinary power.42 In discipline there is no sovereign, no duality and no asymmetry;
there is a reference to a norm and model. No one occupies the position of sovereignty
and there is an impersonal, anonymous and universal subject endowed with the
capacity for freedom and autonomy, but also with the ability to be trained, corrected
and adjusted. It is with recourse to this universal subject that the development of
clinical knowledge about man and the construction of a philosophico-juridical theory
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of individuality became possible. But freedom and autonomy, the scientific discovery
of the self and the establishment of rational principles for moral conduct, were deeply
connected with a tight network of correction, constant surveillance and permanent
visibility. Therefore they do not represent the supposed ideals of the Enlightenment or
humanism, but aspects of a form of rationality which, although liberating with respect
to sovereignty, established a diffused disciplinary set of power relations permeated by
strict rules and a code of normalization. ‘The ‘Enlightenment’, Foucault points out,
‘which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.’ 43
What interests Foucault, we argue, is not the discovery of natural rights or the
promotion of the liberties and natural propensities of man that the Enlightenment
supposedly advanced. His originality lies in his concern with the establishment,
within the disciplinary system, of a relationship with alterity which constituted the
condition of possibility for the birth of psychiatry. It is this relationship with the limits
of rationality, and with the exteriority in relation to the norm, which was the root of
late eighteenth century anthropology and its systematization, through Kant and the
philosophical thinking of specific clinicians of the time, of what will constitute the
problem of critique and the problematic of the enlightenment.44 Insofar as the norm
attaches individuals to the disciplinary system, the mechanisms of distribution and
classification aim at establishing and defining the norm, which by necessity refers to
those who deviate from it and must be brought into line with it by way of correction.
As disciplinary systems rely on clinical knowledge which classifies, hierarchizes, and
supervises, they come up against those who cannot be classified, those who escape
supervision, those who cannot enter the system of distribution, in short, the residual,
the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the unassimilable.45 It will be only at the limits, at
the margins of the disciplinary apparatus that the madman and the delinquent will
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appear. To the extent that these marginalized individuals came to share a common
property of posing a threat to the norm, a new legal system was required which would
make offences intelligible, amenable to correction and prevention, and therefore less
threatening.46 Crime presumably contained a kernel of madness and all madness
harboured the possibility of crime, giving rise to a crucial problem, that of
determining whether a criminal was in need of imprisonment or hospitalization.
Crime, from this moment onward had a nature. There was a rationality behind the
criminal that turned him into a temporary despot, a defiant of the norm and the social
rules. This rationality had to be made intelligible, diagnosed, and restored to the norm.
Importantly, among the various types of mental disorder whose detection and
diagnosis were required by the penal system, one in particular raised concern: the
human monster. The human monster was the subject in which madness manifested
itself exclusively in the form of crime. In the monster, delirium intruded violently,
causing a temporary disturbance in the form of a crack, a break between the
individual’s earlier life and his behaviour during the crime; it was also a condition that
spared the moral consciousness of the subject, excluding the possibility of the crime
being ethically motivated. Monstrosity therefore constituted the point where the law
reached the limits of its application. The human monster created anxiety by its
capacity to breach the law ‘while leaving it with nothing to say.’ It violated the law
and trapped it by triggering a response different from the law itself. It provoked
violence, suppression or medical care. In the monster, the law confronted the
unintelligible, it faced the limits of reason.47 It needed psychiatric expertise to pin
down unreason, spot it in an individual and refer to it in order to define legal
responsibility. Psychiatry became the most pertinent, the most appropriate response to
this problem, since it could provide scientific answers.48 But its answers, its
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knowledge, could no longer rest on the tautology of defining the norm on the basis of
preconceived conceptions of man. It was rather based on a paradox to the extent that it
was asked to produce rational rules for identifying a behaviour which escapes
rationality. Psychiatric knowledge was obliged to construct valid medical propositions
centered around an impossibility, a monstrosity which is exceptional and inexplicable
by definition:
Paradoxically, the monster is a principle of intelligibility in spite of its limit position
as both the impossible and the forbidden. And yet this principle of intelligibility is
strictly tautological, since the characteristic feature of the monster is to express itself
as, precisely, monstrous, to be the explanation of every little deviation that may derive
from it, but to be unintelligible itself. Thus, it is this tautological intelligibility, this
principle of explanation that refers only to itself that lies at the heart of analyses of
abnormality.49
Notwithstanding this paradox, or because of it, psychiatry became the most pertinent
scientific enterprise, owing to its ability to classify individuals, provide diagnostics,
define the norm medically and at the same time establish its limits. Being a type of
medical discourse and hence the science of the normal and the pathological,
psychiatry, far from exerting religious effects, assumed the status of a royal science:50
Psychiatry was one of the forms of social medicine that appeared in the nineteenth
century. The history of psychiatry written by Szasz — another one of his merits —
discloses the social function of medicine in a society of normalization […] But what
permits medicine to function with such force is that, as opposed to religion, it is part
of the scientific institution. It is not enough to indicate the disciplinary effects of
medicine. Medicine may very well function as a mechanism of social control, but it
also assumes technical and scientific functions.51
Psychiatry surfaced as a scientific response to the problem of dealing with penal,
administrative and therapeutic matters linked to the notion of normality. It gained
social significance and it was able to influence legal judgment and political decision
making on account of its functioning as a scientific component in the network of
discipline and normalization. Its import lay in its validity when determining and
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describing the norm and designating those who escape it, rather than in its religious
power to invest the dominant class with a dogma that excommunicated dissidents.
Foucault against anti-psychiatry
We have therefore shown how psychiatry was generated as a scientific
discipline in the late eighteenth century, precisely at the point when jurisprudence
became a productive rather a suppressive discursive practice. We showed how it was
not the oppressive model of sovereignty but the constructive function of legal
discourse which allowed for the existence of truthful discourse concerning the mad.
This account, however, still does not explain whether Foucault differs from anti-
psychiatric positions; it does not clarify why Foucault does not refute the scientificity
of psychiatric propositions, and why he does not align himself with anti-psychiatry in
portraying psychiatric power as an instrument of social control. The fact that juridical
practices had a constitutive relationship with psychiatry still appears to undermine the
autonomy of psychiatric discourse. Furthermore, the fundamental connection of
psychiatric truth with otherness and the limits of reason seems to display a logical
weakness, a contradiction and the insinuation of philosophical notions which
invalidate the scientific status of psychiatry.
In order to tackle these aporias, we need to return to our discussion of the
diagnostic truth regime of a science as a politically motivated but autonomous system
of distinguishing between the true and the false. We should bear in mind that for
Foucault diagnosis is part of an external history of truth, which means that it is not a
falsified construct but a type of scientific discourse which fulfills the truth conditions
created by schemas of rationality. Multiple practices, institutions and systems of
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knowledge revolve around the production of valid distinctions and solid clinical
differentiations, which are capable of yielding scientific knowledge in psychiatry.
These conditions of possibility for the formation of clinical psychiatric knowledge are
localizable in practices outside medicine, which nonetheless do not distort the
scientific validity of its discourse: ‘Political practice has transformed not the meaning
or the form of discourse, but the conditions of its emergence, insertion and
functioning; it has transformed the mode of existence of medical discourse.’52 Social,
cultural and normative components converge in the production of truthful, scientific
discourse, which, in a rigorous fashion, articulates a new form of knowledge that can
be called psychiatric. The discourse produced is culturally driven without being
reducible to the external conditions that engendered it. By exposing the non-scientific
elements of psychiatry, Foucault does not dismantle the scientific endeavour, but
demarcates its boundaries in order to foreground the historical contingencies that
engendered it as a scientific theory that lays claim to universality:
One can show, for example, that the medicalization of madness, in other words, the
organization of medical knowledge around individuals designated as mad, was
connected with a whole series of social and economic practices at a given time, but
also with institutions and practices of power. This fact in no way impugns the
scientific validity or the therapeutic effectiveness of psychiatry: it does not endorse
psychiatry, but neither does it invalidate it.53
Crucially, Foucault shows how the political, social and legal concerns of the late
eighteenth century did not distort psychiatry, but, on the contrary, enthroned it as a
‘royal science’ and rendered it indispensable on account of its capacity to diagnose,
isolate and potentially cure the alterity that stands outside the norm and the rational
boundaries of the law. The law did not permeate clinical knowledge but it became
dependent on psychiatric expertise in order to decide whether the criminal is in need
of punishment or treatment: from the late eighteenth century onward, Foucault argues,
the law ‘can no longer judge; it is obliged to come to a halt and put questions to
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psychiatry.’54 The law did not invoke existing psychiatric theories in order to justify
the imprisonment of law breakers. Such theories did not exist before this period. On
the contrary, the need for a distinction between the criminal and the mad, the anxiety
of the jurors to differentiate between the correct way to punish law breakers and the
provision of therapy to those who suffer from mental disorder, allocated to doctors the
task of performing a strict and valid diagnosis. By this legal act, psychiatry
established its role as a scientific endeavour at the heart of the social system.
Psychiatry became privileged among the sciences by being in a position to decide
with its scientific statements the right to punish; it acquired a central position in the
legal and administrative network of public hygiene.
The paradoxes of this newly formed psychiatric truth were the inevitable
outcome of the need to account for the emergence of an irrational experience which
called for rational description. Therefore, they are not only understandable, but also
constitute an integral part of the anthropological character of proto-psychiatry. This is
why these paradoxes do not undermine its scientific worth. On the contrary, as
Foucault notes, it was when faced with these limit situations, when human finitude
became a clinical problem, that psychiatric discourse constituted itself as a rigorous
scientific enterprise. When alienists performed the diagnosis, the absolute diagnosis
between reason and delirium, between madness and delinquency, they applied a
strictly phenomenological approach to mental disorder, free form theories and
speculations. Both Pinel and Esquirol were primarily diagnosticians.55 Despite the
existence of numerous theories for the aetiology of mental disorders, their gaze
penetrated to the depth of the illness only secondarily. Their primary concern was the
classification of illnesses, in order to produce a valid approach that would resemble
the methods of the newly born clinical medicine. Psychiatry
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had to codify madness as illness; pathologize its disorders, errors, and illusions, and
undertake analyses — symptomatologies, nosographies, prognoses, observations
clinical files, et cetera — to bring this public hygiene, or the social safety it was
responsible for, as close as possible to medical knowledge and thereby enable this
system of protection to function in the name of medical knowledge.56
The courts had imposed the urgent and immediate need for the identification of the
various types of illness, so that sequestration or other forms of medical intervention
could be justified. Therefore a reliable scientific method of categorizing illness was
necessary. Alongside other diagnostic syndromes ― dementia, lypemania and mania
― the proto-psychiatrists coined terms such as ‘partial madness’ and ‘monomania’ to
denote conditions that escape rational explanation. They resisted elaborate theories or
psychological interpretations and sought to describe experiences which they
recognized as being beyond reason. Their descriptions were formal and strict, in
accordance with the medical diagnostic model:
For the alienists, psychiatry really was a medical science because it obeyed the same
formal — nosographical, symptomatological, classificatory, and taxonomic —
criteria. Esquirol needed the grand edifice of psychiatric classifications that so
delighted him to ensure that his discourse and objects were the discourse of psychiatry
and the objects of a medical psychiatry. The medicalization of the discourse and
practice of the alienists passed through this kind of formal structuration isomorphous
with medical discourse.57
Foucault therefore would totally disagree with certain anti-psychiatrists who argue
that psychiatry is a pseudoscientific discourse used by systems of power to justify the
incarceration of deviants, the undesirable and the law breakers. These thinkers claim
that psychiatry was invented as an extension of the prison, in order to cover up
coercive practices with the mask of scientific authority.58 Although Foucault accepts
the role of psychiatry as an instrument of public hygiene, his conclusion, as we
showed, is precisely the opposite. He shows how the asylum emerged precisely at a
time when the distinction between delinquency and mental illness became necessary.
Madness became a problem for the system of power relations, when the necessity
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arose to differentiate between the various types of irrationality and deviance; hence
the simultaneous birth of the prison and the asylum in the late eighteenth century.59
What began as a moral problem of indiscriminate sequestration in the era of the great
confinement was transformed a few decades later into a scientific issue that demanded
the division of inmates. Psychiatry emerged as a response, in the most scientifically
rigorous way possible, to this social demand; it established itself as a firm
epistemological entity making serious truth claims, not as a coercive discipline,
oppressive or pseudoscientific by nature, as anti-psychiatry suggests.
Foucault beyond Anti-psychiatry
Through Foucault’s later works, we have shown how the History of Madness
is not a refutation of psychiatry but a demonstration of the way psychiatric truth is
dependent upon but not reducible to juridical forms, administrative networks and
mechanisms of power. We have also shown that at the origins of psychiatry diagnostic
truth was part of an anthropological endeavour (in the Kantian sense), which
functioned with scientific clarity and philosophical rigour with reference to the
alterity of madness. What remains to be examined is the precise nature of this alterity.
We need to consider what the status of madness is in Foucault’s system and how it
differs from anti-psychiatry. We also need to elucidate Foucault’s perspective on
mental illness and whether it is a notion that he endorses or rejects in view of the
juridical and scientific crises which have occurred since the end of the alienism of the
late eighteenth century.
As we have seen, psychiatry constituted itself as a science from the
moment it defined madness as an illness. It was within the same movement, the same
142
regime of truth, that madness was identified as a problem of human finitude and as a
reality that had to be codified in medical terms. Madness therefore came to existence
in the form of a problem to which mental illness constituted a medical solution.
Mental illness is a medical derivative of madness, a type of medical perception.60 It
was born simultaneously with madness as its empirical and institutional expression. It
is thus illusory to disengage the one term from the other. Anti-psychiatry promotes
this disengagement by seeking to ‘demedicalize’ madness, dismissing mental illness
as a distortion of the reality of madness.61 It purports to produce the truth of madness
in forms other than those of the knowledge relation, and to free the supposed entity of
madness from the concept of mental illness altogether. Foucault challenges this
pretention as utopian. He disputes the defense of madness as a vague anthropological
constant to be liberated, and foregrounds the universal ‘madness’ as a notion always
staged in new modes of perception, new forms of mental illness. What interests
Foucault are those occasions when madness manifests itself as a problem urgent
enough to necessitate the transformation of the diagnostic categories which represent
it, provoking new political, juridical and institutional solutions. These solutions are
never strictly medical and never fixed, but are thoroughly political and always in the
process of being revised: ‘I don’t think that in regard to madness and mental illness
there is any ‘politics’ that can contain the just and definitive solution. But I think that
in madness, in derangement, in behaviour problems, there are reasons for questioning
politics: and politics must answer these questions, but it never answers them
completely.’ 62
As we have shown, anti-psychiatrists hold that there exists a transhistorical
system of repression permeating psychiatric practice which labels, misdiagnoses and
forcibly confines the irrational members of a community, in a process derived from
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the repressive nature of medical rationality. Anti-psychiatry accepts the existence of
madness in its primitive state, rejecting its transformation into mental illness through
pseudo-scientific diagnostic models which reify it and subject it to the doctor’s power
which its medicalisation entails. It advocates the right of the patient to produce his
madness and the truth of his madness, and sets out to give the individual
the task and right of taking his madness to the limit, of taking it right to the end, in an
experience to which others may contribute, but never in the name of a power
conferred on them by their reason or normality; detaching behaviour, suffering, and
desire from the medical status given to them, freeing them from a diagnosis and
symptomatology that had the value not just of classification, but of decision and
decree; invalidating, finally, the great retranscription of madness as mental illness that
was begun in the seventeenth and completed in the nineteenth century.63
For the anti-psychiatrists, madness is an independent ontological reality. Psychiatry,
deployed by the oppressive mechanisms of the state, submits madness to the medical
model which labels it as mental illness, a fictitious entity impossible to analyse and
uncover medically. This interpretation leads the anti-psychiatrists to an inevitable
aporia: ‘if madness is not a mental illness charted on a nosographic table, if madness
has a specific reality that shouldn’t be pathologized or medicalized, then, what is it?’64
Anti-psychiatry needs to account for the reality of madness, its supposed internal
structure as autonomous and ontologically independent from the reality with which
medicine purports to invest it. Anti-psychiatric critique takes the medical model as
given, accepts a priori the division between the sane and the mad, and chooses to side
with madness in the name of its supposed rights, which it also considers
transhistorical. As it cannot go beyond the medical model of truth, it inevitably
considers psychiatry as inherently incapable of adopting it. Therefore, anti-psychiatry
concludes, any attempt on the part of psychiatry to make the obscure ontology of
madness medically intelligible unavoidably stumbles against the necessary limitation
of psychiatric knowledge, falling into simulation.65
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For Foucault, on the other hand, power does not seek to impose false models
in order to incarcerate the mad. He is sceptical of notions such as Power or the ruling
bourgeoisie, which historicism uses as universals. As he characteristically puts it, ‘the
bourgeoisie doesn’t give a damn about the mad’; there was no abstract and universal
despot such as a ruling class that repressed and excluded madness for politically
motivated reasons. Instead, there was a particular technology of government whose
logic was enacted by real agents — doctors, the family, parents, magistrates, the
police — involved in a set of real and concrete practices. The mad were confined
when a specific from of rationality was faced with the problem of their designation
and management as mad, and not because of power’s hidden political or ideological
agenda:66
I tried to see, then, how this set of power relationships which encircled madness and
defined it as mental illness was something completely different from a pure and
simple power relationship, from a pure and simple tautological affirmation of the
following type: I, reason, exercise power over you, madness. 67
Foucault makes no prior assumptions about madness, and even supposes that madness
does not exist: madness is not a substance masked and repressed by the authority of
the doctor who imposes an arbitrary nosography and diagnosis upon it. There is no
permanent and transhistorical medical model which restrains and suppresses. On the
contrary, Foucault shows how the medical model and the diagnostic thinking of the
alienists conceived madness as an experience at the limits, an anthropological
problem, an idea of reason which gradually became an object of medical attention.
‘Madness cannot be found in its raw state’, Foucault notes.68 Madness is unthinkable
outside the specific scientific and philosophical game of truth and falsity, which
endowed it with the status of mental illness, a field of valid research and cognition.
For the alienists, therefore, mental illness was an artificial but nevertheless necessary
mode of representation, a concrete medical response to the real problem of madness.
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It was not a mythical entity but a ‘quasi-natural object,’69 a contingent and historically
determined reality, formed as an object, as an area of concern, through the interplay of
specific relations of power and discourses of truth.70
For Foucault, therefore, mental illness is the enactment of a
problematization, not an entity problematic in itself. Paradoxically, it has become
problematic from the moment psychiatry overcame alienism and sought to establish
itself as a medical specialism, under a new form of legislation. From the middle of the
nineteenth century, psychiatry began to function in the framework of generalized
security and control, instead of discipline, training and surveillance, seeking to nullify
the dangers and risks that madness might entail.71 So as to justify its new role in social
defence, psychiatry began to act not only therapeutically but also prophylactically
with respect to the crises of madness, its sudden and unexpected outbursts in the form
of criminal behaviour. Monstrosity, the linchpin of alienism, now had to be prevented.
Prognostic knowledge, and not diagnostic truth, put an end to alienism bringing about
the second, ‘real birth of psychiatry.’72 The construction of notions such as
schizophrenia and hystero-epilepsy codified social danger as illness attributable to
discernible pathological processes, automatism, lack of free will, abnormal instincts
and degrees of degeneration.73 Knowledge of these causes increased the power of the
psychiatrist who would now be capable of assessing the extent to which an individual
already resembled his crime before he had committed it. It allowed psychiatrists to
detect disorder early, eliminate the risk of monstrosity and ideally dispense with the
problem of madness altogether. The emphasis that the system of security placed on
the prognostic value of diagnosis, however, eventually turned mental illness into a
problematic term. In the age of alienism, it was enough that clinical examination
could reveal the truth of delirium in those rare and exceptional individuals who
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committed monstrous crimes, so that they could be absolved of legal responsibility
and be committed to the asylum. In the era of prevention, the detection of automatism
and lack of free will should take place before the actual crime, so that the individual’s
preemptive incarceration could be justified. From this moment onward, mental illness
became closely linked to danger and the courts began to request the psychiatrist to
identify the risk present in an individual on the basis of prognostic signs which could
link her illness with the possibility of legal transgression. Dangerousness, however, is
not a clinical notion, it is not a medical category, but an administrative term which
concerns social defence rather than medicine.74 Instead of distinguishing between
madness and delinquency, dangerousness conflated the two notions in the figure of
the abnormal individual, the ‘individual to be corrected’, the everyday, commonplace,
‘faded monster’ whose pathology must justify his possible criminal behaviour.75
Since, however, her future culpability could not be demonstrated at the level of
disturbed consciousness and logical error, as in the monster, the proof of her
propensity for disturbance had to take place at the level of the voluntary/involuntary
axis, on a continuum of degrees of automatism which connects insanity with the
smallest crime.76 A type of knowledge was therefore produced which dealt with the
mixture of madness and criminality, and which, for this reason, was consistent neither
with psychiatry nor with the law; it ‘verge(d) precisely on undecidability.’77 Thus, as
an expert in court, the psychiatrist began to pathologize every possible abnormality
that could become criminal; he began to investigate early signs of ‘perversion’ and
disordered personality traits. He provided neurobiological evidence and signs of
automatism which could provide a substratum for an offense not yet committed.78
Instead of increasing the rigour of her diagnosis, the forensic psychiatrist dealt with an
exploded symptomatological field which tackled disorders of conduct rather than the
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search for delirium, producing ‘a discourse of fear and of moralization, a childish
discourse, a discourse whose epistemological organization, completely governed by
fear and moralization, can only be derisory, even regarding madness.’79 Consistent
with the security system of policing abnormalities, forensic psychiatry presented a
derisory image of mental illness closely knit with morality and social offence,
precisely at the moment when it sought to describe pathology in a value-free way.
For Foucault this adulteration and derision of psychiatric expert opinion is
not an intrinsic epistemological flaw of mental illness. It is the price that the
psychiatric subject had to pay for aspiring to incorporate madness. Despite its efforts
to submit mental illness to a pacifying, inclusive network of socialization, the security
orientated form of rationality ended up multiplying compulsory admissions where
heterogeneous forms of abnormal conduct were excluded on the basis of their
suspected insanity. ‘Everyone in the asylum potentially carries the danger of death’,
Foucault notes.80 As a result, the new forms of mental illness unleashed the monstrous
aspects of madness, instead of enjoining it into a nosography of rationalization.
Madness began to pose the danger of its alterity beneath the anonymity of ordinary
behaviour, behind the most commonplace disturbance of conduct. It returned by
inserting the absolute diagnosis between reason and madness that the new psychiatric
rationality tried to ward off at all cost, renewing the anthropological problematic of
alienism. This ‘neo-alienism’, this identification of madness with danger which is still
prevalent today, has generated a new juridical and administrative crisis which calls for
a redefinition of the terms of the debate about mental illness. This crisis can no longer
be critiqued by injecting more rationalization and psychologism into diagnosis. It
cannot be overcome by rejecting diagnosis as a repressive instrument of the patients’
rights. Scientific knowledge of man and humanist discourse are de facto
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overshadowed as forms of critique by the urgent need to reflect on the anxiety and
fear that madness provokes in this new form of punitive power.81 It is madness itself
which resists medicalization by adopting all possible medical, political or moral
attributions, disqualifying the psychiatrist as a scientific subject and becoming more
dangerous and terrifying the more it is subjected to rational understanding.
Therefore, it is no longer enough to criticize the excess of rationality which
exercises terror over madness. Critique must also foreground the ways madness
inflicts terror on the rationality of security: ‘Now the critique of knowledge I would
propose does not in fact consist in denouncing what is continually — I was going to
say monotonously — oppressive under reason, for after all, believe me, insanity
(déraison) is just as oppressive.’82 This is why the History of Madness was not a
praise of madness, just as Discipline and Punish was not an apology for crime.83 In
his studies, Foucault focuses on the struggle between the perils of psychiatric
rationality, and the dangerousness of the patient who revolts, of the mentally ill who
poses a threat to society, of the monster who renews the problem of fear inside penal
practice. This struggle is ongoing, pervasive and transcends the mental institution.
This is why Foucault was sceptical of anti-psychiatric efforts to support
deinstitutionalization and the extension of normalization through the expansion of
psychiatric care.84 These efforts contribute to the excesses of psychiatric rationality
and therefore proliferate the reciprocal dangers of madness. Although he judged
fruitful the anti-psychiatric criticism of the perils inherent to the mental hospital, he
noted that new dangers and risks have emerged and multiplied from the moment
madness has been supposedly liberated. He critiqued the dangers produced by the
closing down of asylums and the opening of free clinics by Basaglia in Italy;85 he
indicated the urgent need to criticize the private, ‘liberated’ medicalized apparatus
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which Szasz has privileged over the therapeutic State;86 he was deeply suspicious of
the ‘leftist doxa’ which, with its anti-repressive rhetoric, chooses the ‘good side’ of
madness in order to combat the ‘badness’ of psychiatric power.87 ‘My point is not that
everything is bad,’ Foucault notes, ‘but that everything is dangerous, which is not
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something
to do.’88 Danger exists in both sides of the dividing line, and it is the work of the
critical historian to extract himself from the mechanisms which make the two sides
appear, illustrating the illusion of their nature and unity:
Everyone dreams of writing a history of the mad, of going over to the other side and
tracing the great evasions or the subtle retreats into delirium from the beginning. Yet,
under the pretext of tuning in and letting the mad themselves speak, one already
accepts the division between the two as a fact. It’s necessary to put oneself at the
point where the machinery that makes these qualifications and disqualifications is
actually operative, and putting the mad and the non-mad on two sides facing each
other.89
The new form of knowledge that Foucault’s work offers is a differential knowledge
which does not promote a new rationality and does not advance knowledge of the
irrational or the unknown. It belongs to the realm of truth — its character as
differential can be conceived as the very definition of truth — and it therefore stands
at the lines of division, accentuating the tensions between opposing sides, making
them more conflictual, rather than dialectically sublating them. It is from this
perspective that the History of Madness can be considered a ‘dangerous’ book, which,
although descriptive in its design, is structured ‘in such a way that the possible paths
of attack are delineated.’90 The book supported neither the faith in rationalist medicine
nor the romanticism of a mythical irrationality. It showed how both attitudes collapse
when they come into conflict, transforming the relation that we have with madness,
the institution of psychiatry, and the truth of its discourse.
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Conclusion
The criticism that Foucault is engaged in an anti-psychiatric endeavour using
counter-Enlightenment discourse holds no currency. Foucault’s enterprise is a type of
historical critique that questions such groupings. Arguing that his own critical
approach is rooted in the Kantian question of how a possible ‘we’ gets established and
formulated rather than the Cartesian problematic of the universal, transhistorical and
impersonal ‘I’,91 Foucault dismantles the notion that there are pre-existing
uniformities in the way psychiatry is practised throughout history, and that a common
rationality is shared by those involved in its practice or by those who criticize it. He
states that he cannot possibly be considered part of an anti-psychiatric ‘we’ because
such a position would imply a conception of psychiatry as homogenous and
immutable rather than historically produced and contingent on rules and regimes of
truth. He stresses that he was ignorant of anti-psychiatry at the time of the writing of
the History of Madness, and distances himself from a discourse whose basic tenets —
psychiatry’s lack of scientificity, its role as instrument of social control — he sets out
to question.92 He notes that there have existed various types of anti-psychiatric
discourse, of the existentialist, Marxist, Reichian or even Deleuzian-Guattarian type,
which remained heterogeneous and never achieved systematization and uniformity.
Laing rested his analysis on abstract existential concepts to support his view of
transhistorical psychiatric oppression, and stopped short of employing his theory to
demarcate the limits of psychiatric knowledge.93 Marxist analysts criticized the
psychiatric institution from ‘a defensive trade-union angle’, which offered no solution
out of the impasse of their resulting ideological opposition with medicine and the
administration.94 Szasz’s critique equated psychiatric power with the state, and his
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proposal of a liberal type of treatment merely transposed the problem. By denying the
existence of mental illness, he ended up complementing the canonical doctor patient
relationship: ‘Psychiatrists were selling the status of illness they gave to their clients
at a rather high price. Szasz sells non-illness to people who think they are sick.’95
Moreover, the thinkers engaged in polemics against psychiatry never identified with
each other and did not present a common ideological or theoretical platform. Szasz —
who in his later works has rejected the term anti-psychiatry — described Laing as a
defender of psychiatry, a ‘drug-guru’ and the high priest of ‘super-sanity’. Peter
Sedgwick, a critic of psychiatric practice from a leftist point of view, wrote Psycho
Politics, a book highly critical of anti-psychiatry from which he clearly distanced
himself.96 All totalising and all-encompassing theories have failed to prescribe
definite solutions, offer global criticism and gain universal validity; they can only
provide tools that can be used on a local level. Critique is essentially local,
autonomous and non-centralized.97 It is a way of posing the problem of a possible
consensus among thinkers instead of asserting it in advance:
I am not sure that at the time when I wrote the History of Madness, there was a
preexisting and receptive ‘we’ to which I would have only have had to refer in order
to write my book, and of which this book would have been the spontaneous
expression. Laing, Cooper, Basaglia and I had no community, nor any relationship.
But the problem posed itself to those who had read us, as it also posed itself to some
of us, of seeing if it was possible to establish a ‘we’ on the basis of the work that had
been done, a ‘we’ that would also be likely to form a community of action.98
Foucault not only questions all existing ‘we’s’, but he insists that this ‘we’, the
identification of the community of which we are part, is never given but is subject to
critical reflection:
It will also no longer simply be a question of (his) belonging to a larger human
community in general, but rather it will be a question of (his) belonging to a certain
us, to an us that relates to a characteristic cultural ensemble of (his) own actuality. No
philosopher can go without examining his own participation in this us precisely
because it is this us which is becoming the object of the philosopher’s own
reflection.99
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Richard Rorty criticized Foucault for undermining the Enlightenment by failing to
appeal to a ‘we’, and promoting instead an anarchic discourse that forbids any
participation in a community. Foucault responded by saying that he does not regard
enlightenment critique as a necessary appeal to a ‘we’, since defining this ‘we’ is
exactly what critique seeks to explore.100 Critique starts out with the problem of
deciding whether it is suitable to place oneself in a community of shared principles
and values, before recognizing and accepting these principles outright. Critical
thought analyses and questions the consensus about the premises and frameworks
which shape experience so as to assess the condition of possibility of its existence or
its future formation, rather than deciding how one will endorse the principles of
consensus after they have been posed.
It was this ‘we’ of the alienists that brought about the conditions for the birth
of the asylum and the science of psychiatry. The psychiatric community of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shared specific institutional, epistemological
and philosophical concerns that were decidedly different from the ones shared in the
previous periods, or the ones existing today. Foucault’s work disputes the conception
of an increasingly sophisticated medical rationality that supposedly began with the
Enlightenment and has brought us closer to the truth of madness ever since.
Enlightenment critique consists of exploring the historical terms on which this unique
type of community was formed, so that the psychiatrist of the present can reflect on
the origins of his own discipline and perform a diagnosis of his own ‘we’, his own
actuality and his own community.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SIMULATION OF HYSTERIA AT THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
RATIONALITY: FOUCAULT’S STUDY OF AN EVENT
In the previous chapter we analysed the political factors which constituted
psychiatry as a discipline in the late eighteenth century. We focused on the juridical
components which contributed decisively to the formation of a particular diagnostic
truth regime that generated psychiatric knowledge. We contrasted Foucault’s analysis
with anti-psychiatry, to show how these extra-psychiatric forces comprised the
external truth conditions that shaped but did not penetrate truthful discourse, and
made up the political coordinates which guided but did not distort diagnosis in
psychiatry. We shall now turn to the internal, ethico-epistemological conflicts and
transformations which took place in the years following the initial episode of the birth
of the asylum. We shall deal extensively with the obstacles which impeded the
formulation of diagnostic truth in a way that would harmonise the newly born
discipline of psychiatry with the rest of medicine. We shall focus our discussion on
simulation, the major epistemological blockage of the nineteenth century which still
constitutes a central topic of debate, a crucial issue threatening the scientific validity
of psychiatry as a whole. Hysteria, a special case of simulation in late nineteenth
century psychiatry will be the reference point of our analysis. For Foucault, the
phenomenon of hysteria was a groundbreaking event which altered the course of
psychiatry and the way psychiatrists approached normality. It was not a random
accident, a mere dysfunction in the technology of the psychiatric institution, but an
exceptional case, a singularity which introduced a new problematic for diagnosis
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emerging alongside the medical model, becoming itself the model for critique. As a
point of rupture in the history of psychiatry, hysteria can serve as a clinical example
of what constitutes an event from a historical perspective. That event disrupted the
rational framework of psychiatry by creating a situation in which truth and illusion,
the history of veridictions and the history of simulacra, came to coexist on the same
strategic plane. Foucault’s analysis of hysteria demonstrates how his philosophy of
the event does not undermine Enlightenment critique but actually enacts it by causing
reason to reflect on the limits of the rational explanations that it provides.
Simulation as crisis
Simulation has been the most important epistemological problem haunting
psychiatry since the late nineteenth century. As we have shown, the truth regime of
alienism had designated madness as the prototype of mental illness, on account of its
appearance as a limit experience conceived by reason. It justified psychiatric
intervention. On the basis of its classification as a newly constituted type of malady of
the spirit, doctors could commit individuals to the asylum without requiring their
consent. However, the appearance of madness as a limit experience conflicted with
the need to identify it in clinical terms. It was by definition impossible to demonstrate
its presence through proof and verification. The fact that the incarceration of the mad
rested — according to the Kantian anthropological project — on the conception of an
a priori of reason rendered the empirical identification of madness far from self-
evident. Madness emerged as a conceptual entity which could not be subjected to
unequivocal rational observation and interpretation, generating an inner tension for
clinical practice: ‘The madman, who was the outsider par excellence, pure difference,
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’other’ to the power of two, became in this very distance the object of rational
analysis, fullness offered to knowledge and evident perception, the one precisely to
the extent that he was the other.’1 Madness as an object of medical perception
contained a fundamental paradox: as an experience at the limits of rationality, it
resisted rational appropriation: ‘The eighteenth century perceived the madman, but
deduced madness.’2 The tension between the de jure, that is, in principle, exclusion of
the mad as agents of unreason, and their de facto, empirical identification,3 generated
the phenomenon of simulation. The mad were isolated on the premise of their
entrapment in their own private truth, therefore not only access to that truth through
medical knowledge was barred, but the outward appearance of madness and its
clinical manifestation could also be imitated by healthy individuals. There appeared,
since the time of Pinel in the early nineteenth century,4 simulators, impostors who
presented the psychiatrist with typical signs of mental illness, but who turned out to
be individuals who wanted to absolve themselves of responsibility for a crime or who
sought to escape army recruitment. Apart from the various legal, social and
institutional problems that simulation raised, it also called the scientific status of
psychiatry into question. For if any symptom can be ‘produced’, and can no longer be
accepted as a fact of nature, then every illness may be considered simulatable. It is not
only psychiatry but medicine which simulation places in doubt since it only knows
how to treat real illnesses by their objective causes. Those who adopt an anti-
psychiatry stance use the idea that mental illness is a myth since it lacks an objective
basis and can be easily imitated through simple simulation as their main line of
argument. 5
For anti-psychiatry, then, simulation is a deep seated crisis of representation
in psychiatry which displays psychopathology’s inherent inability to found mental
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disorder on a medical causal model. It demonstrates the limitation of psychiatry to
represent madness medically and to pin its elusive nature on a tangible reality.
Simulation, the anti-psychiatrists essentially argue, prevents alienism from reaching
an acceptable degree of medical representation. It is not at this level, however, that
Foucault’s critique is situated. The representational value of psychiatric discourse is
not his primary concern.6 He is interested in the distinction between truth and falsity,
in the diagnostic truth regime which is anterior to and constitutive of the ability of
psychiatry to provide adequate representation of madness. Diagnosis is a form of
knowledge which defines and determines differences. While it operates within an
objective field of sickness, it is ‘outside of sickness,’ permitting the objective field of
sickness to appear.7 Diagnosis belongs to a wider domain, at once scientific, political
and ethical, as we have shown, which sets the terms of representation in advance and
makes the scientific statements of psychiatry pertinent and applicable. It was only
after society had posed for itself the problem of madness in terms of truth and falsity
that psychiatric knowledge could appear as its scientific solution.8 It was only after
this division had opened up a psychiatric area of perception that the internal
epistemological rules could then organize and structure it scientifically. For Foucault,
therefore, the diagnostic regime, the division between the true and the false,
constitutes a more primordial practice which, without being wholly scientific itself,
conditions the very possibility of the epistemologically serious claims.9 It is diagnosis,
differential knowledge, as the matrix of scientific knowledge, but more generally as a
mode of historical research, which raises crucial questions to which science must
respond:
First, in what sense is the production and transformation of the true/false division
characteristic and decisive for our historicity? Second, in what specific ways has this
relation operated in Western societies, which produces scientific knowledge whose
forms are perpetually changing and whose values are posited as universal? Third,
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what historical knowledge is possible of a history that itself produces the true/false
distinction on which such knowledge depends?10
Diagnosis, as we have shown, incorporates heterogeneous elements deriving from the
extra-scientific rationality of a given period. It therefore reflects the dominant form of
rationality of an epoch and the general attitude of that epoch towards the division
between the true and the false. In the west, distinct regimes of truth have determined
the various divisions between the true and the false over the centuries, and it was
inside these established divisions that the successive modes of knowledge which
Foucault describes in The Order of Things delineated the correct way of
demonstrating the true. This is why, instead of critiquing the content of psychiatric
knowledge which has only a local effect on its internal structure, Foucault advances
the critique of the prevailing diagnostic regime, insofar as it creates the capacity to
touch the roots of the general form of rationality which has inserted psychiatry into a
apparently permanent and transhistorical knowledge relationship.
Thus, Foucault shows how the diagnostic regime of truth which governs
psychiatry has not been stable throughout history, and, moreover, it has not always
belonged to the framework of western rationality. Contra anti-psychiatry, he suggests
that, if proto-psychiatric knowledge, the anthropological knowledge of alienism, was
confused with the strictly medical knowledge of the time, the reason for this
confusion was not that psychiatry was in a state of ignorance or was not scientific
enough, but that the truth regime which governed alienism obeyed its own unique
rules of formation. This truth has existed in the margins of western rationality since
the Middle Ages, but it has been pervasive inside the diagnostic thinking of medical
practice from Hippocrates to the eighteenth century medicine of Syndenham. It was a
discourse which did not produce scientific knowledge; it determined truth in the form
of arbitration, strategy and conflict. For Hippocrates, it was less the anatomical
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localization of an illness and more its critical moments — fevers, convulsions —
which interested him. These moments of crisis, where the battle between the illness
and the defences of nature reached its peak, revealed the truth of the illness,
determined its course and constituted the right occasion, the kairos when medical
intervention would be appropriate. More than twenty centuries later, the proto-
psychiatrists applied the same logic; they did not rely on inquiry and examination in
order to tackle the problem of unreason. Their basic diagnostic method was the test
which they used in order to detect the presence of madness.11 They studied madness
in its crises and the sudden outbursts of its inner truth. Although, as we have shown,
their nosographic approach was formally isomorphic with the rest of medicine, it was
designed in such a way as to test and make manifest the moment when the truth of
madness appeared, as in crime, and they saw their ability to establish the truth of the
mad as a way of gaining control over the unreason of the mad. The test, however, was
a ritualistic and juridical mode of truth production that psychiatry had to overcome in
its efforts to become a medical specialism continuous not just with the form but
mainly with the content of medical discourse.12 So long as madness could not be
demonstrated anatomically, psychiatry could never become a branch of medicine.
Psychiatry, therefore, strove to incorporate the regime of truth-demonstration and
truth-observation already prevalent in medicine. It sought to dispense with the para-
scientific truth-test, not only because it was irreconcilable with a proper medical
discourse, but also because it allowed the crises of madness to run their course, posing
social and individual danger. It was from that historical moment, from the
complementarity and conflict of these two truth regimes, that the reliable
identification of madness ceased to be a philosophical, quasi-scientific practice and
became a representational problem for psychiatry.
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Foucault’s critique focuses precisely on this interpenetration between these
two fundamental truth regimes of the truth-test and of scientific observation which
govern psychiatric knowledge, and it is at their level that he situates the phenomenon
of simulation. Simulation is the result of the superimposition of one truth regime on
another, the result of the coexistence and derivation of one truth regime from the other
in the same diagnostic discourse. This type of simulation generates a critical moment;
it is a moment of crisis which calls for a diagnosis inside diagnosis, for a discernment
between the two types of truth which function harmoniously in the same domain of
psychiatric practice but nevertheless belong to two different registers. These two
regimes do not consist of simultaneously existing epistemic schemas. They do not
surface when a new scientific model disrupts an accepted, ‘normal science.’13 In this
form of simulation, the accepted scientific model is challenged as a norm by a truth
with different rules of formation. The truth regime of the test does not belong to the
realm of science, but the fact that it is a juridical and philosophical truth does not
make it less true. In fact, its exteriority in relation to science not only does not reduce
its truth value, but, on the contrary, it is the power of its truth which disputes, not the
content, but the hegemony of science in the articulation and organization of
statements. This is why its detection, far from refuting the scientific validity of
psychiatry, constitutes for Foucault the focal point for the emergence of
epistemological mutations and psychiatric revolutions:
It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each
other […] there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement […]
it’s not so much a matter of knowing what external power imposes itself on science as
of what effects of power circulate among scientific statements, what constitutes, as it
were, their internal regime of power, and how and why at certain moments that
regime undergoes a global modification.14
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The History of Madness essentially describes the major crisis of the late eighteenth
century, the moment of simulation which brought about the simultaneous emergence
and bifurcation of the truth regime of the test and the scientific truth of demonstration,
generating alienism. Since that historical point, science has become the dominant
discourse in psychiatry, excluding and suppressing the truth-test. Foucault’s critique
amounts to showing how this excluded system of truth still survives inside diagnostic
regimes which claim to be scientific, working as the underside of scientific
diagnosis.15 Alongside the scientific truth regime which consistently promotes
universality, exactness and identity, Foucault detects heterogeneous elements of truth,
elements of testing the truth rather than fabricating positive knowledge, which,
although seemingly part of the same scientific regime, are not strictly scientific as
they foreground singularity, crisis and otherness.
As we showed in the previous chapter, a juridical regime of truth-test
manifested itself in nineteenth century forensic psychiatry when the prognostic model
of social prevention was interrupted by the unexpected emergence of monstrosity. In
the neurological diagnostic discourse of roughly the same period, as we shall now
show, Foucault isolates a regime of truth which introduces negativity and radical
otherness parallel to, and in the background, of a dominant regime of positivism.
Foucault illustrates this important crisis, the second major crisis of the early years of
psychiatry, when hysteria challenged the status of psychiatry as a part of medicine by
situating the problem of diagnostic truth at the level of the primordial distinction
between madness and non-madness, sameness and otherness. For Foucault, hysteria
was both a neurological construct and a derivative of the production of the truth of
madness through the test; hysteria, without being a genuine medical illness, mere
simulation or pure madness, reestablished the distinction between other and same, the
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being and non-being of illness, inside and outside. It emerged spontaneously as a
problem among other illnesses, challenging the diagnostic efforts of the doctors, their
power and the truth that would offer recognition of the hysterics as mentally ill
subjects. It surfaced as an event, a minor phenomenon with enormous consequences
for the exercise of psychiatry as an extension of neurology. It altered the structure of
the asylum itself, the status of the agents of hysteria as mentally ill patients, and the
whole network of power relations among doctors, patients and mental health workers.
It challenged the way of ‘speaking true’ in psychiatry; that is, the very truth
conditions which the neurological model sought to establish as a grid of intelligibility
for mental illness.16 In other words, it attacked not the validity of statements regarding
illness, but the very rationality that sought to medicalize madness. The neurological
model failed, the question of otherness returned, and psychoanalysis was born.
Hysteria was the major event of nineteenth century psychiatry; a minor phenomenon
with enormous implications for medical rationality.
Simulation and hyperreality ─ the neurological body
We shall now begin our analysis by discussing simulation as both an
epistemological and a political determinant for the formation of psychiatry as a
positive science in the middle of the nineteenth century. During this period,
simulation was not only an internal problem for science, but a more general issue for
the prevalent form of rationality. As we briefly discussed in the previous chapter, the
logic of security and management of the population became dominant in the middle of
the nineteenth century. The distinctive characteristic of the system of security was
that, unlike the constant reference to the law in the rationality of sovereignty or the
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fundamental relation to the norm in disciplinary logic, security could only function in
perpetual reference to the complementarity of reality and simulation. Security
comprised an ensemble of mechanisms for the protection of society from the
uncontrollable elements of nature, whether they be present or future ones, real or
simulated. It was centered around the effort to intervene at the level of variables,
unforeseeable elements of the environment, and potential accidents, in order to ensure
the safety of the population and secure the forecasting and prevention of risks,
dangers and crises. The processes of the external world were studied, plotted on
statistical graphs, manipulated in order to be put in check, nullified and regulated,
even or mainly before they occurred. Reality became the principle of action and the
domain of intervention. Contrary to, and in juxtaposition to, the disciplinary logic
which opposes reality to the imaginary, security tried ‘to work within reality, by
getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and
through a series of analyses and specific arrangements.’17 Reality was not established
as a negative supplement to a set of prescriptions and norms, but as a continuum
between the actual and the virtual. It encompassed every possible anomaly which was
no longer considered as a future actuality to be prevented, but as a potentiality
intrinsic to the present processes which science must correct. Reality became a
concept encompassing the virtual. It became ‘hyperreal.’18 The fake, simulation,
ceased to be an argument against it, but it began to function as its necessary correlate.
Any real event which threatened security could be measured against its preconceived
statistical existence and its simulation models, and conversely any simulated event
could be refuted by recourse to scientific proof of actual processes. Security therefore
targeted simulation as a general political issue, a new problematic in the distinction
between truth and falsity, which gave science the task of policing the global milieu by
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applying its precise system of diagnosis and establishing accurate predictions based
on that diagnosis.19
In the context of this governmental logic of security and hyperreality, a new
truth regime enhanced and expanded the role of science. In discipline, there was a vast
taxonomic discourse — the Taxinomia universalis which we analysed in chapter 3 —
which laid out the norm, classification and order against which things could be
measured and made intelligible. In the logic of security, on the other hand, the
measurement of natural processes should be made in vivo, in their point of simulated
reality, their genesis, their development and mutation. Truth therefore was no longer a
norm, a law to which phenomena should conform, but was part of these phenomena, it
was inscribed in the elements of reality. There was a total identification of truth and
reality, a coincidence between statements and processes, an exact and measurable
correspondence of truth with its object of study. A ‘truth’ now existed, ‘that [was] of
the same order as the object.’20 This is the birth of positivism. In positivism, truth has
no gaps, no black holes and no crises. On the contrary, its objective is to prevent
crises from occurring. Positivist truth is considered to be everywhere, at every time
and every moment. It cannot and must not come forth in the form of simulated or
unexpected events. It should be controllable, programmable and graspable through
investigation using instruments of technology and knowledge of technique. Positivism
replaced the inquiry of the classical age and the examination of disciplinary systems
with an in-depth colonization of things, bodies and actions, where universal truth
could be discovered and measured by qualified individuals who possessed academic
knowledge and had access to laboratories, universities and canonical teaching.21 This
truth regime could free research from the speculative approach of philosophy, the
abstract theories of historians, and of the dilemmas of anthropology regarding the
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finitude of man. It could make feasible the study of man in terms of given truths
derived from physics and mathematics, the rules of logic and the laws governing
human perception. It assigned to the body the locus where truth could be recognized
and made manifest, granting the human sciences the fully constituted privilege of
reflecting on man and replacing the philosophical concerns of the eighteenth
century.22
The hyperreality of this network of security and the prevalence of positivism
brought about the ‘somatocracy’ of the nineteenth century.23 The body satisfied both
requirements of the new political technology; that is, the new government of
individuals and the exact coincidence of truth and reality. In the developing logic of
security and bio-power, the body appeared as a biological entity connecting the
individual with the population, generating the notion of the man-as-species. In
somatocracy the health of the body and the protection of public hygiene became
crucial political targets, rendering medicine a new scientific power central to the
government of the population. The body itself became hyperreal; it was no longer the
docile and useful body which had to be disciplined, manipulated and controlled so as
to function as a model of normality. It was a set of natural processes, the ‘metabody’
of genetics, which contained the real domain of forces where disease took shape and
burst forth, but also the locus of simulated illness, the reservoir of potential ailments.24
At the same time, the body became the site of truth. Insofar as the body was both the
foundation of perceived reality and the object of this reality as a set of biological
processes, truth and reality were grounded in the body, the unequivocal source of a
knowledge which from now on should be not only diagnostic but also prognostic.
Combining these new governmental and positivist aspirations, medicine, the human
science of the body par excellence, could thus serve as a perfect model for a positive,
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both true and real, science of man. Medicine became immune to simulation from the
moment pathological anatomy as an empirical and accurate knowledge provided
diagnostic truth with the power of rigorous demonstration; pathological anatomy
effectively confounded the classification and organization of illnesses in such a way
that their anatomical seat could be revealed, and their localization inside the body
would be discovered and predicted. If it could be applied to psychiatry, it would
extend its demonstrative powers to the discovery of the ontology of madness.
In the light of these transformations, however, psychiatry was still unable to
eliminate simulation. It lacked the conditions necessary to achieve medical truth and
positive knowledge, despite its insertion in the logic of security and its second
enthronement as a royal science engaged in the discourse par excellence of reality. In
terms of defining reality, psychiatry was once again queen. Inasmuch as it was able to
formulate what counts as real in scientific terms, psychiatry acquired the legitimacy
and authority to diagnose, cure and correct those who stand outside reality. The
asylum became the exemplary site of hyperreality; it became a space where power
and reality were mutually reinforced. In the asylum, power was exercised as an agent
of reality, and reality was capable of operating as the sole element of power: ‘Giving
power to reality and founding power on reality is the asylum tautology.’25 This
tautology, however, still relied on crises and tests rather than demonstrative truth. The
reality of madness could emerge only on condition that the patient was carefully
isolated from his environment. The patient began to confront the reality of the asylum
from the moment he faced the doctor’s will, the regulations of the institution and his
own morbid desires. Only crises and conflicts could resolve the fundamental dilemma
between truth and lie, reality and fiction: ‘The activity of psychiatric knowledge is
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really situated at the point of simulation, at the point of fiction, not at the point of
characterization.’26
Characterization of illness was still not possible: there was no objective truth
that would enable the psychiatrist to demonstrate illness anatomically in order to
conduct evidence-based forensic analyses, statistical observations and experimental
research; that is, to perform the role of a proper clinician. The psychiatrist could not
produce the reality of madness, which remained, at this stage, a conceptual object
with no empirical support. He could not substantiate its existence and justify its
presence scientifically. He could not convince the courts that restraining the mad and
diagnosing them as carriers of risk and danger could be medically grounded. He could
not verify sufficiently whether a patient was in need of involuntary hospitalization or
whether he was a malingerer. He could not provide valid prognosis regarding the
future threats that the patient might pose. He lacked demonstrative truth:
The great problem of the history of psychiatry in the nineteenth century is not the
problem of concepts, and not at all the problem of this or that illness; neither
monomania nor even hysteria was the real problem, the cross psychiatry had to bear
in the nineteenth century. If we accept that the question of truth is never posed in
psychiatric power, then it is easy to understand that the cross nineteenth century
psychiatry has to bear is quite simply the problem of simulation.27
The psychiatrist was obliged to produce a new, positive type of knowledge that would
sidestep the problem of simulation in the same way that the rest of medicine had
managed to limit it through objective investigation of bodily illnesses. For this reason,
the psychiatrist of the mid-nineteenth century asylum pursued a form of research
beyond the diagnostic thinking of the proto-psychiatrists, a type of scientific
endeavour that would discover aetiology and localization. It was an enormous effort
which sought to bridge the gap between the otherness of madness and the same of
knowledge, the empirical and the transcendental. It was an effort primarily against
simulation, which marks the psychiatric enterprise to this day.
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For psychiatry, then, the challenge was to lay hold on the patient’s body by
adopting the diagnostic truth regime of medical discourse and its methodology. But it
could not gain access to this specific truth regime. In the nineteenth century,
psychiatry, as it was established, was a medicine without a body.28 The model of
syphilis gave only an approximate anatomical account of madness, failing to provide
reliability.29 The neuroses, mental disorders with clear bodily manifestations such as
hypochondria, hysteria, were too atypical and irregular in their presentation, lacking
ascribable anatomical correlations, and were vulnerable to simulation.30 The
psychiatrist had to substitute for this absence of the body through confessional
techniques that provided the family body and the body of heredity, and the use of
drugs, which offered an elementary understanding of irrationality.31 Psychiatry
remained an imitation, an analogon of medicine rather than a specialism of it. The
demonstrative power of the psychiatrists was limited and it was left to their de jure
judgment to incarcerate the mad. Insanity still constituted an ideal object, a
transcendence, a disembodied illness with no empirical justification. The binarism
that prevailed in the proto-psychiatric setting persisted:
Whereas [general] medical knowledge functions at the point of the specification of the
illness, at the point of differential diagnosis, medical knowledge in psychiatry
functions at the point of the decision between madness or non-madness, the point, if
you like, of reality or non-reality, reality or fiction, whether this be fiction on the part
of the patient who, for one reason or another, would like to pretend to be mad, or the
fiction of the family circle, which imagines, wishes, desires, or imposes the image of
madness. This is the point at which the psychiatrist’s knowledge, and also his power,
functions.32
Psychiatry strove to overcome the difficulty raised by simulation by resorting to a
truth regime which was derivative of pathological anatomy, but was more appropriate
for valid psychiatric research: the neurological body. As we discussed in the previous
chapter, it was observed that in epilepsy and other neurological conditions there was
automatism and lack of will, an irrational and even dangerous behaviour which
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imitated delirium. It was also observed that such behaviour could be traced in its
origins, in the personality and past conduct of the individual. Neurological
abnormalities could be extracted from the patient’s individual history, and
pathological instincts could be spotted in the childhood, development and family life
of criminals such as Pierre Rivière.33 Neurology could now provide a host of
predisposing factors, diagnostic evidence and prognostic indicators for the
manifestation of madness, its future course and the perils that it carried. Psychiatry
could study, analyse and investigate abnormal instincts objectively, like the rest of
medicine. The notion of degeneration was born. The symptomatological field
exploded, and psychiatry could now intervene medically in all aspects of human
conduct.34 This increase in psychiatric power in the field of abnormalities was due to
its firm establishment within the rules of medical discourse:
The appearance of neurology, or more precisely, of neuropathology, was a
fundamental event in the history of medicine, that is to say, when certain disorders
began to be dissociated from madness and it became possible to assign them a
neurological seat and neuropathological etiology that made it possible to distinguish
those who were really ill at the level of their body from those for whom one could
assign no etiology at the level of organic lesions.35
Psychiatry escaped for the first time from the old dilemma ‘mad or not mad’ and
sanctioned a game of truth and falsity so as never to be called into question.
Neurology offered both the form and the content of mental illness, both its truth and
its reality. Differential diagnosis and organic aetiology were finally achieved and
psychiatry could form a part of medicine:
This famous differential diagnosis, which one had never been able to apply to
madness, which never really managed to get a grip on the mental illnesses, this
differential diagnosis that one could never insert between an ordinary illness and
madness, because madness, above all and essentially, fell under absolute diagnosis,
this differential diagnosis then, through the apparatus I have tried to describe, can now
be inserted between neurological disorders with ascribable anatomical lesions, and
those disorders called ‘neuroses.’ 36
176
Psychiatry became a royal science for one more reason. Aside from its role as an
agent of reality, its expertise in the definition and distribution of abnormalities, and its
scientific intervention at the level of all types of human conduct, it managed to be
enthroned as a medical specialism capable of articulating truthful discourse:
In crude terms, psychiatric power says: […] I am the possessor, if not of truth in its
content, at least of all the criteria of truth. Furthermore, because, as scientific
knowledge, I thereby possess the criteria of verification and truth, I can attach myself
to reality and its power and impose on these demented and disturbed bodies the
surplus-power that I give to reality. I am the surplus-power of reality inasmuch as I
possess, by myself and definitively, something that is the truth in relation to
madness.37
The positivism of the body, the dissection of the body through the blade of differential
diagnosis and neurological knowledge, replaced the need to trace delirium, error and
illusion, with the pathology of automatism, involuntary behaviour, and biological
dysfunction. A continuum going from medicine and organic disorder to the
disturbance of conduct was possible from the moment the body became the space
where the transcendence of delirium could find its empirical correlate and its positive
manifestation. Psychiatry — or neuropsychiatry — became ‘hyperreal’ in both its
clinical and social roles. From now on simulation could no longer constitute an enemy
to its epistemological armature, insofar as the malingerer could be refuted through
careful differential diagnostic procedures and proof of organic aetiology. Her
behaviour could be submitted to the law of the voluntary and the involuntary, to the
investigation of his instincts and psychological motives. Moreover, it became possible
for psychiatry to expand its role into the very core of social reality as its scientific
point of reference. Inasmuch as political issues, art criticism and military technology
began to revolve around debates regarding reality, perception and simulation,
psychiatry acquired a royal status and inevitably began to play a political and cultural
role.38 It inaugurated and increased its normalizing function, the ‘psy-function’, which
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has arisen as an institutional discipline infiltrating the family, the school, the army and
the workshop.39 Throughout the nineteenth century psychiatry extended its powers to
medicine, pedagogy, psychology and philosophy, augmenting the logic of integration,
treatment and socialization.40
Hysteria and the subversion of the neurological body
It is at this historical point that hysteria emerged as a singularity within the
heart of the asylum system. Although hysteria existed from the ancient times, in the
nineteenth century it appeared as simulacrum. It was not, however, the great illness of
the nineteenth century, but a typical asylum syndrome which took on the
characteristics of a struggle between doctors and patients. Although initially Charcot
and his pupils picked out hysteria from the large crowd of simulators who populated
the asylum space, it turned out that hysteria was not a typical case of simulation;
simulators were random malingerers, healthy individuals who feigned madness by
faithfully adopting all the known symptoms of mental illness for personal gain. The
hysterics, by contrast, were asylum patients already designated as ill, who did not
pose a problem concerning the reality of madness, but played effectively the truth
game promoted by psychiatric power. They did not confuse the distinction between
truth and falsity and they did not simply make sanity imitate madness. On the
contrary, they responded positively to Charcot’s efforts in differentiating real illness
from simulation. They confirmed the truth game of neurological diagnosis, while at
the same time emerging from another order, outside the field of cognition opened up
by the neurological model.41 They did not represent the way sanity simulates
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madness, but ‘the way hysteria simulates hysteria’, ‘madness simulating madness.’
Through them:
madness replied: If you claim to possess the truth once and for all in terms of an
already fully constituted knowledge, well, for my part, I will install falsehood in
myself. And so, when you handle my symptoms, when you are dealing with what you
call illness, you will find yourself caught in a trap, for at the heart of my symptoms
there will be this small kernel of night, falsehood, through which I will confront you
with the question of truth. Consequently, I won’t deceive you when your knowledge
is limited — that would be pure and simple simulation — but rather, if one day you
want really to have a hold on me, you will have to accept the game of truth and
falsehood that I offer you.42
Hysteria had unique characteristics. It displayed clear neurological symptoms and
signs — tonic-clonic seizures, anaesthesias, paralyses, stigmata — which, however,
showed no indications of a definite anatomical seat. These symptoms were equally
distinguished from simulation, as they did not imitate real illness exactly. They were
close to an existing neurological illness and yet sufficiently different for the diagnosis
of genuine illness to be made.43 The hysterics did not conform perfectly to the
diagnostic model of truth, but, by subtly distinguishing themselves from genuine
illness, they became the modulators of the neurological model, which they thereby
annulled rather than simply taking it to its epistemological limit. For this reason
Foucault calls the hysterics ‘the true militants of anti-psychiatry.’44 For anti-
psychiatry hysteria exemplifies how any simulator, any person with ‘problems of
living’ and no demonstrable anatomical lesion, can imitate the signs and symptoms
put forward by the medical model, thus exposing the limitations of psychiatry as a
medical science. Psychiatry is a ‘science of lies’ insofar as it easily falls prey to
pretence, having no concrete means of demonstrating the nature and essence of
madness.45 As we have seen, for Foucault the argument used by Szasz not only does
not refute psychiatry, but it actually reinforces it. Anti-psychiatry simply sees in
simulation a refutation of the ontology of mental illness, leaving open, however, the
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possibility that the medical model of psychiatry will refine its criteria of authentic and
false illness and that this ontology will be discovered; it thus leaves the medical model
of truth intact. The phenomenon of simulation does not call psychiatric power into
question, since ‘pretending to be mad when one is sane is not something like an
essential limit, boundary, or defect of psychiatric practice and psychiatric power,
because, after all, this happens in other realms of knowledge and in medicine in
particular.’46 The problem with Szasz’s analysis is that it accepts a priori the
neurological model of psychiatry and only exposes its limits through simulation. He
considers hysteria as an epistemological obstacle which can be potentially overcome
once psychiatry discovers, within the confines of its current regime of truth, a way to
avoid it. Foucault, on the other hand, stresses that hysteria questioned the medical
model altogether. It did not confront power externally through falsification of
symptoms. The symptoms of hysteria were not pure and exact imitation of real illness,
but had their own pattern and their own form, which, although clearly neurological,
revealed no neurological basis. Hysteria undermined the neurological model from
within, by installing itself effectively inside the system of differential diagnosis,
becoming, at least formally, one illness among others. It did not dethrone Charcot
from his authority, but, on the contrary, through hysteria Charcot was sanctioned as a
neurologist, a real doctor who could finally win the battle against simulation and
restore the medical status of psychiatry. Charcot owed much of his renown as an
astute clinician to the hysterics; they provided him with the diagnostic rigour that
neurology lacked. But the trap for psychiatric power and Charcot lay in his total
dependence on hysteria for the verification of his clinical observations, and his
inability to touch the hard kernel of unreason which these patients masked. In his very
effort to dispense with madness, Charcot was obliged to rely on it. 47 But at the same
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time he was unable to demonstrate hysteria’s anatomical basis and to account for its
possible origins, which escaped the grasp of neurology. Although he demonstrated
neurological truth through the hysterics, he could not ground it on solid reality. More
importantly, he was obliged to limit the instability and irregularity of the symptoms of
hysteria through hypnosis which was a theatrical and ritualistic rather than
neurological way of mastering the problematic manifestation of convulsions.48 He
thus reinserted the distinction between observation and testing, between organic
disease and psychological disease, between soul and body.49 Seeking to single out
hysteria as the most effective site of veridiction, Charcot transformed it into an entity
more enigmatic than a scientific error or a sort of epistemological blockage. His
hyperrealism and expressionism, which sought to bring forth the reality of illness,
generated the surrealism of the hysterics who brought truth, the discourse of
diagnosis, into conflict with that of reality.50 The hysterics were not concrete
nosological entities, they were simulacra constituting
the militant underside of psychiatric power […] if we accept that simulation was the
insidious way for the mad to pose the question of truth forcibly on a psychiatric power
that only wanted to impose reality on them, then I think that we could write a history
of psychiatry that would no longer revolve around psychiatry and its knowledge, but
which finally would revolve around the mad.51
As simulacrum, as singularity at the heart of the asylum system, hysteria represents
the actual involvement of the mad in the struggle over truth and the strategies inherent
in the structure of the asylum. Hysteria appeared as a body that resisted neurological
organization and disrupted the distribution of signs and symptoms. It was an
incomprehensible body, a body erratic in its responses, which exacerbated symptoms,
producing them in an unstable manner and yet complying with the dictates of the
clinician; it was a wholly unpredictable and unmanageable body:
the explosions of hysteria manifested in psychiatric hospitals in the second half of the
19th century were indeed a backlash, a repercussion of the very exercise of psychiatric
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power: the psychiatrists got their patients’ hysterical body full in the face (I mean in
full knowledge and in full ignorance) without wanting it, without even knowing how
it happened.52
The body of the hysteric emitted confused and ambivalent signs. It was a ‘body
without organs,’53 a locus of phantasms which surfaced in its meaninglessness and
enigmatic significations at a time when psychiatry made its first attempt to provide
recognition of the asylum patient in terms of a coherent discourse of truth and
knowledge. The hysterics illustrate clearly that ‘nothing in man — not even his body
— is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding
other men.’54 Hysteria shows how the body is a specific locus and target of forms of
rationality which inscribe in the body true and false statements that strategically
demarcate it, describe it, dissect it and define it, in order to turn it into an object of
recognition. It shows that the body does not resist by confronting the artificial
constraints of power with its supposed naturalness, but by becoming actively engaged
in this politics of truth, by both submitting to external inscriptions and subverting the
truth that purports to circumscribe it and essentialise it.55 It is not surprising, Foucault
notes, that the body of hysteria appeared exactly at the historical moment when
medicine attempted to construct the mad subject as a fully constituted and
recognizable type through neurology.56 With the emergence of hysteria, the
neurological body was abandoned; the process of medicalizing madness came to a
standstill as its truth regime was called into question. The introduction of the sexual
body was under way. The hysterics were discharged from the asylum, gaining a
rightful place in the general hospital; psychopharmacology and psychoanalysis were
born, the deinstitutionalization which prevailed in the twentieth century was
initiated.57
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Hysteria was the major impact of a small group of asylum patients on the
rationality and practice of psychiatry near the end of the nineteenth century.58 With
hysteria madness was once again problematized. Silenced through integration and
medicalization, madness reappeared as a problem, raising its incomprehensible voice
only to confuse the clarity of medical discourse. It disrupted the calm, settled, but
illusory positivism of medical rationality, and opened the possibility for renewal and
transformation for medical truth in a way far more radical than any liberal, anarchic or
leftist anti-psychiatric discourse: ‘Anti-psychiatry demolishes the medicalization of
madness within the institution and the conscience of doctors. But from this very fact,
the question of madness comes back to us after this long colonization by medicine and
psychiatry. What can we make of it?’ 59
Hysteria and the history of the Simulacrum
It is now possible to appreciate the value of Foucault’s history of the
simulacrum since it clearly illustrates, in a condensed form, the central problematic
which tacitly permeates his work. Foucault does not seek to refute scientific
knowledge by exposing its limitations. He does not concern himself with simulation
which confuses the distinction between the true and the false. The simulacrum
questions the self-evidence of truth and falsity by acting as a sign which at once
affirms the true-false distinction, while also depriving it of any ontological ground.
But it also lends this distinction another dimension; it stops the endless proliferation
of differential diagnosis, its all-encompassing and hyperreal effects, by introducing
another reality, another order which, while ungraspable in itself, exhibits the self-
delusion of rationality, and destabilizes the unity and reality put forth by the good will
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to truth. The evil genius of the simulacrum deceives by introducing a split inside the
truth of diagnosis. Hysteria provoked a crisis by ironically forcing neurologists to
encounter madness from within their positivist model of truth which was designed
precisely with the intention of depsychiatrizing madness.60 The hysterics did not
introduce the truth of madness against the truth of reason, but a division, a caesura
inside rationality itself, inside the regime of global acceptance and limitless expansion
which was made to recognize the necessity of a marginalized, binary diagnostic
discourse of limits and boundaries. Hysteria ‘reproblematized’ madness,61 and
reintroduced it as a question in the form of an illusion, when all medical answers
appeared settled and permanent, and positivism figured as an all-encompassing
solution.
Hysteria cannot be interpreted in strictly Kantian or Platonic terms: it
cannot be assumed to represent a transcendence which forcibly encroaches on the
system of truth, as psychoanalysis will later argue.62 Likewise, hysteria cannot be
understood as a clinical sophism, the confusion between essence and appearance,
between the absence of madness and its positive reality. The hysterics manipulated
the truth regime of neurology in a crude and cynical way. They were ‘visible statues’
of a paradoxical truth which at once sanctioned diagnosis and made it unacceptable.63
Moreover, they clearly did not represent the truth of madness; on the contrary, the
hysterics suspended madness not only as an essence, but also as a universal, as a
transcendence. Hysteria was a curious case of madness, a madness with no ascription
to anatomy; it was the living embodiment of clear symptomatology, and its existence
was linked to moments of crisis and nothing else, at the time when the ideal end goal
of psychiatry was to demonstrate the pure reality of madness, the neurological
expression of degeneration in its terminal stage (dementia), without the need for signs,
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symptoms and crises.64 But at the same time hysteria was a madness ‘with absolutely
no delirium or error’, a madness with no private truth but capable of playing
effectively the game of truth and falsity with the psychiatrists.65 It was not ‘the
absence of an œuvre’,66 but a form of madness fully engaged in ‘the dance of masks,
the cries of bodies, and the gesturing of hands and fingers.’67 By willingly accepting
all clinical attributions, the hysterics showed how madness cannot be approached in
its reality without a prior and fundamental investigation of its truth. Madness can only
be posed in terms of truth and it is its truth which conditions every effort to grasp its
ontology. This is why the effect of hysteria on the production of psychiatric
knowledge is not one of intrinsic limitation or epistemological blockage. As in the
case of the dangerous individual in forensic psychiatry, hysteria led differential
knowledge in psychiatry to a deadlock, illustrating the indispensability of absolute
diagnosis, of the basic duality between madness and non-madness, which is at the
heart of the psychiatric endeavour.
It was for these reasons that hysteria caused the collapse of the model of
pathological anatomy as well as of the neurological model. Charcot’s experiment
succeeded on a clinical level, and he managed to base psychiatric differential
diagnosis on a neurological model of truth. But the hysterics who aided his effort at
the same time marked its limits. They manipulated Charcot himself, who had to face
the question of whether the symptoms induced in the hysterics actually belonged to
the nature of hysteria or were a product of his own intervention.68 Charcot was
obliged to seek recourse to dubious clinical methods such as hypnosis, which belied
his own attempt to insert rigour into his diagnosis. His desire to prove the reality of
madness, through the verification and demonstration of neurological truth, stumbled
on the paradox of imposing the truth of the test and of suggestion, allowing madness
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to control the game of truth and falsity. From the ambitious positivist who would
depsychiatrize madness for the first time, Charcot became the ‘miracle worker of
hysteria’ and the fabricator of simulation inherent to madness itself.69
Simulation as Epistemological Crisis
The case of hysteria can alter the way an epistemological crisis can be
interpreted. An epistemological crisis does not emerge from the temporary impasses
and shortcomings of an immature theoretical model. It does not even arise from
simulation, from the provisional inability of a diagnostic truth regime to elucidate the
distinction between truth and falsity, which is expected to be overcome once a clearer
positivist model of explanation becomes accepted. A crisis which threatens the
rationality and institutional framework of a discipline manifests itself in the
coexistence of simultaneous truth regimes in the same diagnostic discourse. We saw
in the previous chapter that penal psychiatry follows its own normative structure,
although it claims to be an extension of psychiatric knowledge. The psychiatrist who
represents his discipline in the courtroom articulates a discourse which is not
consistent with the established, positive knowledge of psychiatry. In the same way,
Charcot’s efforts to stabilize the clinical picture of hysteria, and to produce it in terms
of neurological differential diagnosis, introduced a method foreign to neurology itself
(hypnosis), raising systematically for the first time the anti-psychiatric suspicion that
the alleged epistemological achievements of psychiatry mask procedures, rituals and
tests external to the rules of medicine.70
For Foucault, the coexistence of heterogeneous truth regimes inside the
same diagnostic model is not an argument against the validity of psychiatry, but a
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domain that needs to be analysed and brought to the fore. For him, the insidious
intrusion of speculative or prescientific modes of truth telling into the otherwise solid
scientific structure which rests on proof and demonstration, is not an accident, an
undesirable mishap. On the contrary, Foucault argues that verification and positivism
have excluded, set aside and subordinated other modes of truth production, which still
subsist and continue to have great historical importance. In psychiatry, as we have
shown, such a marginalized type of truth lies beneath the calm positivism of the
analysis of bodies, and concerns the unexpected and singular crises in which truth is
reconsidered. Foucault, however, does not privilege this type of truth over psychiatric
positivism. He does not look for the moments of crisis which will reveal the inner
truth of madness against the blindness of the psychiatrist who denies it. He
foregrounds the role of this forgotten and dismissed form of truth as a barrier, a
limitation to the pretentions and claims to universality that a regime of truth-
demonstration puts forward. The absolute diagnosis between madness and non-
madness, the modality of the truth-test which preoccupies both the everyday judicial
decision of whether a person is in need of compulsory incarceration and the crucial
diagnostic determination of authentic madness, precedes and determines the
specification of illnesses and their characterization. In psychiatry these two types of
truth are indispensable to one another and their mutual superimposition generates
events and crises which touch the roots of psychiatric rationality:
For a long time, medicine, psychiatry, penal justice, and criminology, remained, and
to a large extent remain still today, on the borders of a manifestation of truth in
accordance with the norms of knowledge and of a production of truth in the form of
the test, the latter always tending to hide behind and get its justification from the
former. The current crisis of these ‘disciplines’ does not merely call into question
their limits or uncertainties with the field of knowledge, it calls into question
knowledge itself, the form of knowledge, the ‘subject-object’ norm. It puts in question
the relationships between our society’s economic and political structures and
knowledge (not its true or false contents, but in its power-knowledge functions). It is,
then, a historico-political crisis.71
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The limitation that the truth-test imposes on the psychiatrist does not demonstrate the
infancy or primitive state of his knowledge. On the contrary, it is the frontier of
objective knowledge, a protective barrier against the self-delusion of possessing too
much knowledge and too great a grasp on the reality of madness. It is a truth-
boundary to the surplus power of reality inside the psychiatric institution which
creates the false image of a universal truth, a timeless objectivity and a universal
subject who is in a position to possess it. The truth-event or the truth-crisis creates
gaps and empty spaces inside the positivist field which is saturated with meaning and
information. This is why it requires specific subjects to trace it and make it manifest,
not everywhere and at all times, but in exceptional, singular instances. Hysteria would
never have provoked such a stir in the psychiatric world were it not for its
manifestation in a precise geography (the Salpêtrière in the nineteenth century), in a
precise historical moment (the unique confrontation between Charcot and his
simulators) and by specific agents (without Charcot and his clinical tests and
hypotheses, hysteria would still be nothing more than mere simulation for the abstract
subject of neurology). Insofar as the truth-event is not susceptible to research and
proof and it is not amenable to repeated analysis and verification, it has a peripheral
role to play in relation to scientific knowledge. Critique, however, traces its
confrontation with positivism, and gives it theoretical force in order to make it more
intense and pronounced, so that psychiatric truth can be questioned, not at its weakest
moments, but at the high points of its rigour.
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Conclusion
Epistemology has sought to uncover the irreducible core of scentificity inside
psychiatric knowledge. Anti-psychiatry, on the other hand, seeks to expose the non-
scientific elements of psychiatry in order to illustrate its low epistemological level.
Foucault takes neither of these two sides. His main concern is to show how, not unlike
for other sciences, in psychiatry scientific truth cannot claim exclusivity over other
modalities of truth. ‘I believe too much in the truth not to assume that there are
different truths and different ways of saying it.’72 There is a philosophical truth, a
truth of finitude and absolute diagnosis which cuts across and disrupts the official
regime of truth which guides scientific thought. This philosophical truth exists on the
fringes of western rationality and it is its effects which Foucault analyses with his
‘ethno-epistemology.’73 It is not, however, a prophetic truth: it does not speak the
truth of madness as the hidden destiny returning as the repressed dark side of western
science. It is not an eschatological truth studying crises intrinsic to science through
which the truth of otherness bursts forth in an apocalyptic form at the ‘point where
human finitude and the structure of time are conjoined.’74 Marxist and Freudian
eschatology have claimed to play this role, and, as in the case of positivism and
phenomenology, they have functioned inside the anthropological epistème as its
tribunal and dialectical synthesis.75 For Foucault, on the other hand, a philosophical
truth is not the truth of madness but the truth regime which tests madness and detects
its presence. Crises emerge when this truth regime becomes interchangeable,
superimposed and confused with scientific truth. When the truth-test and the truth of
science struggle for hegemony, modes of subjectivity and relationships of knowledge
are reversed. Hysteria was such a critical moment for it was the point when, for the
189
first time in the history of positivist medicine, psychiatric power lost its scientific
sovereignty, turning the hysterics into masters of the game of truth. Charcot became
an ubu-esque, derisory figure exactly at the time when his efforts to pathologize
madness crowned him as a doctor.76 At the same time, madness withdrew into the
unknown at the very moment when medicine invested it with the greatest possible
transparency. Hysteria did not evoke the excluded truth of madness which supposedly
returned as the fate and suppressed material of scientific consciousness; on the
contrary, madness retreated further behind the elusive appearance of hysteria,
becoming more mysterious and enigmatic. Hysteria was an event because it disrupted
rational accounts, principles of unity, peace and order, constituting itself the locus of a
confrontation between heterogeneous regimes of truth which questioned psychiatric
rationality, reversed accepted roles and established novel distinctions:
An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at dissolving the
singular event into an Ideal continuity — as a theological movement or a natural
process. ‘Effective’ history, however, deals with events in terms of their most unique
characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a
decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the
usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had
once used it, a domination that grows feeble, poisons itself, grows slack, the entry of a
masked ‘other.’77
Reversals and events do not come about as a result of the calculated and programmed
intervention of psychiatrists or the critical position of a universal subject, a neutral
intellectual speaking in the name of truth or justice. They issue spontaneously from
the actual, psychical encounter between doctors and patients. It is the patients
themselves who set up the battle between the scientific, prophetic and philosophical
types of truth, place them in opposition with one another, disrupt their calm and
ordered harmony and prevent the final domination of one truth over the other.
Beneath the apparent functional coherence of psychiatric rationality, the patients,
whose discourse, attitudes and behaviours are excluded from the diagnostic apparatus
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of truth, subvert its unity and formal systematization. If, however, Foucault chooses to
listen to their ‘confused voices’ and ‘search for what they want to say,’ if he studies
their resistances as ‘an explanation from below,’78 his aim is not to speak in their
name, to reveal the truth of their madness or to promote their revolt. He shows how
the obscure truth of irrationality dismantles the image of a growing rationality which
only sees minor accidents and superficial errors on its way to progress. He describes
truth as an event, as the outcome of the struggle between the ‘cunning and
wickedness’ of madness and the calculation of rationality which becomes vulnerable
the more it seeks abstraction and universality.79 This battle is therefore not won in
advance by a rationality fully equipped with knowledge or by the sovereignty of
unreason which defies rationality from its position of transcendence. It is a permanent
and asymmetrical battle, waged in the place — or non-place — of reason and truth, at
the borders between alien experiences and parallel universes:
We have an axis based upon a fundamental and permanent irrationality, a crude and
naked irrationality, but which proclaims the truth; and, higher up, we have a fragile
rationality, a transitory rationality which is always compromised and bound up with
illusion and wickedness. Reason is on the side of wild dreams, cunning and the
wicked. At the opposite end of the axis, you have an elementary brutality: a collection
of deeds, acts, and passions, and cynical rage in all its nudity. Truth is therefore on the
side of unreason and brutality; reason, on the other hand, is on the side of wild dreams
and wickedness.80
If Foucault were to speak in the name of the patients, he would not have foregrounded
the singularity of hysteria, but would have reduced it to a vague episode in the history
of the patients’ struggle for liberation. In his analyses he shows instead that hysteria
was not a revolutionary event; the mentally ill were not liberated as a result of
hysteria: only the hysterics benefited by securing their discharge form the asylum and
acquiring a medical status.81 If, on the other hand, Foucault were to describe hysteria
from the standpoint of psychiatric rationality and knowledge, he would have reduced
the event of hysteria to a mere epistemological blind spot, an error to be eliminated.
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This is precisely what psychiatric rationality attempted to do: it strove to annul the
impact of hysteria through the endless expansion of differential diagnosis and its
reduction to a causal chain. Shortly after the crisis of hysteria, psychiatric rationality
sought to transform it into a concrete reality, to de-eventalize it, to turn it into a non-
event.82 Charcot himself was soon forced to thematize the notion of trauma in order to
build a pathological framework for hysteria.83 The neurologists who followed, named
hysteria pithiatism, relegating it to the level of a fake illness, an illness of suggestion
and persuasion.84 Freud came to the scene, replacing the neurological body with the
sexual body, incorporating hysteria into a new system of differential diagnosis and
medical rationality.85 Foucault, alternatively, describes hysteria as simulacrum, an
unstable entity, an ‘extrabeing’,86 which constituted the trace of the strategic
opposition between presence and absence. Hysteria ‘affirmed non-positively’ the
presence of an absent other; it surfaced as an unfamiliar object dismantling the
smooth continuity between same and other, and their dialectical sublation.87 It
therefore cannot be located as a singular entity by the logic of positivism which seeks
to dissipate contradiction or nonsense.88 Its detection requires a logic which is
disjunctive, paradoxical and strategic.89 Only the logic of limits, only reason itself,
can conceive hysteria as a subversive force and not as another mental illness or mere
simulation in the field of medical rationality. Only reason can reflect on the limits of
possibility to render intelligible the singular effects of hysteria which constituted a
fracture and a break on account of its detachment from all prior causality.90
It is the strangeness and yet close familiarity with which reason announces
events, which inflicts terror on rationality. This terror is amplified by the fact that the
events announced are not the great, resounding occasions which accelerate progress
and belong to a greater teleological framework, but they constitute everyday points of
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rupture, ‘much less grandiose, much less perceptible,’91 which contain the impetus to
undermine universals and taken-for-granted truths. Events constitute breaks and
upheavals which dispel our illusion that our epoch has reached a stage of revolution or
completion, a moment of damnation or daybreak, and force us to face with humility
the truth that our time ‘is a day like every other, or much more, a day which is never
like another.’92 There is no totalizing idea of progress behind events, no idea of self-
realization that events putatively herald. An event is singular, it exists in its own right
and its success or failure is not necessarily a sign of linear progress or a sign that there
is no progress. The emergence of madness as an event in the late eighteenth century
does not signal a revolutionary act of the mad against the medical establishment or the
beginning of an era when enlightened reason finally mastered insanity. The rebellion
of the hysterics in the late nineteenth century is not a failure of the medicalization of
madness or an isolated episode in the continual march of medical rationality towards
progress. Whether, despite the appearance of these events, the previous medical order
was restored, medical rationality was reinforced, and phenomena of intensification of
medical power and abuses of it were multiplied, none of these facts would deprive
these events of their force and effects. Critique is not concerned with the success or
failure of the event, with the triumph or futility of the enlightenment: ‘Preserving the
remains of the Aufklärung is not the issue, but rather it is the very question of this
event and its meaning (the question of the historicity of the reflection on the
universal) that must be maintained and kept in mind as that which must be
contemplated.’93
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dangers of an Islamic government that would prevail after the revolution, and was sensitive to the abuses that
emerged during the postrevolutionary period (Michel Foucault, ‘Open Letter to Mehdi Bazargan’ and ‘Useless to
Revolt?’, in Michel Foucault, Power, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol 3. ed. by James D. Faubion
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an emerging global order and a universal form of rationality, as well as the collective participation of a people
outside political schemas and beyond ideological appropriation, that marked it as an event.
200
CHAPTER 6
FOUCAULT AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: TRAVERSING THE
ENLIGHTENMENT
Through our analysis of hysteria, we have shown how for Foucault the
phenomenon of simulation introduces an important split inside diagnostic truth. There
is on the one hand the dominant scientific truth regime which objectifies,
demonstrates and analyses mental illness. This truth regime is guided by a rationality
which has become increasingly positivist since the late nineteenth century. On the
other hand, there is a marginalized truth regime which tests madness. It is a regime of
truth guided by reason, a type of diagnostic truth which establishes a relationship with
otherness, a truth where scepticism reaches its culmination and the presence of
madness is recurrently problematized. These two truth regimes, Foucault argues, are
in an antagonistic, conflictual relationship and their oppositional coexistence in the
same diagnostic discourse gives rise to moments of crisis, to rupture and
discontinuity.
Challenging psychiatric positivism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, psychoanalysis brought this uncomfortable relationship between science and
otherness centre stage. Freud — and Lacan later more explicitly — made it visible by
revisiting Kant and the alienists, renewing their anthropological reflections. The father
of psychoanalysis introduced the unconscious, opposing negativity, death and
madness to the calm positivism of his time. However, Freud’s method was at the same
time an effort to insert madness into the domain of medical authority, grounding
psychoanalysis on a fundamental paradox: while he recognized the irreducible tension
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between the truth regime of science and that of the test of madness, Freud tried to
reconcile and modify the two truth regimes, in order to make them function
harmoniously in a medical setting. Freud found the probing method of positivism and
the scepticism of the truth-test too uncertain and dubious to come to terms with the
obscurity of madness. His goal was to construct a new methodology which would
transform scientific discourse so as to provide direct evidence of madness itself. For
this purpose, he furnished a unique diagnostic system based not on truth but on falsity
and illusion, as a way of unequivocally proving its presence in the psyche of the
patient. However, this methodology — this inverted scientific model of simulation
and crisis, coupled with the ceremonial staging of madness which could only take
place on the analytic couch — rendered psychoanalysis an ambiguous enterprise.
Psychoanalysis became both scientific and ritualistic, objective and prophetic, both
quasi-positivist and quasi-religious, anti-institutional and authoritative.
Psychoanalysis presented itself as a type of medical and psychological practice which
nonetheless criticized the efforts of medicine to pathologize madness. It became the
protagonist in the expanding system of normalization, but also a source of
philosophical, political, literary and humanist critique of theories and institutions.
It is this ambiguity intrinsic to psychoanalytic practice and theory which
Foucault underlined with his genealogy and which we shall attempt to reconstruct in
the final chapter. Some commentators hold that Foucault treated psychoanalysis as a
pseudoscience throughout his work, while psychoanalytically orientated thinkers
reproach him for his inability to assess the merits of their theory from the standpoint
of his historicity and his preoccupation with power.1 Foucault, however, applies his
historical method and his analysis of power relations not in order to condemn
psychoanalysis, but to submit it to critical scrutiny. His aim was not to invalidate its
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scientific status or its critical powers, but to locate the exact place that it occupies in
western rationality and to assess the type of truth that it articulates in relation to
psychiatry: ‘I had attempted to account for what happened until the beginning of the
19th century; then psychiatrists took my analysis to be an attack against psychiatry. I
don’t know what will happen with psychoanalysts but I am afraid they will take as
‘anti-psychoanalysis’ something that is only meant to be a genealogy.’2 In this chapter
we shall try to illustrate this genealogy in order to demonstrate the affinity of
psychoanalysis with enlightenment critique, but also to highlight the ways in which it
risks contradicting the spirit of the enlightenment. We shall show how Foucault
classifies psychoanalysis as a ‘counter-science’ and a form of alienism and gives it
credit for its capacity to challenge the prejudices of anthropology, and to reflect on the
limits of science. He views psychoanalysis as a valuable critical enterprise which has
renewed the possibility of playing off truth, desire and limit experiences against
reality, reintroducing philosophical thought within science, into everyday practices
and inside local struggles.3 He does, however, treat with scepticism the Freudian and
Lacanian conceptions of enlightenment critique, insofar as their theoretical premises
and practical applications are in many ways in conformity with the psychiatric
rationality which they claim to criticize. Foucault underscores the need for
psychoanalysis to recognize the limitations of its truth claims and to critique its own
mechanisms of power to the extent that these renew and support rather than oppose
the psychiatric institution. If it is to restore the critical potential which it lost from the
moment it laid claim to scientificity, psychoanalysis must reinstate its theoretical
exteriority vis-à-vis science, and as a practice it must engage in a politics of truth in
order to question psychiatric rationality.
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Freud and Hysteria
Freud followed closely the events surrounding the phenomenon of hysteria at
the Salpêtrière. He observed and recorded carefully the efforts of the neurologists to
offer medical recognition of hysteria as mental illness. As an astute and diligent
clinician, Freud noticed that the hysterics posed a set of stumbling blocks to Charcot’s
efforts to give madness, through neurology, the medical reality that it lacked. He
became aware that the hysterics responded to the game of reality imposed by the
asylum system with another peculiar game of truth and falsity. The hysterics’ game
disrupted any attempt at anatomical localization that would claim to represent their
madness. He thus praised Charcot’s achievement in pathologizing hysteria, while
foregrounding the limitation of his methods.4 Disillusioned by the inevitable failure of
the neurological approach, Freud set out to secure diagnosis in a way that would
sidestep the patients’ elusive game of truth. He went on to construct a new diagnostic
method which would lead safely to the demonstration of the inner core of the
hysterical symptomatology. In fact, it was more this new diagnostic thinking rather
than his theories about trauma and sexuality which distinguished Freud from his
contemporaries. Charcot had already discovered a possible sexual aetiology for
hysteria, which he was nonetheless hesitant to systematize, insofar as repressed
sexuality had already been attributed to all simulatable neuroses in the late nineteenth
century, and therefore was not unique to hysteria.5 Charcot had also thematized the
theory of trauma which served as a neurological aetiological model, an epileptic
equivalent, which also lacked specificity and could also be simulated.6 Freud’s great
achievement, therefore, was not the supposed sophistication with which he developed
sexuality and trauma.7 His innovation consisted in building a system of interpretation
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which would enable the traps of hysterical symptomatology unwittingly to disclose a
repressed archaic traumatic sexual experience, whether real or fantasmatic. Freud
modified diagnosis in such a way as to turn the hysterics’ simulation to his own
advantage; it was not the clear and unequivocal symptoms of the patient, but her most
obscure and ambiguous signs which provided confirmation of his theory of sexuality.
For Freud the hysterics’ game of truth and falsity posed no diagnostic problem but, on
the contrary, it was revealing of a psychic reality containing a madness which
remained hidden from the patients themselves:
Freud and psychoanalysis took the historical point of their departure — their point of
departure — in a phenomenon which, at the end of the nineteenth century, had a very
great importance in psychiatry, and even in a general way in society, and it can be
said, in western culture. This singular phenomenon — almost marginal — fascinated
doctors, and fascinated in a general way, let us say, the researchers who were
interested in one manner or another in the very broad problems of psychology. This
phenomenon was hysteria. Let us, if you will, set aside the properly medical problems
of hysteria; hysteria was essentially characterized by a phenomenon of forgetfulness,
a massive misunderstanding (méconnaissance) of oneself by the subject who was
able, through the increase of his hysterical syndrome, to ignore an entire fragment of
his past or entire part of his body. Freud showed that the subject’s misunderstanding
of himself was the point of anchorage for psychoanalysis; that it was, in fact, a
misunderstanding by the subject, not of himself generally, but of his desire or of his
sexuality.8
Freud’s stroke of genius consisted of using the simulation of the hysterics in order to
disclose their madness. Whereas in typical medical practice the demonstrative power
of scientific knowledge stumbled at the ruses of the hysterical crises which barred
recognition of pathology, for Freud the lies of the patients became the very condition
of possibility for this recognition. There was no longer any need to depend on the
hysterics’ truth game, which blocked awareness of illness. Now misrecognition itself
could unveil what is blocked from the patients’ consciousness. Moreover, there was
no longer any need for the institutional power of the neurologist. All that was needed
was a type of discourse, a form of confession which sidestepped the patients’ games
of truth and illusion which puzzled Charcot, in order to decipher symptoms as
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markers of a hidden truth which was desire. With the notion of misrecognition, Freud
asserted madness as a void, a limit experience which can only be approached
negatively through the self-limitation of truth and knowledge. He thus introduced an
extra-psychiatric and extra-institutional diagnostic discourse which reversed
Charcot’s observations, questioning the possibility of pathologizing madness and
foregrounding its ungraspable truth which resists its immersion into the reality of the
asylum.9 He disrupted the rational hegemony of psychiatry and rendered problematic
the field of the human sciences tout court as a positivist enterprise. After nearly one
hundred years Freud made it possible for madness to be posited again as the excluded
term, the inaccessible truth, the secret of man’s destiny and myth, and at the same
time his hidden reality which could become an object of knowledge.
Psychoanalysis as a new regime of truth
From the moment Freud circumvented the problem of simulation, or
rather used simulation itself as a tool for staging the truth of madness, he introduced a
unique and unprecedented type of discourse in the history of psychiatry.10 As we have
shown, simulation is the biggest epistemological obstacle for psychiatry, a diagnostic
problem which must be overcome anatomically in order for madness to be
demonstrated as mental illness so that treatment can be applied and the magistrates
convinced that the involuntary sequestration of an individual can be medically
legitimized. With Freud’s approach, this difficulty is bypassed; the transformation of
madness into mental illness is not the ideal end goal, and therefore simulation is
removed as an obstacle to its recognition. On the contrary, regardless of any proposed
anatomical or psychological aetiology, for Freud, the simulation intrinsic to mental
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illness — the patient’s deception, his fantasies — is the highest moment of crisis, the
surest path to madness, its clearest indication. With this crucial reversal,
psychoanalysis not only presented itself as an epistemological break, but also as a
discourse whose claim was that it could go beyond the traditional modes of
veridiction governing psychiatry. Medical knowledge and testing madness are
indispensable for psychiatric practice, and it is the conflictual relationship between
these two truth regimes which provokes crises of truth in psychiatry. In
psychoanalysis, on the other hand, there is a truth regime which does not test but
stages madness, and a system of knowledge which limits its own scientificity in order
to allow madness to burst forth. Thus, there is a prophetic truth regime which takes
transcendence as its point of departure and produces the crises of madness itself, and a
scientific truth which is not strictly medical but helps these crises come to the fore.
The coupling of these two types of truth is typically operative around the figure of the
psychoanalyst, and it is the analytic relationship which constitutes the scene where the
crises of madness are staged.
The prophetic truth at work in the analytic process is not merely a truth
which foretells the patient’s future or a truth which offers unequivocal and clear
prescriptions. It is a discourse of finitude, addressing a truth to the patient which
comes from elsewhere.11 It is a truth which reveals what is hidden from the patient’s
gaze and it evokes a voice which the patient cannot hear. It is a truth which unveils
what the patient’s blindness prevents him from seeing, and, importantly, it performs
this revelation in an obscure way, in the form of riddles and enigmas. Psychoanalytic
prophecy never speaks a pure, transparent truth; even when its truth is spoken, the
patient has to ask himself ‘whether (he) has really understood, whether (he) may still
be blind; (he) still has to question, hesitate, and interpret.’12 This prophetic truth
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regime is incompatible with the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes or Kant’s
transparent transcendental subject. It rather follows the opposite direction; it evokes
the dark side of subjectivity, the unconscious, and then sets out to investigate the
possibility of studying the human subject.13 The unconscious hides behind riddles
because it has its own voice for which the analyst works as an intermediary. It is a
transcendental space with its own language, its own logic and its own typology.14 This
is why psychoanalysis as the study of the unconscious constitutes a ‘counter-science’,
not because it is an irrational, magico-religious endeavour, but because it foregrounds
the unconscious, man’s double, his finitude, as no longer being the forbidden region
of psychiatry, but its epistemological basis.15 Psychoanalysis does not speak the clear
language of representation — hence its reliance on simulation — insofar as its object,
the unconscious, lies at the limits of representation and the borders of human
experience which, as Kant had shown, mark the boundaries of possible knowledge,
but also its condition of possibility: ‘With its gaze turned the other way,
psychoanalysis moves towards the moment — by definition inaccessible to any
theoretical knowledge of man, to any continuous apprehension in terms of
signification, conflict, or function — at which the contents of consciousness articulate
themselves, or rather stand gaping, upon man’s finitude.’16 As a prophetic discourse,
psychoanalysis is also a discourse of fate: standing between past and future, the
analyst demonstrates to the patient that he is caught in an endless loop, an eternal
cycle between the empirical and the transcendental. He shows to the patient how all
his empirical determinations cling upon unconscious transcendental forces which at
the same time foreclose any possibility of completion and self-realization: death,
desire, law. Death, as a condition of possibility for knowledge, desire as the
‘unthought at the heart of thought’ and the law-language as the origin of signification;
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they all belong to the transcendental realm which makes possible and simultaneously
annuls the patient’s efforts to achieve complete knowledge and jouissance: ‘It is
indeed true that this Death, and this Desire, and this Law can never meet within the
knowledge that traverses in its positivity the empirical domain of man; but the reason
for this is that they designate the conditions of possibility of all knowledge about
man.’17 The revelation of the most extreme aspects of existence — the limit of death,
the deadlock of desire, the distant and obscure Law — lead to the recognition of an
inner, inaccessible and traumatic core of the psyche which is unthought and resistant
to symbolization. Here psychoanalysis reveals madness in its otherness, its truth
which cannot be grasped or assimilated into our reality: ‘when Desire reigns in the
wild state, as if the rigour of its rule has leveled all opposition, when Death dominates
every psychological function and stands above it as its unique and devastating form,
we recognize madness as it is posited in the modern experience, as its truth and its
alterity.’18 For psychoanalysis madness does not exist as an autonomous entity, as the
repressed reality of the inner life, but as the unbearable truth which we can never
know or grasp, and whose terrifying encounter forces us to escape into reality, in
order to ensure the consistency of our being. Psychoanalytic prophecy shows madness
to be the radical otherness, the kernel of our psyche which does not stand for what is
excluded or silenced, but which represents a primordial state from which we protect
ourselves and constantly try to avoid by constructing a reality that we can tolerate:
In this figure, at once empirical and yet foreign to (and in) all that we can experience,
our consciousness no longer finds — as it did in the sixteenth century — the trace of
another world; it no longer observes the wandering of a straying reason; it sees
welling up that which is, perilously, nearest to us — as if, suddenly, the very
hollowness of our existence is outlined in relief […] an existence at once real and
impossible, thought that we cannot think, an object for our knowledge that always
eludes us.19
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The prophetic discourse of psychoanalysis repudiates anthropology as the ultimate
fate of human knowledge, and instead places man’s tragic destiny in the gap between
the empirical and the transcendental. Rather than dialectically sublating the division
between man’s empirical existence and his limitations, it discerns this division and
accentuates it, foregrounding the culmination of human history as an illusion, Kant’s
transcendental illusion which keeps resurfacing in the fashion of the Nietzschean
return. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had introduced the notions of nihil
negativum, nihil privativum and antinomy, which allude to the existence of objects
which lie beyond the limits of possible experience, beyond the formal criteria of truth,
outside the field of established truth and falsity, existing in the ‘land of illusion.’20
This illusion designates a place where these objects can only be intuited but can never
acquire a content. As Nietzsche’s concept of the return implies,21 such objects,
excluded as they are from the apparatus of rationality, continue to exert their effects
on the truth that precludes them. They continue to haunt the logic which has
established a division that appears to have forever reduced them to non-being.
Madness, as such an ideal object beyond the boundaries of knowledge and with no
possible substantiation or comprehensible essence, returns as a real force which
dismantles the cognitive schema that has silenced it. Its existence cannot be certified
or proven, but it is detectable through the effects that it produces on the truth
conditions that determine it as other. This is the Kantian in-itself, the Lacanian Real.
Its presence can only be deduced in the analytic process and is made manifest through
the simulacrum which reveals the Real as a fleeting appearance, a momentary shining
through.22
However, in psychoanalysis prophecy is not the only modality of truth. The
ritual which stages the Real requires the interaction between the analyst and the
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analysand, and it is enacted within the domain of a specific form of knowledge. This
form of knowledge involves a technique which is taught, transmitted and shared.23
But it is first and foremost a knowledge based on an illusion. The analyst is not the
doctor possessing a positive and unquestionable knowledge of the patient’s pathology.
He is a ‘subject supposed to know’, a subject assumed by the patient to possess a
certain doctrine, a technè and a certain skill through which he can decipher the
patient’s symptoms.24 This supposition is illusory but necessary for the production of
knowledge in the analytic process. It is the heart of transference, the always
problematic character of the relationship of the analysand to the analyst, which makes
analysis possible and at the same time prevents it from ever coming to completion.
Transference, the illusion of analytic knowledge, is the limit but also the precondition
for the interpretation of the patient’s symptoms.25 Its illusory dimension explains the
marginal position that psychoanalytic knowledge occupies with respect to science; it
belongs rather to a type of shared knowledge purposefully grounded on a bond, a
contract between doctor and patient, which proceeds from one misrecognition to
another until the ultimate limit of that shared knowledge is uncovered. The objective
of this contractual and ritualistic knowledge is to reach the point where all
interpretation comes to a standstill and where the patient’s illusions unconsciously
resist further analysis and his symptoms emerge as fantasmatic. Fantasy is at the core
of transference, as the patient projects his desire for absolute truth, psychological
unity and full meaning onto the analyst. This fantasy need not and cannot be
interpreted further; it is simply ‘traversed’, it is revealed as vain, bringing the patient’s
pathology to full view. It is through the deadlock of transference that the patient
manages to recognize the illusory character of his desire and his fantasy as the
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framework of his fragile and inconsistent reality, becoming liberated from his
prejudices and coming to terms with his tragic destiny:26
All analytic knowledge is thus invincibly linked with a praxis, with that strangulation
produced by the relation between two individuals, one of whom is listening to the
other’s language, thus freeing his desire from the object it has lost (making him
understand he has lost it), liberating him from the ever-repeated proximity of death
(making him understand that one day he will die). This is why nothing is more alien
to psychoanalysis than anything resembling a general theory of man or an
anthropology.27
By reversing the anthropological postulate and asserting the analytic relationship as
the fundamental precondition for the production of truth, psychoanalysis presented
itself as a challenge to orthodox psychiatric and psychological thinking, without
however being anti-scientific in itself. Psychoanalytic knowledge is scientific, but in a
‘perverse’ way;28 it is a system which questions the standard Cartesian tradition
governing positivism and phenomenological hermeneutics. Analytic knowledge is
demonstrative and apodictic but, unlike the Cartesian tradition, it does not take the
exclusion of doubt as a prerequisite for the establishment of truth. Rather, doubt is the
result of a primordial traumatic experience, of an archaic truth which the subject has
repressed. This premise is based on an original reading of the Cartesian method:
contrary to Foucault’s interpretation whereby the possibility of madness is excluded
by the doubting subject, in psychoanalysis doubt is proof that there is a mad kernel, an
absolute truth from which the subject is excluded.29 It is therefore not in certainty, but
in the gaps of knowledge, in its inherent incompleteness that indications of otherness
are sought. Whereas Descartes aims to discover the self-evident and is suspicious of
simulation, the very being of the evil genius of madness, psychoanalysis does
precisely the opposite: it is suspicious of the self-evident and accepts what is
sufficiently disguised. As Foucault notes, ‘Freudian censorship is a falsehood operator
through symbolization.’30 Thus, the economy of truth for psychoanalysis rests on
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semiology rather than hermeneutics, which is why psychoanalytic theory is to a large
extent opposed to phenomenology.31 Psychoanalytic examination is not an
interpretive process which deciphers meanings until it reaches the point where the
ultimate truth of madness is decoded, along with the law by which the hidden
message of madness means what it means. On the contrary, it looks for the fractures
of meaning, the ceasuras between the signifier and its denotation, until an absolute
break ensues. Symptomatology for psychoanalytic diagnosis consists of a system of
signs which do not offer access to the Real through knowledge, but enact the
traumatic encounter with it. The symptom is not considered a product of the
pathology of the unconscious, but the pathway to the impossible, the unrepresentable,
the intolerable. Discussing Freud’s notion of the symptom, Foucault describes it as a
phantasm, a unique sign belonging simultaneously to two distinct orders, the
‘irruptive figure of a signifier that is absolutely unlike the others’32 which emerges
from within the symbolic chain of interpretation, bringing interpretation itself to its
limit, since the symptom also belongs to the transcendental and the realm of the
nonsensical: hence the psychoanalytic account of hysteria which interprets it as an
ambiguous and confusing set of signs and symptoms from within the established table
of nosography, revealing the inaccessible and irreducible madness which neurology
strove to medicalize. With the involuntary and unconscious hyperconformity of the
hysterics, psychoanalysis argues, the Real exploded in the heart of the medical system
of representation, overthrowing the symbolic universe of psychiatric discourse and
unsettling the reality of the asylum.
For Foucault, the scientific ‘perversity’ of psychoanalysis defines it as a
unique type of discourse that can critique psychology itself as well as historical
analysis. Its capacity to locate symptoms, pinpoint phantasms and illusions, and
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reflect on limits, gives it its strength of criticism in fields of application that exceed its
own domain. Foucault maintains that, through psychoanalysis, psychiatry could
acquire the potential to establish a self-reflective attitude in relation to its past and
present reality. He openly declares that ‘it should be said that, without psychoanalysis,
our criticism of psychiatry, even from a historical perspective, would not have been
possible.’33
The Psychoanalytic Politics of Truth and Enlightenment Critique
However, although psychoanalysis deserves credit for introducing two truth
regimes (prophecy, teaching) which escape the constraints, not only of the western
epistème, but of western rationality, Foucault submits them to critique insofar as they
have generated certain ambiguities which seem inherent to psychoanalysis. Since the
birth of psychoanalysis, its prophetic discourse has produced a critique of
anthropology and positivism, while at the same time its scientific technique has
functioned as an extension of psychiatric practice and normalization. Thus, Freud the
prophet, as we have shown, was the first since Pinel and Esquirol to recognize
madness in its alterity and its private truth34; with his discovery of the unconscious, he
undermined the role of the atemporal and stable subject which served as a foundation
of knowledge and experience in psychological interpretations; with his notion of
infantile sexuality, he unsettled all previous aetiological theories which sought to
reduce human pathology and madness to degeneration.35 But by the same movement,
Freud the teacher-psychiatrist abolished the singularity of madness by extending and
renewing medical rationality through another truth regime and another body, the
sexual body, this time not inside the asylum space but in the private office of the
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analyst.36 He opened a dialogue with madness and at the same time he reduced
madness to zero, by submitting it to the rational and contractual power of the doctor.
He ingeniously institutionalized the lyrical and poetic aspect of madness, but also
attached it to the scientific, bringing about, along with psychopharmacology, its
‘depsychiatrization.’37
Thus there is an intrinsic ambiguity which stems from the tension between
the two regimes of truth (prophecy, teaching) which psychoanalysis tries to reconcile
and put to work in the same discourse. On the one hand, psychoanalytic theory,
following the scientific model albeit in an inverted form, revolves around the Kantian
impossibility of knowing the in-itself, looking for truth in the field of illusion, in the
misconstrual (méconnaissance) on which knowledge is based, according to Nietzsche,
and its emergence in the form of crises, events and encounters with error and limit-
experiences.38 One of Freud’s basic teachings, Lacan has shown, is the thoroughly
Nietzschean formula ‘truth is structured like fiction,’39 which implies the sudden
emergence of truth through illusion and negativity, through the violent intrusion of the
impossible Real into the reality of the subject which experiences itself as a void, as
decentered. By formulating truth as illusion, Lacan, after Freud, rendered problematic
the autonomy of the subject and stressed the Kantian impossibility of reconciling the
knowing subject with the subject of morality.40 On the other hand, however, what
appears as irreconcilable between truth, power and ethics in the scientific dimension
of psychoanalysis is made to function in unity in its prophetic domain. Psychoanalytic
prophecy tries to establish a common ground between the truth produced, its
emergence inside a specific power relationship and the subject’s moral formation.41
Inasmuch as the patient’s unbearable truth, his elusive madness, must burst forth, this
emergence must adapt to the analytic relationship. The limit-experience of the
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analysand, which escapes the symbolic universe of the analytic process itself, must be
controlled and enacted in such a way as to avoid threatening the form of knowledge
and the power relationship which sustain the reality of analysis. This is why, for
Foucault, it is questionable whether the truth regimes which govern psychoanalysis
are radical enough to critique psychiatric power, whether they actually constitute an
epistemological break and, more broadly, whether they can be said to belong to the
spirit of enlightenment critique.42
Foucault maintains that the shortcomings of psychoanalysis emanate not so
much from its failed attempt to harmonise prophecy with science, but from the
incompatibility of both of these two regimes with the spiritual tradition of the
enlightenment. This is why his analysis of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s critique contradicts
the conclusions of psychoanalysis.43 In Kant and Nietzsche, Foucault argues, truth is
not grounded in illusion, but in difference, in a diagnosis, a differential knowledge
constantly vigilant and attentive to divisions, to the distinction between truth and
illusion, identity and otherness. Kant’s critique opens up a field in which a perpetual
interplay between truth and illusion is enacted; it is an analytics and an ontology
issued not from the illusions of our limited knowledge, but from the constant
confrontation of these illusions with truth: ‘The Aufklärung is a period, a period which
set out to formulate its own motto, its own precept, and which spells out what is to be
done both in relation to its present and to the forms of knowledge, ignorance and
illusion in which it is capable of recognizing its historical situation.’44 Nietzsche
picked up Kant’s method and carried out the genealogy of the relation between truth
and illusion, their battles and conflicts, their mutual reinforcement and historical
constitution. Nietzsche asks the question, ‘What is the hazardous career that Truth has
followed?’,45 and defines knowledge as perspectival, not because it is partial, relative
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or illusory, but because it is differential, it gives rise to differences and it is itself the
product of struggles and oppositions. Thus, Nietzsche introduces a politics of truth
rather than an obscurantism of illusion: ‘The political question, to sum up, is not error,
illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself. Hence the importance
of Nietzsche.’46
Differential knowledge originally emerged at the limits of western culture in
the spirituality of the Greeks and the religious practices of the Christians of antiquity,
and was resurrected by Kant and the Enlightenment. It dominated ancient practices
and has been marginalized since the Middle Ages, when theology introduced a strict
rationality which was taken up and reinforced in the form of science up to our day.47
This type of knowledge does not seek to offer prescriptions in the domain of politics;
it is not a prophetic truth. It does not concern itself with what is true and false in the
realm of science, and therefore is not merely a knowledge of wisdom and teaching;
and its task is not to disalienate the subject or to desubjectivize it. It is rather a form of
truth telling which tests its reality in relation to politics, its function consists of a
criticism of truth, illusion and deception, and it brings about the transformation of the
subject by himself. This triple function of ascetic knowledge has been taken up and
elaborated by Kant in philosophical terms, and constitutes the very mode of being of
modern criticism:
Philosophy as exteriority with regard to a politics which constitutes its test of reality,
philosophy as critique of a domain of illusion which challenges it to constitute itself
as true discourse, and philosophy as ascesis, that is to say, as constitution of the
subject by himself, seem to me to constitute the mode of being of modern philosophy,
or maybe that which, in the mode of being of modern philosophy, takes up the mode
of being of ancient philosophy.48
Kant coupled an analytics of truth with an ontology of the present and the courage to
know with an ethical attitude based on reason, renewing the ancient relations between
power, truth and subjectivity. He analysed the connection between ways of
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distinguishing the true and the false and ways of governing men, giving philosophy its
current form as a ‘politics of truth.’49
Kant’s text on the Aufklärung is a certain way for philosophy, through the critique of
the Aufklärung, to become aware of problems which were traditionally problems of
parrhesia in antiquity, which will re-emerge in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, and which became aware of themselves in the Aufklärung, and particularly
in Kant’s text.50
After Kant, thinkers like Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Husserl also posed knowledge
in terms of spirituality and asceticism.51 Psychoanalysis belongs to the same tradition,
insofar as it does not rest on the dilemma of science and ideology, and does not
reduce thought to a psychical reality, but posits reality as an object to be thought,
problematizing the mode of the subject’s being in relation to the possibility of
thinking.52 Foucault praises Lacan for being the first after Freud to introduce into
psychoanalysis the tradition of ancient spirituality and asceticism, which revolves
around the question of the relationship between subjectivity and truth. He is sceptical,
however, of the possibility of fashioning a critique based on this asceticism from
within the confines of psychoanalytic knowledge.
Of course, a question arises, which I will not answer, of whether psychoanalysis itself
can, in its own terms, that is to say in terms of the effects of knowledge
(connaissance), pose the question of the relations of the subject to truth, which by
definition — from the point of view of spirituality, and anyway of the epimeleia
heautou — cannot be posed in terms of knowledge (connaissance).53
Lacan’s breakthrough has been to show that psychoanalysis is not a positive
knowledge that looks at sexuality for the aetiology of neurosis, but a system of truth
in which madness is to be unmasked.54
Lacan seeks, however, this truth in the lies of the patient. He refutes the
conception that analysis should oppose the truth of rationality to the falsity of
madness, and instead advances the view that the falsity, the simulation of the patient’s
discourse, his slips and misrecognitions contain a core of truth which the analyst can
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stage. This interpretive method is foreign and in many ways contradicts the spirit of
enlightenment critique. Freud — and Lacan more explicitly — regards reality as
inconsistent and defective and locates truth in the unconscious dimension of the
psyche, which, through the symptom, is played off against the symbolic order,
causing the whole edifice of reality to undergo radical transformation in order to
accommodate the intrusive force of the unnamable, of the unspeakable. In contrast,
spirituality all the way from Socrates and early Christianity to Nietzsche, regards
reality as overloaded with meaning and interprets it exhaustively to show how it
becomes fictitious and hyperreal from the moment it begins to incorporate negativity
and otherness.55 When the presence of irreducible alterity inside our rational system is
revealed, interpretation reaches a point of culmination, saturation and final collapse,
exposing reality as simulation and self-delusion. This is a crucial opposition between
psychoanalysis and the tradition of enlightenment spirituality, and it is clearly
formulated in Foucault’s quite telling remark:
What is in question in the point of rupture of interpretation, in this convergence of
interpretation on a point that renders it impossible, could well be something like the
experience of madness. An experience against which Nietzsche fought and by which
he was fascinated; an experience against which Freud himself struggled, not without
anguish, all of his life.56
In Nietzsche, as well as in the whole of the spiritualist tradition, there is a constant
testing of madness, a perpetual scepticism that what is taken as reality may well be a
self-delusion. This scepticism, as we showed in the previous chapter, has survived in a
marginal space within psychiatric discourse, and it is a subversive force which
unsettles the calm positivism of scientific truth. For Freud, by contrast, the possibility
of madness is a source of anxiety, and therefore must be recognized with certainty,
which means that the doctor responsible for its manifestation must be equipped with
adequate knowledge and sufficient power to ward it off as an adverse outcome of the
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therapeutic process. This is why Foucault is critical of Freud’s peculiar system of
truth production which, although presenting itself as extra-psychiatric, in practice not
only affirms the truth regime of psychiatry, but it also reinforces its power. By
rejecting the opposition between truth and illusion, trickery and deception, and using
simulation, the patient’s misrecognition, to indicate that which never deceives and
resists symbolization, psychoanalysis aspires to overcome the patients’ lies, their
‘counter-power that traps, nullifies and overturns the doctor’s power,’57 claiming to
obtain unequivocal proof of the madness masked by these lies.58 It therefore puts to
work a mechanism of ‘making the production of madness in its truth as intense as
possible, but in such a way that the relationships of power between doctor and patient
are invested exactly in this production, that they remain appropriate for it, do not let
themselves be outflanked by it, and keep it under control.’59 Private consultation, the
rule of free contract between doctor and patient, the limitation of the effects of the
relationship to the level of discourse, and the rule of discursive freedom in which the
patient’s lies serve as further aid to the unmasking and cure of madness; all of these
‘ensure that the doctor’s sovereign science is not caught up in mechanisms that it may
have unwittingly produced.’60 Treating phenomena like hysteria as products of the
excess of psychiatric power, psychoanalysis tackles them in a private setting where
they are subjected to the reality of the couch, of transference, resistance and the
payment of fees: ‘withdrawal outside the space of the asylum in order to get rid of the
paradoxical effects of psychiatric surplus-power; but reconstitution of a truth-
producing medical power in a space arranged so that that production of truth is always
exactly adapted to that power.’61 Like anti-psychiatry, psychoanalysis appears critical,
but effectively operates in conjunction with psychiatric discourse, for the opposite
reasons. Anti-psychiatry holds that every effort to codify madness either in terms of
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mental illness or in terms of social normativity always ends up in simulation, while
madness must produce its truth and its right against psychiatric oppression. Opposite
to this, but in a symmetrical way, psychoanalysis regards simulation not only as an
inevitable but also as a favourable outcome of psychiatric power, enabling the truth of
madness to escape the grip of psychiatry, only to be transposed to the power of the
analyst. As a result, the two approaches become each other’s mirror image: anti-
psychiatry can be practised by doctors who wish to free their patients from the
pathological framework; psychoanalysis, even if it is not always practised by doctors,
functions as therapy, as a medical type of intervention. In both cases, there is a
constant reference to psychiatric knowledge and to the medical truth regime. Just as
anti-psychiatry, by claiming to give voice to the mad, accepts the division between the
mad and the non-mad as a fact, psychoanalysis reinforces psychiatric knowledge and
power by medicalizing madness at the same time as it intensifies madness in its truth:
‘If it has played a critical role, at another level, psychoanalysis plays harmoniously
with psychiatry.’62
The Cultural Unconscious beyond Psychoanalysis
Apart from its essential complicity with the power and truth of psychiatry,
there is another aspect of psychoanalytic theory which, according to Foucault, is at
odds with the politics of truth as it is conceived by the spirit of the enlightenment: the
implementation of its clinical models to historical processes.63 Foucault questions the
notion that the hysterical model based on repression can promise to liberate desire
against a supposedly oppressive power. He also challenges the effort to fit the
paranoiac model, that is, the model based on misrecognition of truth, into political
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analyses. As he points out, for psychoanalysis the unconscious is exterior to power,
positioning the truth of the Real as the outer limit of a repressive power whose only
function is to block access to that truth. Power is linked to misrecognition which
precludes knowledge and therefore produces the unconscious as its own dead end, its
own stumbling block. This postulate is clearly illustrated in the psychoanalytic
interpretation of the Oedipal myth, in which Oedipus, in his blind, truthless and
ignorant power, was challenged by the powerless truth of his humble servants who
unwittingly articulated the prophetic truth of his tragic destiny:64
The postulate is that power, especially repressive power, would always and essentially
produce effects of misrecognition (méconnaissance). In acting as a ban, in barring
access to manifestation, the major effect of repressive power would be to prevent the
formation of knowledge: to prevent it in the strongest sense, by producing the
unconscious […] the major effect of power would be not knowing, or at any rate the
impossibility of access to the truth. Power would be that which bars access to the truth
(Foucault’s emphasis).65
Many proponents of psychoanalysis argue that by setting the immanent power and the
transcendence of truth in opposition, psychoanalysis is superior to Foucault’s critique.
Foucault, they argue, tends to historicize everything, offering no alternative to the
absolute and universal immanence of power relations which saturate the social field.
His notion of resistance is itself part of the nexus of power and knowledge, and every
form of critique is necessarily entangled in the same space of strategies and tactics.66
According to the same interpretation, Foucault’s historicity treats madness as a
historical construct, an effect of power and discourse. Psychoanalysis, on the other
hand, views madness as the transhistorical and transcendental dimension inherent to
human finitude which escapes power, returning and disrupting power’s efforts to
grasp it and assimilate it. This transcendental and unconscious part of subjectivity, the
madness and the void that constitutes it, is exterior to the immanent reality of things,
totally undetermined and unconditional. The Kantian in-itself, the Lacanian Real,
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always already accompanies human knowledge and is not excluded by power, but is
to be found in power’s own excesses, as its ‘obscene supplement.’67 There is no ‘Big
Other’, no absolute and all-encompassing power controlling and regulating what will
count as real. There is no regime of truth which excludes illusion and represses or
produces desire. Truth is external to power, irrupting unexpectedly into the symbolic
universe which stages and supports reality.
History protects from historicity, Foucault points out,68 and it is by way of
history that Foucault defends himself against the criticisms made by psychoanalysts.
History, for Foucault, entails problematizations and scepticism towards constants, a
priori principles and universals. Thus Foucault does not overlook human finitude but
neither does it consider it an a priori. He does not take human finitude to be an
eternal, primordial truth deduced negatively from the failures of power, but, on the
contrary, he shows that it was under concrete historical conditions, under specific
power relations and through particular forms of truth, that finitude became an object
of thought. ‘That it should have this historicity does not mean it is deprived of all
universal form, but instead that the putting into play of these universal forms is itself
historical.’69 It was not until the late eighteenth century that an experience that was
different, not conforming to defined rules, could be designated as mad and assume a
pathological status. It was only when reason established a specific relationship with
itself that the Cartesian method of excluding madness could arise and make sense.
And it was only when a particular type of knowledge dominated western science that
the Kantian inaccessible in-itself could be thematized. Only after the emergence of
positive science, with the investigation of man in his entirety through anthropology,
did it become possible for the notion of otherness to return, and for the dark, silent
and faceless side of man to be revalorized as the unconscious:
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For is not the unconscious what necessarily yields itself up to the scientific thought
man applies to himself when he ceases to conceive of himself in the form of
reflection? As a matter of fact, the unconscious, and the forms of the unthought in
general, have not been the reward granted to a positive knowledge of man. Man and
the unthought are, at the archeological level, contemporaries.70
Freud arrived at the scene nearly one hundred years after the opening of the asylum
and the exclusion of the insane, at a time when a process of inclusion was under way.
He stood at the limits of positive knowledge to theorize the long forgotten core of
madness that psychiatry strove to reduce to sameness, and thus opened up a new field
of critique, which could nonetheless make sense only within the confines of a
historically constituted anthropology. Madness, Foucault notes, ‘is such an important
problem that a number of things, for example, psychoanalysis (and God knows how
much it is spread throughout our culture) take off from a problem which is absolutely
contained within the relationships that one could have with madness.’71 Freud’s
conception of the unconscious dissipated the illusions of anthropology, but it cannot
lay claim to atemporality since it was itself the historical product and the outer limit
of such an anthropology. The Freudian discovery of the truth of desire does not
escape history inasmuch as this discovery emerged within a specific cultural context
and was the result of a specific truth regime and a particular form of rationality, which
need to be theorized.
Hence Foucault’s insistence that it is the history of truth and forms of
rationality which constitute the west’s Oedipus complex, not the unconscious and
desire. Oedipus was not blind or ignorant — he possessed too much power and too
much knowledge.72 It is the deep complicity of his power and his truth, not their
disconnection, which remains hidden and implicit in our civilization. This complicity
is unconscious, but not in the sense of being a hidden mystery, a deeper truth that
needs to be uncovered. It is an ‘enigmatic thing, at once visible and invisible, present
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and hidden, ubiquitous,’ comprising a coupling which escapes the consciousness of
the subject not because it is too difficult to excavate, but because it is too obvious to
be noticed; it is too much on the surface of discourses and on the visible side of
practices and institutions.73 The way power imposes constraints of truth is governed
by specific rules which are complex and multifaceted, but equally accessible to
historical analysis. These rules are traversed by language, formal modalities of
thought and historical types of logic.74 They interact beneath subjectivity and are
constitutive of it. They infiltrate the social field, are inscribed in its institutions and
operate unbeknown to the subject. They are historically determined as effects or
practices of governmentality and they are beyond the subject’s control, but still they
are more transparent than the Freudian unconscious:
The problem is to find out whether the Freudian unconscious is not itself the locus in
which this system of formal relationships operates. These relationships are operative
in language, in formal thought, and even in certain social structures. Perhaps the
Freudian unconscious as well is, shall we say, ‘touched’ by this structural
unconscious. This is the point at which many psychoanalytic investigations have
arrived.75
Foucault replaces the logic of the unconscious with the notion of logic as unconscious
— logic as the implicit framework of power, as its set of coordinates.76 The logic of
power is fundamentally a governmental logic, according to which the conduct of
subjects is to be regulated. It is not the ‘logic accorded today to the signifier and its
chains’,77 but a logic which deduces, excludes or incorporates real individuals, on the
basis of specific divisions of truth and falsity. As Foucault notes, critiquing
psychoanalysis, madness is not an abstract universal which is excluded from discourse
and rejected from reality as a structure incompatible with the symbolic field or the
signifying chain. On the contrary, the constraint ‘that allows us to separate true
discourse from false discourse’78 has the effect of designating as mad concrete
experiences which are assumed to harbour universal structures. Power deduces
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madness within an established set of distinctions between truth and falsity, and on the
basis of this deduction it produces a specific type of medical knowledge which can be
called psychiatric, and it transforms the institutional field so as to isolate particular
individuals who can be governed, treated, corrected and studied. The repression,
exclusion and recognition of actual subjects as mad is a notion totally foreign to
psychoanalysis:
It seemed to me interesting to try to understand our society and civilization in terms of
its systems of exclusion, of rejection, of refusal, in terms of what it does not want, its
limits, the way it is obliged to suppress a number of things, people, processes, what it
must let fall into oblivion, its repression-suppression system. I know very well that
many thinkers — though if only since Freud — have already tackled the problem. But
I think there are exclusions other than the suppression of sexuality that have not been
analyzed. There is, up to a certain point, the exclusion of the insane.79
Positing exclusion and repression at the level of real patients rather than at the level of
structures indicates a different perspective on the notion of resistance as Foucault and
psychoanalysis conceive it. Psychoanalytic critique celebrates the subversive effect of
the truth of madness on the status of medical authority and the psychiatric institution.
It falls, however, into an inevitable contradiction: as unconditional universal, and as a
deadlock to symbolization, madness by definition can only be witnessed in its
moments of crisis. It cannot be institutionalized or channeled into the power of the
analyst, it cannot be appropriated by the power of psychoanalysis, even if that power
is extra-institutional or extra-psychiatric. By allowing, therefore, the — revolutionary
— truth of madness to be produced, psychoanalysis contradicts itself insofar as this
production is controlled, managed and institutionalized anew.80 Foucault, on the other
hand, considers power reversible precisely because it consists of strategic
relationships.81 Doctors and patients can manipulate power, mutate it and transform it
through strategies which block, reverse or subvert its logic. This is why Foucault sees
greater potential for subversion and revolution in the employment of specific
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strategies and tactics, modifying the rules of power relations, than in the decoding of
the symbolic network that psychoanalysis advances.82 Objectives that are never met,
ends never reached, effects which distort or cancel the goals, values and the initial
programming of a rationality, constitute strategic manipulations which change the
very nature of governmentality. With strategies, zones of reversal are demarcated,
sites of confrontation are created and lines of escape are formed.83 Strategies create
distances between different forces, they draw distinctions between adversaries and
impose limits and points of subversion within stable and fixed mechanisms of power.
There is no ‘Big Other’ for Foucault, but multiple spaces of reciprocity and linking in
which relations of government can become elements of combat, and interactions
between partners can turn into struggles between opponents. ‘We are never trapped by
power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a
precise strategy.’84
The case of hysteria is in this respect an example of marked divergence
between Foucault and psychoanalysis. As a psychoanalytic interpretation would have
it, hysteria was a symptom of the excessive medical desire for otherness and the
surplus power of psychiatry; it was produced by the symbolic order of the medical
regime of nineteenth century psychiatry, from within the diagnostic system of
neurology and the excesses of the psychiatric power. The hysterics appeared as an
effect of psychiatric desire, power and truth, outgrowing and exploding them. They
were the embodiment of a transcendental core already contained in the immanence of
the asylum’s all-encompassing reality. Through the misrecognition of their desire, the
hysterics postponed and impeded the total satisfaction of medical fantasy and desire
for otherness, while at the same time making it manifest. They are the ‘quilting point’
of psychiatric power, a crack in the reality of the asylum, pointing to the presence of
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alterity beyond the medical system of representation, unmasking the futility and
illusion of a timeless medical desire which strives to conquer madness, ontologize it
and give it the status of illness. Although it appears plausible, this claim considers
such desire ahistorical and transcendent. It also risks relegating the Real, madness, to
a mere symptom of reason and power, neutralizing the phenomenon of hysteria as an
event.85 Foucault, on the other hand, insists on the specificity of the confrontation
between the doctors and the hysterics: hysteria was not an outgrowth, an excess of
psychiatric power, a stumbling block inherent to it, which analysis can reveal
retrospectively as the remainder of the epistemological failure of neurology. Hysteria
was the point when madness underwent a second phase of exclusion, this time from
the asylum itself, not by passively substracting itself from its reality but by saturating
it. When psychiatric power submitted the hysterics to medical methods of
examination, confessional questioning and hypnosis, they responded with perfect
docility and suggestibility to a regime of truth which gave them the privilege of
controlling and manipulating diagnosis, and of acquiring the status of genuine illness.
The hysterics confirmed medical truth the better to conceal their madness behind it,
thereby seducing power into granting them medical extra-territoriality by discharging
them from the asylum space.86 Behind hysteria, madness vanished into unknown
ontological depths despite the will and desire of the doctors, and it was the hysterics
who constituted the illusion, the simulacrum, the event, the point of the unforeseeable
and unwanted refusal of madness to be captured inside the asylum.87 It was due to the
actual struggle between the surplus power of the doctors and the truth of the hysterics,
and not as a result of a theory, that the medicalization of madness was suspended:
At any rate, credit should not be given to Freud for the first depsychiatrization. We
owe the first depsychiatrization, the first moment that made psychiatric power totter
on the question of truth, to this band of simulators. They are the ones who, with their
falsehoods, trapped a psychiatric power which, in order to be the agent of reality,
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claimed to be the possessor of truth and, within psychiatric practice and cure, refused
to pose the question of the truth that madness might contain.88
The strategy of the hysterics — and this is a crucial contrast between Foucault and
psychoanalysis — did not result in the subversion of medical rationality or in the
refutation of its symbolic order, but in an act of refusal of power and of the reality that
it purports to hold. Medical rationality and truth were not overturned but, on the
contrary, they were reinforced, but at the cost of excluding the hysterics from the
asylum space. The hysterics were not a mere epistemological blockage, but through
their insubordination they became power’s underside, its outer limit.89 They were
transformed from subjects to be governed into adversaries that power was obliged to
confront. They became dissidents, the frontier for the relationships of power, the ‘line
at which, instead of manipulating and inducing actions in a calculated manner, one
must be content with reacting to them after the event.’90 Medical rationality continued
to rely on neurology and the power of the asylum, until it was forced to construct a
whole set of new solutions to the question of madness, now that it had been
reproblematized by this small group of patients.
Power is not opposed to the unconscious but to the secret.91 It is the logic, the
integral rationality of power which is unconscious because it is too transparent to be
seen and the reality that it constructs too consistent to be questioned and too real to be
challenged. The secret that is opposed to power, on the other hand, is not the limits of
our knowledge nor the illusions of our desire, but the enigmatic truth of those who do
not desire to belong to a particular reality, a specific form of government or to a given
cultural context:
In what way can the effects of coercion characteristic of (these) positivities not be
dissipated by a return to the legitimate destination of knowledge and by a reflection
on the transcendental or semi-transcendental that fixes knowledge, but how can they
instead be reversed or released from within a concrete strategic field that induced
them, starting with this decision not to be governed? 92
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Critique is a practice of dissent, a will not to be governed which limits
governmentality rather than freeing the subject from any government whatever.
Government is inescapable, and therefore the will not to be governed at all, the total
rejection of government in general, is meaningless. Foucault does not identify with
critique anarchism, the absolute and wholehearted resistance to any
governmentalization, with critique, and goes on to comment that the anarchism which
treats the subject of counter-conduct as an innocent victim, a scapegoat or a rebel is in
fact an indication of the failure to integrate and reflect on the logic of strategies.93 The
critical value of dissent does not consist in eluding governmentality — ‘there is no
part of the self that is by definition ungovernable,’ as Judith Butler points out — but
in creating a rogue subject, a critical attitude, and the possibility of a new community
of subjects, outside the current relations of government.94All the movements of
dissent which Foucault studied and closely observed — from the hysterics of the
nineteenth century asylum to the dissidents of the former Soviet Union, from the
resistance of the Poles to the communist regime in the 80s, to the Iranian revolution
against the Shah — do not interest him because of their underlying ideology, their
transcendental origin or their professed anarchism, but because they demonstrate limit
experiences and an individual or collective will to escape and undermine the scientific
and political rationality of their society, through specific and well calculated
strategies.95 The strategic weapon par excellence of dissent is truth itself; truth is not a
transcendental form or a fiction; it is ‘a thing of this world’,96 a practice which limits
power relations and questions forms of rationality. It is the site of confrontation
between a power which seeks legitimacy and the forces which wish to disengage
themselves from it.
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Conclusion
Prophecy and science are the two modalities of truth telling governing
psychoanalysis. Whenever prophecy has dominated, psychoanalysis has functioned as
an anti-psychiatric discourse, an anti-repressive discourse promising to liberate the
drives and desires that have been silenced by the constraining effects of the
psychiatric classificatory and therapeutic system. Whenever the scientific aspect has
prevailed, psychoanalysis has provided a medical and psychotherapeutic setting where
the hysteric’s symptoms are verbalized, the ‘legalistic scruples of the obsessional
neurotic’ are alleviated and the denial of the paranoiacs is enacted.97 In the history of
psychoanalysis, both truth modalities have functioned in a balanced and symmetrical
way, constantly referring to medical knowledge and affirming medical truth. It is the
proximity of the psychoanalytical discourse to medicine that Foucault sets out to
critique. He does not, therefore, criticize psychoanalysis for its low level of
scientificity, but, on the contrary, for its efforts to be medical and scientific. He is not
sceptical of its epistemological status, its rules of construction or the validity of its
concepts, but rather of the way it denounces its own critical powers as counter-
science, in its bid to become a valid scientific discourse with power effects:
You know how many people have been asking themselves whether or not Marxism is
a science for many years now, probably for more than a century. One might say that
the same question has been asked, and is still being asked, of psychoanalysis or,
worse still, of the semiology of literary texts. Genealogies’ or genealogists’ answer to
the question ‘Is it a science or not?’ is: ‘Turning Marxism, or psychoanalysis, or
whatever else it is, into a science is precisely what we are criticizing you for.98
The importance of psychoanalysis, for Foucault, lies in its effective critique of today’s
scientism. It has dismantled the absolute power of science, its universal legitimacy,
the unanimity that it provides, and the functional coherence and formal
systematization that it aims to produce. Psychoanalysis has escaped the ‘disciplinary
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policing of knowledges,’ which scientific truth has increasingly imposed since the late
eighteenth century.99 However, psychoanalytic discourse has also asserted theoretical
unity, a totalizing approach and hierarchical organization. It too has drawn its
pretensions to validity and universality from scientificity,100 laying claim to power
effects and becoming centralizing and hegemonic. Even in its critical dimension, it is
embodied in the university, has a diffuse pedagogical role, has been widely
institutionalized and it comprises a vast theoretico-commercial network in many
countries.101 For Foucault, these paradoxes undermine the very coherence and
revolutionary capacity to which psychoanalysis aspires, causing it to be ‘suspended,
or at least (be) cut up, ripped up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced,
caricatured, dramatized, theatricalized, and so on.’102
Psychoanalysis, however, has not lost its critical value. It can still be used on
a local level as a weapon of truth against the dominant medical discourse. It can serve
as a local form of knowledge, as an alternative type of truth, which, along with other
marginalized, disqualified forms of knowledge, the nonconceptual forms of
knowledge below the level of scientific erudition (the personal experience of the
doctor, the patient, the nurse, the delinquent), can exert considerable effects on the
political status of psychiatry, its internal reforms, and on the fate of madness as limit
experience in the west.103 In Foucault’s critique psychoanalytic truth does not yield a
new, universal and neutral discourse. Rather, it is deployed from a position of combat
inside a nexus of disparate truths engaged in agonistics and war. This agonistics of
truth is a crucial element of enlightenment critique.104 Foucault stresses the fact that
what is called the Enlightenment cannot be exhausted in the alleged triumph of
science which, as a state mechanism in the late eighteenth century, was in charge of
the selection, normalization, hierarchicalization and centralization of knowledge. It
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was during the same period that intellectual debates which occurred at the margins of
scientific disciplinarity provoked dispersal, heterogeneity and struggle among various
forms of knowledge. Psychoanalysis has helped to renew these debates which
challenge the monopoly of science and dismantle the view that knowledge is a state of
order, peace and rationality.105 It is one of those local and regional forms of
knowledge which have resisted the principle of universality and consensus which
scientific truth has increasingly imposed. This is why, in Foucault’s system,
psychoanalysis is inserted in the wider domain of intellectual struggles which, since
the late eighteenth century, have undermined the hegemony of the ‘enlightened’
scientific subject who exerts the power to exclude and disqualify forms of knowledge
which do not meet the constraint of institutionalized truth:
The genealogy of knowledge must first — before it does anything else — outwit the
problematic of the Enlightenment. It has to outwit what was at the time described (and
was still described in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) as the progress of
enlightenment, the struggle of knowledge against ignorance, of reason against
chimeras, of experience against prejudices, of reason against error, and so on […]
when we look at the eighteenth century — we have to see, not this relationship
between day and night, knowledge and ignorance, but something very different: an
immense and multiple battle, but not one between knowledge and ignorance, but an
immense and multiple battle between knowledges in the plural — knowledges that are
in conflict because of their very morphology, because they are in the possession of
enemies, and because they have intrinsic power-effects.106
The ‘Enlightenment’ is not the triumph of science over ideology, truth over error or
light over darkness. On the contrary, enlightenment critique is anti-scientific and anti-
consensual, not in the sense that it refutes scientific knowledge and opposes reason,
but insofar as it frees truth and reason from the totalizing effects of science and
intellectual universality. This is why critical psychiatry promotes a pluralism of truths
without, however, supporting their abstract multiplicity, their ideal democratic
equality or their indefinite free interplay. It sets them in opposition, constant challenge
and confrontation.107 It intensifies a war between regimes of truth, where no type of
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truth, be it prophetic, scientific or juridical, can ever prevail over others. No subject
can ever claim to articulate a universal and absolute truth, to speak in the name of a
‘we’ or to occupy the position of a jurist or a philosopher. The subject engaging in
truthful discourse (the psychiatrist, the patient, the analyst, the nurse or the
magistrate) is not a totalizing and neutral subject, but a subject involved in an
antagonistic process, whereby divisions, confrontations and struggles disturb the
ordered harmony of unitary, formal and scientific theoretical discourses.108 The
subject speaking the truth is engaged in a battle, has adversaries, and through her
discourse, claims to clarify facts, dispel illusion and denounce error. Therefore, her
truth cannot settle affairs, bring order or restore peace, but it can shift balances and
accentuate dissymmetries. It is a truth which brings about conflict and dissent, but,
more crucially, it is a truth which introduces otherness both by challenging our
seemingly self-evident reality and by problematizing foreign forms of experience:
‘there is no establishment of truth without an essential position of otherness; the truth
is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other
life (l’autre monde et de la vie autre).’109
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Conclusion
This thesis has analysed Foucault’s critical engagement with concrete
psychiatric issues with the aim of demonstrating the specific strategies through which
enlightenment critique can unsettle the foundations of psychiatric power and
transform the regimes of truth which sustain it. Our analysis has not offered a
programme, concrete solutions, prescriptions or proposals for action. There is no
revolutionary project, no ideological vision or Enlightenment manifesto in Foucault’s
critique. Nowhere does Foucault take the stand of the erudite scholar encouraging
doctors to rebel against their institution, urging magistrates to defy the unjust laws
which they are obliged to enforce, or inciting patients to provoke upheavals in order
to overturn psychiatric authority. There is no proposed theory awaiting to be
transformed into practice, no truth to be followed and no justice to be fulfilled. This
lack of proposals for reform or ideological interventions appears frustrating and
disillusioning to those who expect from the intellectual suggested courses of action
and political agendas to transform the established order.
We have shown, however, that if Foucault refuses to propose solutions and
to offer prescriptions, it is because he mistrusts universal values and absolute truths as
Enlightenment ideals, and as rational principles of action or global ethical codes. For
Foucault, critique is not measured by its nomothetic activity and its ability to
intervene in politics in the form of advice or proposals for an ideal state of affairs: ‘the
role of the intellectual today is not that of establishing laws or proposing solutions or
prophesying, since by doing that one can only contribute to the functioning of a
determinate situation of power that to my mind must be criticized.’1 Foucault
considers the ‘acting out’ of institutional violence, the defensive ‘trade union’ position
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of psychiatric reformers, and the anti-institutional movements led by the anti-
psychiatrists as well intentioned and politically significant phenomena which,
however, do not affect the prevailing form of rationality governing the institution. All
those prophets and legislators, those ‘universal’, ‘exemplary’ and ‘just-and-true-for-
all’ humanist activists who speak for and above the patients, do not escape the power
of the ‘total’ institution which they criticize.2 These ‘Enlightened’ voices consider
themselves and the patients as abstract subjects in law, remaining blind to the regimes
of truth which have produced the division madness/sanity, without which the
discourse of human rights and liberation would make no sense. While, therefore, these
intellectuals lay claim to universal wisdom, their thought and action remain trapped
inside the social and institutional categories of truth which they unwittingly help to
perpetuate.
Foucault, on the other hand, envisages the ‘specific intellectual’ who
engages in local, real, material and everyday conflicts, who possesses specific
knowledge but who is also an agent of universality insofar as he is in a position to
relate his competence and expertise to truth in the field of politics.3 Hence the value of
enlightenment critique for the psychiatrist, the magistrate and the patient, as subjects
whose position in specific sectors gives them immediate and concrete awareness of
struggles. After Foucault’s critique, the transformation of the psychiatric institution is
no longer the duty only of the prophet or the sage. It is not the task of the ideologues
or the legislators expressing universal theories or worldviews about an ideal state of
things. It is up to the psychiatrist, the magistrates and the patients themselves to
accept the challenge and display the courage to reason freely, publicly and universally
in order to identify the divisions, confrontations and conflicts of their everyday
practice as global problems, not only of the institution in which they work, but also of
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the society in which they live. These specific intellectuals are in the privileged
position of participating in struggles which are local enough to produce specific forms
of knowledge and general enough to affect the most universal problems of society.
The division between reason and madness is not only a constant theme embedded in
everyday practices, and therefore a problem raised locally and specifically in the
narrow field of mental health, but it is also a general problem of current politics and
ethics. The problem of how a society defines its relation to madness, and therefore
determines itself as rational, not only specifies the nature of psychiatric power over
the patients, but also helps to produce the cultural and social context in which power
can be exercised over others in extra-institutional spaces. It is therefore in this
division between reason and madness where the local intersects with the general and
the universal crosses paths with the exceptional, enabling those engaged in their
limited institutional framework — sociologists, lawyers, psychiatrists and
psychologists — to use their local knowledge and expertise to bring about general
political effects and transformations:
Therefore, I think that the role of the intellectual is perhaps not so much, or maybe not
only, to stand for the universal values of humanity. Rather, his or her responsibility is
to work on specific objective fields, the very fields in which knowledge and sciences
are involved, and to analyze and critique the role of knowledge and technique in these
areas in our present-day society. In my opinion, today the intellectual must be inside
the pit, the very pit in which the sciences are engaged, where they produce political
results. Thus, working with intellectuals — mostly doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, and
psychologists — has paramount importance to me.4
Thus, critique addresses the expert working in the field of mental health who occupies
a position of special importance. His experience in dealing with patients, his
involvement in tribunals and forensic issues, his engagement with social work and
pedagogy; all give his expertise a critical role and social significance. As an ‘alienist’,
his personal ideas about insanity, his theories and views about what constitutes true
and false illness, his everyday struggles with patients, administrative authorities and
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legal demands imposed on him, and with the scientific rules that govern his practice,
give him the power to affect the reality of his endeavours. As a scientific specialist in
issues of normality, reality and public hygiene, his decisions, theories and ideas can
have far reaching consequences on the biopolitical forms of rationality that permeate
today’s governmental practices.
Moreover, critique addresses the magistrate, the lawyer and the forensic
expert as specific intellectuals involved in local, everyday conflicts which produce
new scientific, philosophical and political modes of reflection. Critique does not
classify magistrates and doctors as instruments of an oppressive political ideology. On
the contrary, it shows how their epistemological status can question current security
orientated rationality. In today’s forensic settings, both magistrates and doctors are
obliged to work inside an epistemological and political field foreign to their
endeavour, exerting a new type of punitive power and hygienic policing. It is not,
however, the inherently low epistemological threshold of psychiatry or the law that is
responsible for this situation. It is the over-medicalization of the criminal and the
over-criminilization of the insane which have deprived jurists and psychiatrists of
their specific roles. Therefore, the solution is not to inject more psychiatry and
medicine in order to make the penal system more acceptable, nor to propose more
humane forms of penal law in order to define what is necessary to punish without
recourse to an oppressive medicine. While these medical and ideological interventions
do contribute to reform, they leave the rationality of biopolitics unquestioned. It is the
most enigmatic, monstrous cases of legal psychiatry which disrupt the medico-legal
and the definition of normality. That disruption urges that the limits of the human and
the scientificity of applied psychiatric knowledge be debated on a new ethico-juridical
and political footing beyond biopolitical categories. This is why for Foucault the
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eighteenth century dilemma ‘prison or hospital’, the alienist division between
madness and delinquency, constitute today one of those empty spaces for the forces of
security, a void where biopower cannot be exercised, a critical space where,
‘magistrates and psychiatrists […] have become able to participate — both within
their own fields and through mutual exchange and support — in a global process of
politicization of intellectuals.’5 Occupying the bifurcation between the psychiatric and
the juridical, expert psychiatric opinion and legal authority can act critically at the
limits of medical science and penal law, forcing political structures to modify their
technologies of power and to redefine their internal regime of truth.
Critique also addresses the patients themselves. It does not, however, defend
their rights and does not fight for their ‘liberation.’ Critical history is the archaeology
of the silence of madness and as such it does not offer grand narratives for or on
behalf of the mad, but records the emergence of this silence at the limits of the truth
claims articulated by psychiatric discourse. It does not instruct the patients nor
mobilise them to take collective political action. It rather records their silence, their
bodily revolts and their struggles against the divisions of normality and abnormality,
reason and madness, innocence and guilt, which are imposed on them. The patients
‘do not speak the truth in its ultimate depth.’6 They do not reveal the inner workings
of their psyche. They only pose problems which force administrative authorities to
reconsider the institutional dimension of insanity, oblige doctors to review the whole
spectrum of diseases, and motivate psychologists, social workers and moralists to
reflect on the prevalent ethic of socialization, rationalization and public hygiene. In
current western rationality, the mad do not need a defensive discourse which will give
them the voice that they lack; on the contrary, it is their confused voice which disrupts
those discourses that make them speak. Their struggle can take the form of open battle
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and revolt, suicide, or the form of intellectual oeuvre, as in Nietzsche, Nerval, Artaud
and Hölderlin, who, from deep within their madness, managed to achieve enough
clarity so as to produce works of ‘alienism’, poetic and spiritual revelations of their
experience which have altered our perception of madness.7
Thus, the notion of the specific intellectual, whether it refers to the
psychiatrist, the magistrate or the patient, contains a kernel of universality, insofar as
it does not privilege nor exclude any subject from the exercise of critique on the basis
of his qualifications, legitimacy or status. What this universality does exclude is the
supposedly neutral, objective and totalizing subject who speaks in the name of
timeless values and absolute truths. As Kant showed, such an intellectual is still a ‘cog
in the machine’, a ‘partial’ thinker whose private use of reason is tied to value
judgments and ready-made truths and whose resistance is successfully absorbed by
the all-encompassing logic of the system he opposes. By contrast, the universal
intellectual as Kant envisaged him, while in a state of conformity or even obedience
to the rules of his institution, does not allow this obedience to be confused with non-
reasoning, and clearly distinguishes his professional duties and relationships of
obligation or authority, as a functionary within the institution, from his
unconditionally free, public and autonomous use of reason as a rational being
addressing other members of a reasonable community.8 Crucially, however, this free,
unimpeded use of reason does not bring about a Habermasian Enlightened and
transparent community of rational subjects ensuring order and harmony; on the
contrary, it is precisely the critical function of reason to indicate the forms of
domination to which this excessive demand for transparency gives rise. Thus, for
example, the psychiatrist does not constitute a universal subject by asserting his
rationality, or promoting his power so that other rational subjects may follow his
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example; on the contrary, he criticizes the excess of his rationality which, instead of
guaranteeing freedom for doctors and patients, causes psychiatric power to lose its
foundation, and submits both psychiatrists and the mentally ill to a condition of self-
incurred tutelage. The psychiatrist locates the abuse of his power not in the oppression
or ideological distortion of medical truth or in the exclusion of the mad, but in the
forced rational integration and inclusion of madness, and in the overabundance of
psychiatric knowledge which today weakens the epistemological status of the
psychiatrist, questions his authority, distorts his therapeutic services, increases his
accountability and reinforces his subjection to extra-psychiatric forces.9
The psychiatric subject becomes universal when, as an autonomous and
free thinker, he demonstrates to his peers but also to other rational subjects beyond his
institution that it is the illegitimate use of their reason which is responsible for their
state of immaturity and heteronomy. He thus freely and publicly draws attention to
similar phenomena of subjection wherever rationality illegitimately infiltrates
domains beyond possible experience — illness, death, crime, sexuality. By appealing
to these domains through journalism, the university, legal and administrative
interventions, literature and art, he establishes connections with other scientific
subjects (criminologists, doctors, social workers), in order to encourage scepticism
toward scientific knowledge which, instead of enjoying autonomy, becomes
dependent on a more global form of rationality. This is why this form of scepticism
does not divide intellectuals, because it does not refute or relativize verified truths,
but, on the contrary, opens up a common field of action, a common ground for
intellectuals to develop global strategies for the modification of the institutional
techniques and procedures, the economic mechanisms and the political instances
through which these verified truths legitimize the current overproduction of
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knowledge. It is through this scepticism that the specificity of these intellectuals can
become linked, beyond their class position and free from possible manipulation by
political parties or ideologies, to the general functioning of an apparatus of truth in
our society, enabling their local, specific struggle to ‘have effects and implications
that are not simply professional or sectorial.’10 At the limits of the current form of
rationality, intellectuals can participate collectively in the construction of this new
politics of truth, creating the possibility of a new community of thinkers, of a new
‘we’ which, through constant agonistics, debates and disputes, can free the power of
truth, psychiatric or otherwise, from ‘the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and
cultural, within which it operates at the present time.’11
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